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This survey' is a continuation of previous articles2 on the topic of
Florida criminal law and procedure.
1. This survey covers cases reported in 222 So.2d through 247 So.2d and laws enacted by
the 1970 and 1971 Regular and Special Sessions of the Florida Legislature.
2. Wills, Criminal Law Survey, 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521 (1960); Wills, Criminal Law,
1959-1961 Survey of Florida Law, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 225 (1961); Wills, Criminal Law,
1961-1963 Survey of Florida Law, 18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 381 (1963); Wills, Criminal Law
and Procedure, 1963-1965 Survey of Florida Law, 20 U. MmAmi L. REV. 246 (1965); Wills,
Criminal Law and Procedure, 1965-1967 Survey of Florida Law, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 240
(1967); Wills and Wsotsky, Criminal Law and Procedure, 1967-1969 Survey of Florida Law,
24 U. MIAMI L. REV. 215 (1970).
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I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE 1.8503
There continues to be litigation concerning the scope of rule 1.850,
i.e., what alleged errors may properly be raised by motions under the
rule.
A. Matters Subject to Direct Appeal
Because rule 1.850 was designed for collateral attack, it may not
ordinarily be used as a substitute for appeal nor to review matters which
could have been raised on direct appeal. Thus, rule 1.850 was used to
review the following non-appealable matters: where one of the prose-
cuting attorneys was formerly employed by the prisoner's defense coun-
sel,4 and where there was a failure to give the required statutory notice of
charges to the parents of a minor child.5 On the other hand, the following
matters could have been raised by appeal and thus were not subject to
review by rule 1.850: the alleged failure of a judge to include a charge
on lesser included offenses,' contentions that the trial court erred in deny-
ing a motion for severance 7 or in denying a motion for jail time credit,8
and where defendant's attorney was not notified and was not present at
a pre-trial photographic identification. 9
Complementing the rule that 1.850 may not be used as a substitute
for appeal, the court in State v. Biesendorfer1° held that the correctness
vel non of matters actually decided on direct appeal may not be the sub-
ject of further review under rule 1.850.
3. Subsequent to the period covered by this survey, the Supreme Court of Florida
amended the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure by substituting for the existing number
system, which had a prefix of "1" followed by a decimal and additional numbers, a number-
ing system which has a prefix of "3" followed by a decimal and the numbers following the
decimal remaining as they were. For example, rule 1.850 has been changed to rule 3.850. In
re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 253 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1971). For the purposes of
this survey, however, the numbering system in effect during the biennium under review will
be used.
4. Jackson v. State, 234 So.2d 708 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), citing Young v. State, 177
So.2d 345 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
5. Stewart v. Wainwright, 225 So.2d 410 (Fla. 1969). FLA. STAT. § 932.38 (1969) re-
quires that the parents of any unmarried minor be notified when the minor is charged with
an offense.
6. Moses v. State, 242 So.2d 145 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970); Tafero v. State, 242 So.2d 470
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
7. Nelson v. State, 227 So.2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969) (distinguishing Reddick v.
State, 190 So.2d 340 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966) which allowed the denial of a motion for severance
to be raised under rule 1.850 because of the "exceptional" and "extraordinary situation"
presented).
8. Lowman v. State, 242 So.2d 750, 751 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971), wherein the court
ex mero motu dismissed an appeal from an order denying jail time credit on the grounds
that review of such an order was "impermissible under either F.S. 924.06 ... or Cr. Pr.
1.850 . .. ."
9. Powell v. State, 244 So.2d 746 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
10. 244 So.2d 147 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 247 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1971) (de-
fendant appealed and appellate court affirmed verdict but remanded for resentencing; held,
upon remand that defendant may not attack the verdict via rule 1.850).
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The conflict" over whether rule 1.850 is a proper remedy for relief
from the deprivation or frustration of direct appeal was addressed in
State v. Wooden,12 wherein the Supreme Court of Florida held that the
proper way to raise the issue of deprivation of direct appeal is by habeas
corpus, not by rule 1.850. Rule 1.850 is limited to review of errors "going
to the validity of the judgment and sentence"' 3 and is not available to
review matters pertaining to appellate procedure since the trial judge
has no power to order the correction of any errors at the appellate level. 4
The scope of the rule was also limited in Hamilton v. State,"
wherein it was held that postconviction relief based on newly discovered
evidence was obtainable only through a petition for a writ of coram
nobis and not through rule 1.850.
B. In-Custody Requirement
During the period surveyed liberal interpretation of the in-custody
requirement of rule 1.850 has resulted in significant broadening of the
scope of the rule. Relying on Peyton v. Rowe,' 6 the Supreme Court of
Florida in Lawson v. State17 overruled its decision in Fretwell v. Wain-
wright'" and held that a prisoner serving consecutive sentences is "in
custody" under any one of them for the purposes of rule 1.850. In State
v. Reynolds 9 the supreme court, overruling prior decisions of the district
courts of appeal,2 ° went on to add that a prisoner in the custody of a
state other than Florida who seeks postconviction relief from a Florida
judgment is "in custody" within the meaning of rule 1.850.21 Thus, a
prisoner incarcerated in Georgia may seek postconviction relief from a
11. Compare Flores v. State, 240 So.2d 816 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970) (which held that an
allegation that a public defender promises to appeal but did not appeal would support a
1.850 hearing) with Powe v. State, 216 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1968) (holding that the matter of
a frustrated appeal resulting from the failure of the trial court to appoint counsel for an
indigent should not be heard under rule 1.850 but by habeas corpus).
12. 246 So.2d 755 (Fla. 1971), overruling Wooden v. State, 236 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1970).
13. Id. at 757. The court held that "a finding of frustration of direct appeal does not
bring into question the validity of the judgment and sentence." Id.
14. Id. The fact that the purpose of rule 1.850 is to facilitate factual determinations
does not necessarily render it a more appropriate remedy than habeas corpus since on peti-
tion for habeas corpus an appellate court may appoint a commissioner to make factual
findings if that measure is found to be necessary. Id. at 756.
15. 237 So.2d 255 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
16. 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
17. 231 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1970), aff'g Lawson v. State, 225 So.2d 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
18. 185 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1966).
19. 238 So.2d 598 (Fla. 1970), aff'g Judge Mann's well-reasoned opinion in Reynolds v.
State, 224 So.2d 769 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
20. Holstein v. State, 205 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967); Hill v. State, 184 So.2d 457
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
21. Whether such a prisoner will be brought before the Florida court to participate in
the postconviction relief hearing, if one is deemed proper, is a matter of judicial discretion,
tempered by the minimal requirements of due process. State v. Reynolds, 238 So.2d 598,
600 (Fla. 1970). See section I, C, infra.
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Florida judgment under rule 1.850 even though he is not in custody under
the sentence being attacked.22
Formerly, rule 1.850 review of the first of consecutive sentences was
denied if the sentence had already been served.3 However, the rule that
is now emerging is that
a prisoner is "in custody" for the purpose of applying for post-
conviction relief from a judgment, the sentence for which has
been satisfied, if the motion shows some relationship between
the current confinement and the judgment to which the motion
for relief is addressed such as would result in the prisoner's
receiving credit in some degree on the current confinement. 4
Thus, under the Rose decision, a prisoner may, by rule 1.850, at-
tack a sentence already served if relief from that judgment has "some
relationship" to current confinement.
C. Hearings on Motions Under Rule 1.850
Rule 1.850 provides that the court "shall" grant a hearing on a
motion "unless the motion and the files conclusively show that the
prisoner is entitled to no relief." This language has been judicially in-
terpreted to mean that if the motion is defective in form or substance
and insufficient to state a prima facie case entitling the prisoner to relief,
the court may deny a hearing; if the motion is sufficient but the files and
records conclusively refute the allegations, the court may deny a hearing;
if the motion reflects substance and "there is nothing conclusively in the
record to the contrary" a hearing should be granted.25
Rule 1.850 provides that the court may "determine such motion
without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing." Thus,
it is not error for a judge to deny a motion under rule 1.850 when a
prisoner was not present but was represented by a public defender if
there are no substantial issues of fact as to events in which the defendant
participated or no other reasons which require the presence of the de-
fendant. 6
22. Lowe v. State, 226 So.2d 430 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 238 So.2d 601
(Fla. 1970) (defendant escaped from custody in Florida and incarcerated in Georgia on
different charge).
23. Barnett v. State, 229 So.2d 890 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970). However, Judge Mann, in his
dissenting opinion, urged that:
To the extent that prior decisions of Florida courts purport to deny meaningful
relief on grounds of excessively technical definitions of mootness inconsistent with
present constiutional standards they ought to be overruled.
Id.
24. Rose v. State, 235 So.2d 353 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), citing Cappetta v. Wainwright,
406 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1969); State v. Reynolds, 238 So.2d 598 (Fla. 1970); Lawson v.
State, 231 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1970).
25. State v. Reynolds, 238 So.2d 598, 600 (Fla. 1970). See also Lawson v. State, 231
So.2d 205, 208 (Fla. 1970).
26. Van Eaton v. State, 226 So,2d 265 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), citing King v. State, 157
So.2d 440 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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Similarly, a prisoner "in custody" in another state who files for post-
conviction relief from a Florida judgment pursuant to rule 1.850 need
not be brought to Florida for the hearing if there are no questions of fact
within the personal knowledge of the prisoner to be resolved, the prisoner
is represented by counsel, and his absence would not otherwise prejudice
the petitioner.27
Although the rule does not mention the quantum of proof necessary
for realization of relief, it has been held that where a 1.850 petition
raises the issue of innocence on the basis of a confession to the crime by
a third party, the movant-who pleaded guilty and did not resist the
state's case against him-must establish on collateral attack "at least
some clear showing by competent substantial evidence" that there was




Rule 1.850 provides that a court "shall not be required to entertain
a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same
prisoner." However, if a change in the applicable law has occured, the
movant is not precluded from raising allegations which had been pre-
viously rejected in prior motions. 9 Further, if the petitioner alleges
grounds for relief not previously relied upon ("new grounds") the court
may entertain the motion.8
E. Appeal From Rule 1.850 Hearings
An appeal from an adverse order under Rule 1.850 will be dis-
missed sua sponte as moot if, while the appeal is pending, the petitioner
completes the sentence and is discharged from custody.8 '
The right to appeal from an adverse order entered in a 1.850 hear-
ing applies to the state as well as to the defendant. If a defendant's
conviction is vacated in a rule 1.850 hearing and a new trial is ordered,
and the state appeals from that order, the defendant's application for bail
pending the determination of the state's appeal may be denied.
3 2
Although the rule of Anders v. California8 applies to direct appeals,
27. State v. Reynolds, 238 So.2d 598 (Fla. 1970) (dictum), citing Bryant v. State, 204
So.2d 9 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967); Ballard v. State, 200 So.2d 597 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967); Dickens
v. State, 165 So.2d 811 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
28. State v. Pitts, 241 So.2d 399, 414 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), vacated on other grounds,
247 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1971).
29. Lawson v. State, 231 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1970).
30. See generally State v. Pitts, 227 So.2d 880 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
31. Lee v. State, 230 So.2d 478 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
32. State v. Pitts, 227 So.2d 880 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969). Rule 1.850 provides that the
reviewing judge shall "vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner
or resentence him or grant a new trial . . . ." (Emphasis added).
33. 386 U.S. 738 (1967) which held that if counsel, after conscientious examination of
his client's case, finds the appeal to be "wholly frivolous," he should so advise the court
and request permission to withdraw; provided, however, that such a request must be ac-
companied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might support the appeal.
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where a public defender filed an Anders-type brief stating there was no
error in the denial or relief under 1.850, and the appellate court itself
found no error in the record, the denial of relief was affirmed. 4
II. RIGHT To COUNSEL
In Gideon v. Wainwright" the Supreme Court stated that "any
person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be as-
sured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."
In Florida, the test for indigency is whether the defendant person-
ally has the means, or property which can be converted to the means, to
employ an attorney to represent him; the financial abilities of a de-
fendant's relatives have no bearing on the question of the defendant's
solvency8 6 Unless it appears that the defendant can obtain counsel with
his own resources, the state is obliged to furnish counsel and attempt to
collect later, if it can, for the cost of doing so.
7
A. Adequacy of Representation
The right to counsel implies the right to adequate representation.
The question of adequacy of representation has often been raised in
cases wherein one lawyer represents two indigent codefendants. The
rule that has emerged is that representation by a single attorney of
indigent codefendants is legally permissible (1) if there has been no
request for separate counsel and the record reveals no prejudice has
resulted from the failure to appoint a separate lawyer for each de-
fendant; or (2) if there has been a request for separate counsel, but the
state clearly demonstrates that prejudice would not result from the
denial. 8 Thus, a defendant who did not request separate counsel prior
to or during trial must establish that prejudice resulted from the failure
to appoint separate counsel before relief will be granted on collateral at-
tack. 9 On the other hand, a codefendant's request for separate counsel
made during the trial should be honored by the trial judge unless the
state can clearly demonstrate that there is no prejudice or conflict of
interest in having the codefendants jointly represented by one public
defender.40 If a request for separate counsel has been made and the state
34. Williams v. State, 246 So.2d 791 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
35. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (emphasis added).
36. Sapio v. State, 223 So.2d 759 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969) (defendant earned $75 per week;
the trial court, in noting that the defendant's mother posted a $3,000 bond for him, er-
roneously ruled that the defendant was not eligible for the services of the public defender).
37. Bowen v. State, 236 So.2d 16 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), citing FA. STAT. § 27.56 (1967).
38. Powell v. State, 222 So.2d 464 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), citing State v. Youngblood, 217
So.2d 98 (Fla. 1968). See also Jenkins v. State, 228 So.2d 114 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), citing
Belton v. State, 217 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1968). The rule established by these cases is not re-
troactive in application. Keith v. State, 222 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1969).
39. Parker v. State, 239 So.2d 121 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), citing Dunbar v. State, 220
So.2d 366 (Fla. 1969).
40. Pearson v. State, 223 So.2d 736 (Fla. 1969) (the court held, however, that the
1972]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVI
has failed to demonstrate for the record that prejudice would not result
from joint representation, the case should be remanded to the trial court
for an evidentiary hearing on whether prejudice actually resulted from
the denial of separate counsel.4 '
The question of adequate representation has been raised in other
contexts. In Berriel v. State,42 the denial of a continuance in a case where
the court-appointed attorney had only five days from time of appointment
to prepare for trial was held not to be an abuse of discretion nor a denial
of effective representation of counsel. In Simmons v. Wainwright,43 the
defendant, claiming that his public defender ignored requests for visits
in the jail, requested that a private attorney be appointed. The request
was refused and the defendant represented himself and was convicted.
Defendant's subsequent petition for habeas corpus relief was denied on
the ground that there was "no allegation of incompetence nor conflict
of interest. '44 The court stated that although adequate representation
is essential, representation will not be deemed inadequate unless it
amounts to a "farce." The court stated further that:
The number of visits or consultations between a member of the
public defender's office and a defendant is not a proper criteria
for determining whether proper representation is being af-
forded.45
It has been held that an attorney's failure to raise the defense of former
jeopardy, thereby causing a waiver of that defense, does not result in the
denial of adequate representation.46 The rule that has emerged is that
the test of ineffective assistance of counsel is not any specified aptitude
test in point of professional skill nor whether the attorney committed
common mistakes of judgment, strategy, trial tactics or policy, but
trial judge's refusal to grant separate counsel was not reversible error since the record
established that no prejudice resulted from the joint representation of the codefendants).
41. Beucher v. State, 239 So.2d 122 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
42. 233 So.2d 163 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
43. 237 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
44. Id. at 6. Ironically, although relief was in part denied on the technical ground that
there was "no allegation of incompetence nor conflict of interest" in the defendant's pro se
petition, the court itself evidenced impatience with what it termed "technical" defenses:
[W]e are further of the strong opinion that these defendants, who don't even deny
guilt, but allege only some technical violation of an imagined constitutional right,
are not entitled to the right of selection of probably the best and highest paid, ex-
perienced criminal trial lawyer.
Id.
45. Id. Rather than establishing any objective criteria as to exactly what constitutes
inadequate representation, the court offered the following nebulous subjective test:
The trial court is fully aware of the obligations of attorneys and when it appears
that a public defender or a member of his staff are failing to do their job for an
indigent defendant, then it is proper and necessary for the court to appoint other
counsel.
Id. (emphasis added).
46. Robinson v. State, 239 So.2d 282 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
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whether it is such a substandard level of services that the trial becomes
a mockery and farcical.1
7
Notwithstanding the fact that the previous tradition in Dade
County was to appoint private counsel in capital cases, it is not error for
the public defender to represent defendants in capital cases.4
Usually an accused may not raise the issue of the competency of his
privately retained counsel. 9 Thus, where a conviction was based on a
guilty plea entered pursuant to advice of privately employed counsel, and
the court examined the defendant as to the nature and consequences of
his guilty plea before accepting such plea, the conviction would not be
set aside on the claim of incompetency of counsel." However, one Florida
case considered the competency of privately retained counsel. In Humph-
ries v. State,5 subsequent to the defendant's conviction, his privately re-
tained counsel was prohibited from practicing law by the Supreme Court
because he was adjudged to be suffering from a mental disorder. Defen-
dant thereupon filed for 1.850 relief on the grounds that at the time of his
trial and conviction, his attorney was incompetent. The motion was de-
nied without hearing and an appeal therefrom was affirmed on the ground
that the record conclusively established that the attorney was competent
at the time of the defendant's trial. Nonetheless, the court, by necessary
implication, established that a movant may obtain postconviction review
of incompetency due to mental disease of privately retained counsel.
B. Waiver
The constitutional right to the assistance of counsel may be voluntarily
waived by the defendant. 2 However, waiver may not be presumed from
a silent record;" a the defendant must knowingly, willfully and intelli-
gently waive the right to counsel before a waiver will be deemed valid.'
Thus, mere conversation at an arraignment wherein the defendant stated
that he discussed a guilty plea with an attorney and also indicated that
he did not need counsel at that time, does not constitute intelligent waiver
of the right to be represented by an attorney at arraignment and sentenc-
ing. 5 Also, the fact that a defendant chooses to use his money for food
47. See State v. Pitts, 241 So.2d 399 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), vacated on other grounds,
247 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1971).
48. Barker v. State, 239 So.2d 278 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
49. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 223 So.2d 337 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 229
So.2d 866 (Fla. 1969), 397 U.S. 969 (1970).
50. Belsky v. State, 231 So.2d 256 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) (defendant attacked the
competency of his lawyer on the ground that he had previously represented another individ-
ual when that individual had been questioned by the authorities concerning the very crime
for which defendant had been convicted).
51. 232 So.2d 23 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 237 So.2d 752 (Fla. 1970).
52. See, e.g., Brumit v. State, 220 So.2d 659 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), appeal dismissed,
225 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1969).
53. Miller v. State, 246 So.2d 169 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 340 (1971).
54. Fassenmyer v. State, 233 So.2d 642 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
55. Id.
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and rent with none left over for hiring counsel does not necessarily con-
stitute a waiver of the right to counsel. 56
A defendant who seeks postconviction relief under rule 1.850 on the
ground that he was denied the right to counsel at time of trial must allege
that, at time of trial, he was insolvent and unable to procure counsel, or
the motion will be fatally defective.57
C. Critical Stages
The general rule operative in this area of the law is that the defen-
dant is entitled to an attorney at all critical stages, but deprivation of the
assistance of counsel at a non-critical stage is not reversible error unless
there is a showing of special prejudice to the defendant.
1. PRELIMINARY HEARING
Florida courts continue to hold that the preliminary hearing is not
a critical stage of the proceedings.
In Harrison v. Wainwright" it was held that the failure to appoint
counsel at the preliminary hearing was not error notwithstanding the
United State's Supreme Court decision in Coleman v. Alabama, 9 since
"[t]he reasons advanced by the court in Coleman for invoking the result-
ant rule in Alabama [that defendant has the right to counsel at prelim-
inary hearing] do not obtain under Florida law."6 Moreover, even if
Coleman were deemed applicable in Florida, the defendant must still
establish that the absence of counsel at the preliminary hearing resulted
in prejudicial error since the "harmless error" rule would apply.6'
In Brown v. State 2 it was held that the denial of counsel at a preliminary
hearing was not reversible error since the hearing occurred prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Coleman v. Alabama.6" This decision sug-
gests, perhaps, that the question of whether Coleman is applicable in
56. Bowen v. State, 236 So.2d 16, 17 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970) (defendant, who made
$63 per week and used same for food and rent, was erroneously told by the lower court
judge "[i]f you prefer to spend your money on other matters, the court will deem that
as a waiver of counsel.").
57. Rose v. State, 235 So.2d 353 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
58. 243 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
59. 399 U.S. 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Coleman] (which held that in Alabama,
a defendant is entitled to representation by counsel at the preliminary hearing). [Subsequent
to the period covered by this survey, the Supreme Court of the United States in Adams
v. Illinois, 92 S. Ct. 916, 917 (1972), reaffirmed that "a preliminary hearing is a critical
stage of the criminal process at which the accused is constitutionally entitled to the
assistance of counsel." In Adams the Court held that Coleman v. Alabama is not retro-
active].
60. Harrison v. Wainwright, 243 So.2d 427, 428 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). See also State
ex rel. Williams v. Purdy, 242 So.2d 498 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), appeal dismissed, 248 So.2d
171 (Fla. 1971).
61. Miller v. State, 246 So.2d 169 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 340 (1971).
62. 246 So.2d 151 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
63. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
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Florida is not as settled as the decision in Harrison v. Wainwright64 rep-
resents.
2. ARRAIGNMENT
Being deprived of counsel at the arraignment, without any showing
of prejudice therefrom, is not a valid ground for reversal.65 Thus, where
a defendant plead not guilty at arraignment and was later represented by
counsel at trial, it was not reversible error to deny counsel at the arraign-
ment since no prejudice resulted therefrom.6
In Baker v. Wainwrigkt the defendant, who was not represented
by counsel at the arraignment, plead not guilty and waived his right to
trial by jury. At trial, the defendant was represented by court-appointed
counsel who made no motion to withdraw the waiver of jury, but pro-
ceeded to try the case. The court, although stating that "[the arraign-
ment was a critical stage in the felony prosecution,"'68 held that the de-
privation of the right to counsel (which was held not to have been waived
by the defendant) at the arraignment was harmless error. The court
based its finding of harmless error on the fact that the subsequently ap-
pointed counsel did not request leave to withdraw the defendant's waiver
of jury trial and thus served as "counsel-advised affirmation of the [de-
fendant's] prior action. '69 Thus, the court, which found the arraignment
to be a critical stage, held that the deprivation of counsel was harmless
error and suggested that the lack of counsel at a critical stage is subject
to the harmless error rule.
3. AFTER FORMAL CHARGE BUT BEFORE TRIAL-
IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT
Although the rule established in United States v. Wade7" (that the
line-up is a critical stage of the proceedings to which the right of counsel
attaches) has been followed in Florida, the Florida courts are reluctant
to extend the rule beyond postindictment line-up identifications.7 Thus,
64. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
65. Barnett v. State, 222 So.2d 30 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
66. Id.
67. 245 So.2d 289 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
68. Id. at 290, citing Sardinia v. State, 168 So.2d 674 (Fla. 1964) which, contrary to
the implication of the instant decision, holds that there is a right to counsel at arraignment
only if special circumstances make the arraignment a critical stage. See also Machwart v.
State, 222 So.2d 38, 40 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969) which states that
[iun Florida an arraignment is a 'critical stage' of a criminal proceeding, and the
accused is entitled to have an attorney with him unless he intelligently waives
that right.
Machwart also cites Sardinia v. State, supra.
69. Baker v. Wainwright, 245 So.2d 289, 290 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
70. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
71. Perkins v. State, 228 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1969) (absence of defendant's counsel at
pre-indictment photographic identification, and custodial identification of the accused by
viewing him through a window in the jail where he was confined held not to be reversible
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where a robbery victim was shown photographs of potential suspects from
which he identified the defendant, the fact that defendant's counsel was
not present at the photographic identification was held not violative of
the defendant's rights72 and an in-court identification which was based
on a prior photographic identification was admissable 3 The rule that has
emerged is that a display of photographs for identification purposes is
not violative of due process even though defendant's counsel was not
present at the identification, unless there is a demonstration that the cir-
cumstances under which the display was made were unfair or untrust-
worthy.74 Evidently, a pretrial identification by photograph will be set
aside only if the photographic identification procedure was "so imper-
missibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irre-
parable misidentification."76
The safeguards which Wade prescribes for line-up identification
have been held not to apply to a pre-indictment custodial identification of
an accused occasioned by viewing him through a window in the jail where
he was confined, 76 or to a field identification of defendant which occurs
shortly after the alleged crime.77 An in-court identification which is based
on what the witness saw at the scene of the offense is admissible, even
though there may have been a subsequent line-up at which counsel was not
present.
78
The rule established in United States v. Wade is prospective only79
as of June 12, 1967, the date of decision. Thus, a line-up identification
made in November 1966 is not affected by Wade, notwithstanding the
fact that the trial at which the evidence was introduced occurred in De-
cember 1967, six months after the Wade decision. 80
4. SENTENCING
Sentencing is a critical stage of the criminal process; thus, the right
to counsel at sentencing is a constitutional right. Therefore, to be valid,
a waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. 81 Ac-
cordingly, where both revocation of probation and sentencing occur in
error). For a recent case contra, see United States v. Ash, 40 U.S.L.W. 2568 (D.C. Cir.
filed March 1, 1972), citing United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305 (3d Cir. 1970).
72. Jenkins v. State, 228 So.2d 114 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), citing Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (finding any error to be harmless).
73. Wilson v. State, 235 So.2d 10 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970); Marshall v. State, 238 So.2d
445 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
74. Tafero v. State, 223 So.2d 564 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
75. Id. at 567, quoting from Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
76. Perkins v. State, 228 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1969).
77. Robinson v. State, 237 So.2d 268 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
78. Aiuppa v. State, 228 So.2d 615 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
79. Paige v. State, 227 So.2d 727 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), citing Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293 (1967).
80. Lambs v. State, 223 So.2d 772 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
81. Machwart v. State, 222 So.2d 38 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969) (counsel not intelligently
waived).
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the same proceeding, both the sentence imposed and the order revoking
probation are void if the defendant was not afforded the opportunity to
be represented by counsel."2
5. DIRECT APPEAL
Direct appeal is a critical stage of criminal proceedings.8 While it
is not constitutionally necessary that the trial judge initiate action toward
the appointment of appellate counsel by advising a convicted person of
his rights or by making inquiry as to his indigency, 4 Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 1.670 provides in pertinent part that
[w]hen a judge renders a final judgment of conviction, imposes
a sentence, grants probation or revokes probation, he shall
forthwith inform the defendant concerning his rights of appeal
therefrom, including the time allowed by law for taking an
appeal.
Since the purpose of the rule is to give the defendant notice of his right
to appeal, the failure of a trial judge to advise a defendant of his right
to appeal is not a frustration of the right to appeal, if the defendant was
not "completely ignorant of the existence of the appellate process."85 If
the defendant proves that he "did not know of the appellate process"
then the failure of the trial judge to comply with rule 1.670 will entitle
the defendant to a full appellate review by habeas corpus. 6 Similarly, the
failure of court-appointed counsel to advise the defendant of the right to
appeal does not constitute incompetency on the part of counsel sufficient
to constitute a denial of fundamental due process.87
If the record shows that the defendant was advised of his right of
appeal on the day of sentencing, and if his failure to appeal was not due
to any action by the state, a habeas corpus petition for release based on
the failure to be so advised will be dismissed. 8 However, if the petitioner
establishes that he was not at any time informed by the trial court that
he had the right to appeal the judgment and sentence entered against him,
and that he did not discover the existence of appellate machinery until
well beyond the time permitted for direct appeal, a prima facie case for
habeas corpus relief is shown.8 9
82. Id.
83. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
84. Nichols v. Wainwright, 243 So.2d 430 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971), citing Baggett v. Wain-
wright, 229 So.2d 239 (Fla. 1969). See also Baggett v. Wainwright, 235 So.2d 486 (Fla.
1970).
85. Nichols v. Wainwright, 243 So.2d 430, 431 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971) which held, rather
remarkably, that since the defendant expressed a desire to appeal he must have known
that he had a right to appeal. Contra, Baker v. State, 224 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
See note 89 infra.
86. Nichols v. Wainwright, 243 So.2d 430, 432 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
87. Id.
88. Myrick v. Wainwright, 243 So.2d 179 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
89. Robinson v. Wainwright, 245 So.2d 867 (Fla. 1971). In Robinson, the supreme
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The policy of some of the Florida courts is that if an attorney wishes
to withdraw as counsel at the appellate level only because he sees no merit
in the appeal, the motion will be denied."
Where an indigent defendant appeals he is entitled to have the state
furnish a transcript of record. If he seeks postconviction relief under rule
1.850 he is entitled to have the state furnish a transcript of that portion
of the trial proceeding to which the motion is directed. However, an ac-
cused who does not appeal from his judgment of conviction and who does
not move to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence is not entitled to be
supplied with a transcript of the trial proceeding even though he may be
an indigent."
6. COLLATERAL ATTACK
There is no absolute right to counsel on a motion for postconviction
relief under rule 1.850, but when the assistance of counsel is essential to
a competent presentation of the motion, counsel should be appointed for
an indigent. 2
7. PROBATION AND PAROL HEARINGS
Under the rule of Mempa v. Rhay, 3 a hearing to determine whether
probation should be revoked and the defendant sentenced is considered a
critical stage.
However, a probation supervisor is not required to advise the proba-
tioner of his rights to counsel and to remain silent before asking proba-
tioner about alleged violations of his probation? 4
court expressly refused to settle the conflict between Nichols v. Wainwright, 243 So.2d 430
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1971) and Baker v. State, 224 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969) as to whether
the trial court's failure to advise a defendant of his right to appeal under rule 1.670 is
ipso facto reversible error. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
90. Schuler v. State, 229 So.2d 667 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969). The reason is to assure that
the federal court will "have a record replete with all the constitutional safeguards . . . ." Id.
91. Cassoday v. State, 237 So.2d 146 (Fla. 1970).
92. See Wills and Witsosky, Criminal Law and Procedure, 1967-1969 Survey of Florida
Law, 24 U. MIAmi L. REV. 215, 224 (1970). See also Harper v. State, 201 So.2d 65 (Fla.
1967).
93. 389 U.S. 128 (1967), followed by Gargan v. State, 217 So.2d 578 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1969).
94. Clark v. State, 222 So.2d 766 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). In the author's opinion, this
decision cannot be reconciled with the language of the United States Supreme Court in
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964):
We have also learned the companion lesson of history that no system of criminal
justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness
on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights. No
system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to
consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, these rights. If the
exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law
enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that system. (footnotes
omitted).
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D. Offenses Less Than Felonies
In State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin,95 the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida, receding somewhat from its former position in Fish v. State,96 held
that an indigent defendant is entitled to court-appointed counsel when
the offense carries a possible penalty of more than six months imprison-
ment." The court extended this right rather reluctantly,18 stating that it
was satisfied with the rule of Fish v. State, 9 'but was caught on "the horns
of a dilemma" in that indigent state misdemeanants were obtaining relief
by federal habeas corpus. 100 Thus, to avoid the specter of state misde-
meanants obtaining instant relief by federal habeas corpus, the Supreme
Court of Florida adopted the rule announced in Brinson v. Florida,1' 1
that indigent misdemeanants are entitled to court-appointed counsel when
the offense carries a possible penalty of more than six months imprison-
ment.
In Boyer v. Orlando,"2 the Supreme Court, relying on Argersinger,
refused to extend the right to counsel to a misdemeanant who was sen-
tenced on each of two charges to sixty days.03
III. CONFESSIONS
Florida courts continue to resist the principles of Miranda v.
Arizona"4 by admitting, except in cases of flagrantly illegal police con-
95. 236 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1970), cert. granted, 401 U.S. 908 (1971) [After this article
had gone to press, the Supreme Court of the United States held that all indigent including
misdemeanants are entitled to counsel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972), rev'g
236 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1970)].
96. 159 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1964).
97. The six month rule was patterned after the rule established in Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968) which held that the tight to jury trial extends only to trials of serious
offenses punishable by more than six months imprisonment. State ex rel. Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 236 So.2d 442, 443 (Fla. 1970). But see note 103 infra.
98. The Argersinger court pointed out that the United States Supreme Court has
denied certiorari in three cases involving a denial of counsel in misdemeanor cases. 236
So.2d at 443.
99. Id. Fish v. State, 159 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1964) held that the right to counsel does
not extend to indigent defendants charged with misdemeanors.
100. See, e.g., McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965) (6 months and $250);
Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965) (90 days or $500). For a good discus-
sion of the conflict between the Florida and federal courts in this regard, see Comment,
Will the Trumpet oj Gideon Be Heard in All the Halls of Justice?, 25 U. MIAmi L. REv.
450 (1971).
101. 273 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
102. 238 So.2d 84 (Fla. 1970). See Judge Adkins well-reasoned dissent at 238 So.2d 84,
85, citing Bohr v. Purdy, 412 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1969); James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325
(5th Cir. 1969).
103. Subsequent to Brinson and Argersinger the Fifth Circuit in Alvis v. Kimbrough,
446 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1971) held that the sixth and fourteenth amendment right to
counsel applies to state misdemeanants if the crime carries a possible penalty as great as
90 days' imprisonment or a fine of $500, regardless of the sentence actually imposed.
104. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The gist of the holding in Miranda is that:
Prior to any questioning [during custodial interrogation] the person must be
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duct,10 " confessions obtained in contravention of Miranda which are
otherwise voluntary. 0 6
A. Right to Counsel and Right to Be Silent
The principles of Miranda v. Arizona"7 and Escobedo v. Illinois'0
were applied in State v. Alford' to invalidate a confession obtained from
a defendant who was not advised of his right to counsel or to remain
silent and who was denied access to his available attorney while being held
incommunicado for 27 hours during which time he was asked to strip
naked in front of police officers. On the other hand, the principles of
Miranda were held not to apply to invalidate a "voluntary" confession
which was obtained from an accused who was in custody and who had
not been adivsed of his constitutional rights, on the theory that the con-
fession was not made in response to an interrogation." Moreover, while
statements made in response to an interrogation which was not preceded
by Miranda warnings are themselves inadmissible, the fact that the vic-
tim was able to make a voice identification of the defendant by listening
to those inadmissible statements is admissible."'
Since the constitutional rights enunciated by Miranda do not attach
until there is custodial interrogation of the defendant by the police," 2 it
has been held that a defendant's response to a police officer's on the scene
inquiry of "how did it happen" is admissible."' Similarly, where police
upon arriving at the scene of a homicide, asked the defendant where the
gun was and how did it happen, defendant's responses were held admis-
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may
be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of
these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not
wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him.
Id. at 444-45.
105. See note 109 infra and accompanying text.
106. See note 110 infra and accompanying text.
107. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See note 104 supra.
108. 378 U.S. 478 (1964) which held that the right to counsel applies at the police
station when an investigation ceases to be general in nature and begins to "focus in" on the
defendant. Although it is still a viable case, Escobedo has largely been superseded by and
incorporated into Miranda.
109. 225 So.2d 582 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
110. Putman v. State, 227 So.2d 60 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 237 So.2d 178
(Fla. 1970). See also Brown v. State, 222 So.2d 793 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
111. Howard v. State, 230 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1969).
112. See James v. State, 223 So.2d 52 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969) (pre-arrest statements
made before defendant was taken into custody held admissible).
113. State v. Barnes, 245 So.2d 108 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 248 So.2d 170
(Fla. 1971). The court held that the officer's question "who stabbed him" was equivalent
of asking "what happened" or "how did it happen," which is acceptable as being within
the range of "on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime." Id. at 109.
CRIMINAL LAW
sible notwithstanding the fact that Miranda warnings were not given until
later."4
Florida courts have held that Miranda does not apply to all forms
of interrogation. For example, in Clark v. State,"' it was held that a pro-
bation officer need not give Miranda warnings prior to asking a parolee
about an alleged violation of probation, even though the information so
obtained is used against the defendant at a revocation hearing. Also,
where one freely waives immunity and appears before a grand jury, the
responses to questions asked are admissible despite the fact that the wit-
ness was not warned of his right to remain silent and to have assistance
of counsel." 6
The fact that an otherwise "voluntary" confession was induced by
deception practiced by police officers, or that the confession was induced
by suggestions of leniency or reduction in penalty does not render the
confession inadmissible."'
In Dixon v. State,"' it was held that an instruction to the jury that
a person in unexplained possession of recently stolen property permits an
inference of guilt of stealing does not amount to an impermissible com-
ment on the defendant's failure to take the stand and is not proscribed by
Miranda or the fifth amendment.
In those instances where Miranda does apply, the question of the
adequacy of the warnings has often arisen. In Irvin v. State,"9 it was held
that advising the defendant that if he could not afford to retain his own
attorney one would be appointed for him was an adequate warning, not-
withstanding the omission of the statement that the counsel would be
appointed "at state expense."
The Miranda decision does not require the interrogator to give legal
advice (i.e., recommend to the defendant that he should have a lawyer),
but only that the defendant be told of his right to obtain legal advice.120
It has been held that when the question of whether the warnings were in
fact given is in issue, the law does not give greater credence to defendant's
statement denying the warning than it does to the police officer's contra-
dictory statement that the warnings were given.' 2' However, where
114. Hill v. State, 223 So.2d 548 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). The court held there was an
unexpressed waiver of Miranda warnings. See note 141 infra and accompanying text.
115. 222 So.2d 767 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
116. State v. Chadroff, 234 So.2d 412 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
117. See generally Paramore v. State, 229 So.2d 855 (Fla. 1969).
118. 227 So.2d 740 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 237 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1970), citing
State v. Young, 217 So.2d 567 (Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 853 (1969). In State v.
Young, the supreme court reversed Young v. State, 203 So.2d 650 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967)
wherein the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that such an instruction con-
flicted with Miranda v. Arizona.
119. 246 So.2d 592 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 251 So.2d 878 (Fla. 1971).
120. State v. Craig, 237 So.2d 737 (Fla. 1970), rev'g Craig v. State, 216 So.2d 19 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1968).
121. Simmons v. State, 227 So.2d 84 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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Miranda warnings are given informally and without being preserved in
the record, the state runs the risk that its officers will be disbelieved;
thus, the state's burden of proof in establishing that the warnings were
adequately given and/or intelligently waived is by clear and convincing
evidence.121 Accordingly, where the police officer who allegedly advised
an accused of his constitutional rights did not take the stand and the
"Miranda Card" from which the rights were allegedly read was not en-
tered into evidence, the burden of showing that the accused was advised
of his rights prior to interrogation was not met and the confession was
inadmissible, notwithstanding the fact that another police officer testified
to overhearing the interrogating officer advise the accused of his rights."'
B. Illegal Detention-Interrogation
Statements made by a defendant after an illegal arrest are inadmis-
sible under the "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine. 24
The rule of State v. Outten1 5 that a second or subsequent confession
is admissible unless it can be shown that it was tainted by the coercive
influences exerted in obtaining a previous confession, was followed in
Rhome v. State.'26
In Rivera Nunez v. State,27 it was held that an accused in custody,
who wished to remain silent and requested an attorney, thereby stopping
the interrogation, may, 30 hours later, waive his right to counsel and
right to remain silent and thereafter make statements without the pres-
ence of counsel which can be later used against him.
Although the Supreme Court of Florida has heretofore refused to
apply the McNabb-Mallory rule in Florida,'28 the court in Perkins v.
State" has intimated that a change may be forthcoming. In Perkins the
122. State v. Graham, 240 So.2d 486 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970). The clear and convincing
evidence standard is less demanding than the exclusion of every reasonable doubt and
requires more than a preponderance. Id. at 490-91. See also Perkins v. State, 228 So.2d
382, 390-91 (Fla. 1969).
123. Long v. State, 231 So.2d 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
124. Betancourt v. State, 224 So.2d 378 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). (There was no probable
cause for arrest, thus, incriminating statements made by the defendant subsequent to
arrest pertaining to whereabouts of marijuana were inadmissible.)
125. 206 So.2d 392 (Fla. 1968).
126. 222 So.2d 431 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969) (first officer without giving Miranda warnings
promised the defendant it would work in his favor if he cooperated; subsequent interroga-
tion by second police officer, who gave warnings and did not know of other's promise,
was held admissible on the theory that the taint from the first interrogation had dissipated).
To have this contaminating effect, the first confession must be the product of an
overbearing physical or mental pressure. Even then, a second confession will be
admissible if it can be clearly demonstrated that the coercive pressures have termi-
nated and freedom of will has been restored.
Id. at 433, quoting State v. Outten, 206 So.2d 392 (Fla. 1968).
127. 227 So.2d 324 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
128. In this regard see Wills, Criminal Law and Procedure, 1965-1967 Survey of Florida
Law, 22 U. MiAmi L. Rtv. 240, 252 (1967). See also Dawson v. State, 139 So.2d 408 (Fla.
1962). But see note 131 infra.
129. 228 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1969).
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court reasoned that strict compliance with Florida Statutes section 901.23
(1969) (which requires that persons arrested without a warrant be taken
"without unnecessary delay" before a magistrate) would help insure that
the proper safeguards and warnings will be afforded an accused who is
subject to custodial interrogation. Thus, the time has arrived to "reexam-
ine these procedures and study their full measured implications and im-
portance to our judicial system.""'  Since the defendant in Perkins did
not raise the issue the court could not rule on it, but it nonetheless ex-
tended an invitation to hear the issue "in an appropriate proceeding."''
C. Voluntary
When the state desires to introduce a confession into evidence it has
the burden of making a prima facie showing that the confession was the
voluntary act of the defendant." 2 If the state establishes a prima facie
case of voluntariness, the burden is then cast on the defendant to show it
was in fact not a voluntary confession.133 The determination of voluntari-
ness must be based upon facts rather than opinions of witnesses which
simply express a conclusion that a given confession was voluntarily
made. 4 Thus, a police officer's opinions as to the defendant's physical
or mental condition is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 3"
Moreover, the defendant has the right to have the question of the volun-
tariness of the confession determined by the judge in the absence of the
jury. 136 However, it is not reversible error if the trial judge determines
voluntariness in the presence of the jury and defense counsel makes no
objection to such procedure.'37 This is true even though the defendant
represented himself."8
If it is established that at the time of making the confession the
accused was insane, the confession is inadmissible. 3 The test is whether
the defendant would be competent as a witness, and whether he is capable
of understanding the meaning and effect of his confession. 4°
130. Perkins v. State, 228 So.2d 382, 391 (Fla. 1969).
131. Id. at 391.
Subsequent to the period covered by this survey, the Supreme Court of Florida held
that the "rationale" of the McNabb-Mallory rule was applicable in Florida. Oliver v.
State, 250 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1971).
132. Dodd v. State, 232 So.2d 235 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), cert. discharged, 241 So.2d
384 (Fla. 1970).
133. Brown v. State, 245 So.2d 68 (Fla. 1971).
134. Dodd v. State, 232 So.2d 235 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
135. Id.
136. Allen v. State, 239 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), citing Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964). See also State v. Prosser, 235 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), cert. dis-
missed, 243 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1971).
137. Coleman v. State, 245 So.2d 642 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
138. Id. (defendant discharged his appointed counsel and represented himself; he
failed to request a hearing on voluntariness in absence of jury, as was done in Allen v.
State, note 136 supra).
139. Brown v. State, 245 So.2d 68 (Fla. 1971).
140. Id.
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A defendant who has been advised of his right to counsel and right
to remain silent may intelligently waive those rights and thereafter make
a "voluntary" confession. The waiver need not be an expressed affirm-
ative response. 4' Thus, where a defendant who has been read the
Miranda warnings indicated that she had an attorney but would talk then
and discuss it with her attorney later, the interrogator was not bound to
end the interrogation since a waiver was deemed to have occurred.'42 On
the other hand, in State v. Prosser,43 it was held that where a defendant,
when asked by police whether he wanted counsel, gave an ambiguous
answer which could be interpreted as a request for representation, the
trial court's determination that the interrogation should have ceased was
deemed correct.
D. Use of Confession at Trial
The Supreme Court of Florida has taken the position that voluntary
statements which are inadmissible in the state's case-in-chief because
Miranda warnings have not been given may not be used at trial for pur-
poses of impeaching a defendant who testifies in his own behalf. 44 The
United States Supreme Court, in Harris v. New York, 4 ' has recently
held otherwise, however, and thus the question may arise as to whether
the Florida court will continue to follow its former position.'46
The use of a confession which implicates a codefendant at a joint
trial continues to be the subject of litigation. The rule announced in
Bruton v. United States,' 47 that codefendants are entitled to a severance
when the prosecution uses the confession of a non-testifying codefendant
which also implicates the non-confessors, is applicable in Florida. 4 ' The
rule of Bruton is retroactive. 49 The Florida district courts of appeal have
141. Thompson v. State, 235 So.2d 354 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), appeal dismissed, 239
So.2d 828 (Fla. 1970). See also Hill v. State, 223 So.2d 548 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), discussed
at note 114 supra and accompanying text.
142. Thompson v. State, 235 So.2d 354 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
143. 235 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), cert. dismissed, 243 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1971).
144. See, e.g., State v. Galasso, 217 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1968). See also Young v. State, 234
So.2d 341 (Fla. 1970).
145. 401 U.S. 422 (1971), noted in 25 U. Mna1- L. REV. 531 (1971). In Harris the
court held that statements otherwise trustworthy but which are inadmissible in the state's
case-in-chief because of the failure to advise the defendant of his right to counsel and to
remain silent are admissible for the purposes of impeaching the defendant should he take
the stand in his own behalf.
146. In the opinion of the authors, the position announced in State v. Galasso and
Young v. State, note 144 supra, is the better view and should continue to be followed in
Florida.
147. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The theory of Bruton is that if a codefendant does not
testify, his confession adds weight to the case against the defendant in a form not subject
to cross-examination thereby violating the sixth amendment right to confrontation. See
section VI infra. See also note 151 infra and accompanying text.
148. Jones v. State, 223 So.2d 790 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). See also Sturgis v. State, 233
So.2d 166 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 238 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1970).
149. Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968). See also Jones v. State, 223 So.2d 790
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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held that a court's instruction to the jury that a codefendant's statement
can only be considered against the defendant making the statement does
not vitiate the constitutional error in a Bruton type situation. 150 However,
the Supreme Court of Florida has held that if the evidence of guilt is
otherwise "overwhelming," the admission of a codefendant's testimony
at a joint trial is considered "harmless error."'' Thus, the use of con-
fessions of a non-testifying codefendant does not require reversal where
the evidence supplied through such confession was merely cumulative
and the other evidence against the defendant was so overwhelming that
the court could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the violation of
the defendant's constitutional rights constituted harmless error. 52 Apply-
ing this rule in State v. Stubbs,1" the Supreme Court of Florida, despite
a well reasoned dissent by Chief Justice Ervin,' 4 held that where a de-
fendant's confession was voluntarily given before his codefendant con-
fessed, and the confessions were substantially alike, and the trial judge
instructed the jury that admission of the codefendant's confession at the
joint trial was only to be used against the individual codefendant, there
was sufficient independent proof of guilt so that "the risk of 'prejudicial
spill-over' incrimination without cross-examination is reduced to an insig-
nificant level."' 55
It is incumbent upon the state to prove the corpus delecti in every
case, and in so doing it must rely on proof other than the confession of
the defendant.'56 Thus, where there is no evidence that the defendant was
driving except his confession, it is error to admit the defendant's confes-
sion since there is no other proof of the corpus delecti. 5 r However, if a
confession is admitted before the corpus delecti is established and the
150. Garcia v. State, 226 So.2d 17 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969); Stubbs v. State, 222 So.2d
228 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
151. State v. Garcia, 240 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1970); State v. Stubbs, 239 So.2d 241 (Fla.
1970). See also Jones v. State, 227 So.2d 326 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969), cert. dismissed, 237
So.2d 533 (Fla. 1970), citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). See also
Schneble v. Florida, 40 U.S.L.W. 4299 (U.S. filed March 21, 1972), decided subsequent to
the period covered by this survey.
152. Collins v. State, 230 So.2d 711 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), citing Harrington v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See also
Schneble v. Florida, 40 U.S.L.W. 4299 (U.S. filed March 21, 1972).
For an example of when the non-testifying codefendant's confession is not considered
merely cumulative and thus reversible error, see Seidel v. State, 240 So.2d 521 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1970).
153. 239 So.2d 241 (Fla. 1970).
154. Id. at 242 (dissenting opinion).
Justice Ervin points out that
decisions in the wake of Bruton have made it clear that the existence of the con-
stitutional error described in Bruton is not vitiated where a defendant otherwise
deprived of the right of cross-examination due to the introduction of inculpating
statements attributed to his non-testifying codefendant, himself confesses.
Id. at 243 (dissenting opinion).
155. Id. at 242 (majority opinion).
156. Farley v. City of Tallahassee, 243 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), citing Sciortino
v. State, 115 So.2d 93 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959).
157. Id.
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corpus delecti is established by subsequent testimony independent of the
confession, there is no reversible error.""
IV. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A search warrant must conform strictly to statutory requirements and
must particularly describe the place to be searched.'59 Accordingly, where
a building contains multiple dwelling units, and the state knows or reason-
ably should have known that a more particular description can be had, it
is the duty of the state to give a particular description; a general descrip-
tion of the building will not suffice.' 6 However, a search warrant author-
izing a search of a named building or house and "all persons therein ...
suspected of being connected with ... gambling" is not void for failure to
identify persons to be searched,' 6 ' and a search of "suspected" persons
therein will be valid even though the search preceded arrest. 6 Also where
the return of a search warrant does not comply with the ten day limitation
of Florida Statutes section 933.05 (1969), it does not become void unless
there has been prejudice to the defendant. 6 '
Florida has adopted the general rule that a subpoena duces tecum
which requires production of every book, paper, document and record of
a corporation is overly broad and violative of the fourth and fifth amend-
ments.' Such a subpoena may not be used for discovery or as a "fishing
expedition" with the hope that something incriminating may result there-
from. 165
Contraband which is seized pursuant to a valid search warrant is-
sued by a municipal court may be used in evidence in a prosecution for
the same offense in the state court, provided that the requirements for
158. Darrigo v. State, 243 So.2d 171 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971) (when confession was offered
into evidence defense objected on ground that corpus delecti had not been established, the
court reserved ruling on the objection allowing the state to proceed and subsequently
establish corpus delecti independent of confession).
159. State v. Gordillo, 245 So.2d 898 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), citing Fance v. State, 207
So.2d 331 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
160. Id. Where the premises in question contained two separate unconnected apart-
ments, one downstairs and one upstairs, the search warrant, which described such premises
as a two-story dwelling house occupied or under the control of certain persons, was not
specific enough.
161. Samuel v. State, 222 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1969), citing Lemus v. State, 158 So.2d 143
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). However, if an owner or operator of a building is known he may be
named in the warrant. Church v. State, 151 Fla. 24, 9 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1942).
162. Poole v. State, 247 So.2d 443 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 251 So.2d 879
(Fla. 1971). A "suspected" person therein is one who police have probable cause to believe
is suspected of being connected with the illegal activity described in the warrant.
163. State v. Featherstone, 246 So.2d 597 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). In the opinion of the
authors, the failure of the state to comply strictly with statutory requirements should auto-
matically invalidate the warrant and make any evidence obtained thereby inadmissible.
See, e.g., State v. Gordillo, note 159 supra.
164. Imparato v. Spicola, 238 So.2d 503 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
165. Id.
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obtaining the warrant in municipal court are not less strenuous than the
state requirements. 166
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.90(h) (2) provides that:
The motion to suppress shall be made prior to trial unless op-
portunity thereof did not exist or the defendant was not aware
of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion may
entertain the motion or an appropriate objection at the trial.
In Davis v. State'6 7 this rule was interpreted to mean that a judge, in his
discretion, may entertain a motion to suppress at trial even if the oppor-
tunity to move prior to trial did exist, and that a decision whether to
entertain such a motion will not be set aside unless there has been an
abuse of discretion. However, if the opportunity to so move prior to trial
did not exist or the defendant was not then aware of the grounds for the
motion, the judge must entertain the motion when the opportunity arises
or when the defendant learns that there are grounds therefore.
A general objection to the admission of evidence will not suffice. The
specific grounds must be alleged.' 68
A justice of the peace has no jurisdiction to determine the validity of
a search at a preliminary hearing, and his finding is not res judicata as to
the issue of admissibility at the subsequent criminal trial.'6"
The "safe procedure" suggested in Carter v. State7 ° of securing an
arrest or search warrant in all cases if there is a reasonable opportunity
to obtain one was held not to apply in Sheehan v. State'7' (where the
police one day before arrest had "set-up" a sale of narcotics) on the
theory that there is no need to obtain a warrant for a crime which is
about to be committed. Moreover, the rule of Carter v. State 72 has been
expressly overruled by the Supreme Court of Florida in Falcon v. State,7 '
wherein it was held that the requirements for arresting without a warrant
166. State v. Williams, 227 So.2d 331 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969) (citing no Florida cases).
167. 226 So.2d 257 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
168. Darrigo v. State, 243 So.2d 171 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
169. State v. Everly, 228 So.2d 923 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
170. 199 So.2d 324 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967). In this regard see Wills, Criminal Law and
Procedure, 1965-1967 Survey of Florida Law, 22 U. MiAmI L. REv. 240, 253-54 (1967).
171. 228 So.2d 444 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
172. See note 170 supra. In Carter the district court stated:
We therefore hold that where an arrest or search is made by an officer without a
warrant, the State must be prepared to show, not only the factual existence at
such time of probable cause, but also that the officer or officers had no reasonable
opportunity to previously apply for and be issued an arrest or search warrant;
otherwise the evidence as to the fruits of the search goes out.
199 So.2d 324, 334 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967) (emphasis added).
173. 226 So.2d 399 (Fla. 1969), citing United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
See also State v. Browning, 233 So.2d 866 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970) wherein it was held that a
warrantless search of a car 15-20 minutes after the defendant had been arrested in his car
was not invalid even though there was a reasonable opportunity to obtain a search warrant.
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are prescribed by Florida Statutes chapter 901 (1969) which does not
require that a warrant be obtained if probable cause exists.
The general rule in Florida is that if there is probable cause to arrest
a warrantless search may be conducted incident to the arrest. 74 Under
certain circumstances a warrantless search may be conducted though not
incidental to a lawful arrest; if, for example, the officer has probable
cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband.' Similarly,, where an
officer legally sees contraband in plain sight he may seize it before arrest
or warrant, and the evidence so seized is admissible.17 ' This rule applies
when a police officer picks up and inspects a bag dropped by a defendant,
finds it to contain narcotics, and thereafter arrests the defendant; 177 or
when a police officer shines a flashlight in a car and spots a weapon in
plain view.'
78
The test of probable cause is whether a prudent and cautious police
officer on the scene, conditioned by observation and information and
guided by his police experience, reasonably could have believed that a
crime had been committed by the person to be arrested.' 79 Accordingly,
it has been held that when a police officer sees a man taking money from
his wallet and offering it in exchange for a "baggie type" bag, there is
probable cause to arrest and thereafter search. 10 Similarly, in Trivette v.
State,'8' an officer observed someone on a deserted street late at night who
took special notice of the officer and thereafter turned to put something
in his pocket. The officer further observed that the person had dilated
eyes and appeared to have an unclear mind. The court held that these ob-
servations constituted probable cause to arrest for public intoxication,
and a subsequent search of the defendant's person which produced evi-
dence of marijuana was held to be valid. If the police officer had probable
cause to believe a felony had been committed, the fact that the arrest was
ultimately labeled a misdemeanor would not render the arrest and subse-
174. State v. Sanders, 239 So.2d 120 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
175. Id., citing FLA. STAT. § 933.19 (1969) which specifically adopts the rule of Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In State v. Sanders, the person fitting defendant's
description had threatened to burn down a tavern. A person fitting defendant's description
was seen in the vicinity of the tavern in the company of two people, one of whom had
a "molotov cocktail" type of bottle. The defendant's car was searched and a bomb and
guns were found. Held, evidence admissible.
176. State v. Ashby, 245 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1971); State v. Jackson, 240 So.2d 88 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1970).
177. State v. Jackson, 240 So.2d 88 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
178. State v. Bass, 240 So.2d 90 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 244 So.2d 433 (Fla.
1971), wherein it was held that shining a flashlight to see things in plain view is not a
search. What constitutes "plain view" was discussed by the Supreme Court in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
179. State v. Profera, 239 So.2d 867 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
180. Id.
181. 244 So.2d 173 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). The court's decision that there was probable
cause to arrest is somewhat surprising in view of the officer's answer on cross-examination
that the fact that the defendant had long hair and bell bottoms added to his reasons for
stopping them. Id. at 174. With reference to limiting the search of the defendant's person
in a case such as this, see Gustafson v. State, note 192 infra and accompanying text.
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quent search invalid under the theory that according to statute an officer
may not make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor not committed in
his presence.8 2 Where police officers observed occupants of a car passing
around a small cigarette and thereafter detained them for questioning,
seizure of a plastic bag of marijuana thrown into street while the occu-
pants were being detained but before they were arrested was proper.8 3
Similarly, where police had probable cause to believe narcotics had been
used, and it was necessary to put a choke-hold on the defendant to pre-
vent him from destroying the evidence, there was no violation of the de-
fendant's constitutional rights." 4
To effect a valid warrantless search the arresting officer does not
have to have firsthand knowledge in order to have probable cause; it is
sufficient that the officer initiating the chain of communication either have
firsthand knowledge or receive information from some person who it
seems reasonable to believe is telling the truth.' Thus, an officer has
probable cause to arrest on the basis of a description he has received over
his radio,8 6 or on the basis of information received from a confidential
informer.' 7 However, whenever an arrest is made without a warrant and
probable cause for the arrest is based on information provided by a con-
fidential informant, there should be present in the circumstances preced-
ing the arrest facts which give rise to a reasonable inference: (a) that the
informant is reliable; and (b) that his information with respect to the
defendant's criminal activity is likewise reliable.' 8 The state is privileged
to refuse to disclose the identity of the confidential informant, and the
burden is on the defendant to show why exception should be invoked;
where disclosure of identity is relevant and helpful to the defense or essen-
tial to a fair determination of the cause, the privilege must give way. 9
However, if the only part the confidential informant played was furnish-
ing information which provided a lead in preliminary investigation, and
the informer was not a participant in crime or connected with the offense
in any manner, there is no duty to disclose. 90
In those instances where there is probable cause to arrest there re-
mains the problem of whether the subsequent search was "incident to"
182. Chaney v. State, 237 So.2d 281 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 242 So.2d 461
(Fla. 1970), 403 U.S. 904 (1971) ; West v. State, 239 So.2d 611 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), appeal
dismissed, 243 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1971).
183. State v. Padilla, 235 So.2d 309 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 239 So.2d 830
(Fla. 1970).
184. Salas v. State, 246 So.2d 621 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
185. Id.
186. McRae v. State 245 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
187. State v. Lewis, 225 So.2d 170 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 232 So.2d 178
(Fla. 1969) (search warrant issued based on allegedly reliable informant). See also section
XXII infra.
188. State v. Doherty, 240 So.2d 332, 335 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). See also State v. Smith,
233 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1970). See also section XXII infra.
189. State v. Matney, 236 So.2d 166 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
190. Id.
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the arrest, i.e., within the scope of the arrest. The search of the trunk of a
car without a warrant while the defendant was being held for a traffic
charge' or an extensive search of defendant's person when arrested for
driving without a license'92 have been held invalid as being outside the
scope of the arrest. Similarly, a defendant arrested without a warrant for
robbery may not then be taken to his home where a search is conducted,
the fruits of which result in an additional unrelated charge for which
there had been no probable cause. 93 In Ashby v. State,' the District
Court of Appeal, Second District, applied the rule of Chimel v. Califor-
nia'95 to invalidate a search of an entire house which occurred after the
defendant was arrested outside the front door.196 The rule of Chimel is
that for a warrantless search to be "incidental to" the lawful arrest, it
must be limited to the defendant's person and to the immediate area
around the defendant in which he might obtain a weapon or something of
an evidentiary nature which could have been destroyed or concealed.'"
The District Court of Appeal, First District,' has expressed disap-
proval of the rule of Chimel v. California and has deemed it a "windfall
for criminals." The First District intimates a hope that with the present
composition of the United States Supreme Court the "pendulum will
again swing toward" the rule that a warrantless search of the entire prem-
ises is proper as incident to a lawful arrest in or on the premises. 9
Chimel has been held to be not retroactive; moreover, it does not apply
if the defendant consented to the search of his home.200
191. Smith v. State, 228 So.2d 613 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), citing Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752 (1969). However, if the search is an "inventory" search as opposed to an
"exploratory" search, it may be held valid. See Godbee v. State, note 204 infra and ac-
companying text.
192. Gustafson v. State, 243 So.2d 615 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971) (held that while a
"custodial search" of arrested defendant's person-a "pat-down search"-for purpose of
determining if he is armed is allowable, the search is limited to a search for weapons or in-
strumentalities, none of which are likely to be found inside the defendant's package of
cigarettes).
Subsequent to the period covered by this survey the Supreme Court of Florida re-
versed the Fourth District's decision in Gustalson. See State v. Gustafson, 258 So.2d 1 (Fla.
1972). The supreme court held that the search in Gustafson was a proper, incidental search
that reasonably enues after a legal arrest (citing FLA. STAT. § 901.21 (1969)). The court
reasoned that since the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant driver was
intoxicated, it was proper to conduct a thorough search of his person for drugs, notwith-
standing the fact that the arrest was for driving without a license.
The authors submit that the decision of the Fourth District is by far the better view.
193. Betancourt v. State, 224 So.2d 378 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
194. 228 So.2d 400 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
195. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See also Vale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 30 (1970).
196. The decision of the Second District in Ashby v. State, 228 So.2d 400 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1969) was reversed by the supreme court, wherein Chimel was distinguished. State v.
Ashby, 245 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1971).
197. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (warrantless search of an entire
house after arrest of defendant held invalid).
198. State v. O'Steen, 238 So.2d 434 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
199 Id. at 437. (In the opinion of the authors, such a regression would be highly un-
desirable.)
200. Grimes v. State, 244 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1971). See notes 207-216 infra and accompany-
ing text.
CRIMINAL LAW
The requirement that a warrantless search to be valid must be "in-
cidental" to an arrest has sometimes been relaxed if the search can be
considered reasonable under the circumstances. In Adams v. State,2 01 for
example, the defendant was arrested for drunk driving. Twelve hours
after her arrest she was taken to a hospital and during preparation for a
physical examination, marijuana fell from her brassiere. The court held
the evidence admissible on the theory that preparing the defendant for
the physical exam was reasonable under the circumstances and evidence
inadvertently obtained therefrom is accordingly admissible. Similarly,
when a valid arrest is made on the highway and the search of the car,
originally begun on the highway, is continued at the station, the evidence
obtained from the search is admissible under the theory that it would be
unreasonable to conduct a thorough and exacting search on the high-
way.202 The rationale of the reasonable search was extended to its limits,
or perhaps beyond its limits, in State v. Mitchell.2°3 In Mitchell the
Supreme Court of Florida held that an unconscious driver who had been
involved in an automobile accident may be made the subject of a blood
test to determine intoxication under the "implied consent" law (Florida
Statutes section 322-261 (1969)) even though the driver was not under
arrest and had not consented to the test. This case, in effect, permits a
search of the person before arrest and allows the evidence so obtained to
serve as the basis for the subsequent criminal charge of driving while
under the influence.
The question of whether a station house search of a vehicle is invalid
as not being incidental to a lawful arrest has been further complicated by
the holding in Godbee v. State.2 °4 In Godbee the rule was established that
where reasonable routine procedures justify an "inventory" of the con-
tents of the vehicle, 205 evidence obtained from the warrantless inventory
search is admissible, irrespective of whether there was any probable cause
to believe such contraband was present. Although the court limited the
rule to "inventory" searches as opposed to "exploratory searches" which
are motivated by a desire to "hunt" for incriminating evidence, the effect
201. 240 So.2d 529 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
202 State v. Aiken, 228 So.2d 442 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969). See also State v. Browing, 233
So.2d 866 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970) wherein it was held that a search of defendant's car con-
ducted at the station 15 to 20 minutes after defendant's arrest on the road was reasonable.
Accord, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 90 (1970).
203. 245 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1971) overruling the well-reasoned opinion of the District of
Appeal, Second District, in Mitchell v. State, 227 So.2d 728 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). See also
Shores v. State, 233 So.2d 434 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970) which was in accord with the decision
of the Second District in Mitchell. Nowhere in the Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell was
the case of Shores v. State even acknowledged.
Moreover, both FiA. STAT. § 322.261(1) (1969) and FLA. STAT. § 322.261(1) (Supp.
1970) provide that "[tihe [chemical] test shall be incidental to a lawful arrest .... "
For a case contra to Mitchell see People v. Hawkins, 40 U.S.L.W. 2607 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
filed March 3, 1972).
204. 224 So.2d 441 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
205. An "inventory" of the contents of an abandoned or impounded car is deemed
reasonable because it is deemed necessary to insulate police and pound operators from
liability for theft or destruction. Id. at 443.
19721
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of the rule is to make admissible any incriminating evidence which is
found by police officers who in good faith are discharging their official
duties by making an inventory of impounded vehicles. 20 6
A warrantless search which is not incidental to an arrest is nonethe-
less lawful if the defendent consented thereto .1 7 And, while the state has
the burden of proving consent, 08 it is not necessary that the consent be in
writing209 or that the police inform the defendant that he has a right to
refuse to consent.210 Consent to a warrantless search of the defendant's
premises may be given by a third party who himself has an ownership
interest or dominion and control over the premises, such as a grand-
mother21' or a grandfather.212 However, in State v. Blakely,"8 the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Second District, held that the mere existence of a
husband-wife relationship, without more, did not impute authority to the
wife, after the husband's arrest, to consent to a warrantless search of the
couple's apartment. Although not expressly receding from this position,
the Second District, in a subsequent case,214 held that a wife has the right
to invite FBI agents into her home, and a search warrant obtained on the
basis of what they saw when inside the house is not defective or violative
of the husband's constitutional rights. The effectiveness of the holding in
Blakely 5 was further limited in Dinkins v. State.216 In Dinkins the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that for the purpose of con-
senting to a search, a car and a dwelling are distinguishable, and where a
husband gives the keys to his car to his wife, without specific instructions,
she had sufficient control to authorize a search of the car notwithstanding
the fact that she did not drive and did not have any ownership interest
in the car.
The issue of an owner's consent to the search of a tenant's apartment
was avoided in the alarming decision of State v. Clark.11 In Clark the
police had been called by the owner to investigate the use of drugs in one
of the apartments. With the owner's "implied consent" the police peered
into the defendant's room from the fire escape. The court, while giving
lip-service to the rule that "[a] person has a right to have his own home
206. The authors submit that the better rule is that such inventory checks are per-
missible, but should be limited only to the listing and storage of articles and should not be
used as an inadvertent method of gathering evidence.
207. See, e.g., Moss v. State, 247 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
208. Id.
209. Davis v. State, 226 So.2d 257 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
210. Cockerbam v. State, 237 So.2d 32 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970) ; James v. State, 223 So.2d
52 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
211. Addison v. State, 243 So.2d 238 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971) (defendant had exclusive
occupancy of room in his grandmother's house, but as a guest and not a tenant).
212. Rivers v. State, 226 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1969) (defendant had non-exclusive use of a
room in his grandfather's house).
213. 230 So.2d 698 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970). For an analysis of the wife consent issue see
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
214. State v. Coryell, 247 So.2d 87 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
215. See note 213 supra.
216. 244 So.2d 148 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
217. 242 So.2d 791 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 246 So.2d 112 (Fla. 1971).
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or residence reasonably secure from invasion, visual or otherwise, by the
police or anyone else," 18 held that since the fire escape was open to every-
one's use, the defendants had no right to expect any privacy with respect
to what they did inside the window within the view of anyone on the fire
escape, and thus there was no "search" or "invasion of privacy." The
court also upheld the officer's subsequent action of breaking down the
door, without warning or announcement, entering and forcibly seizing
"relatively small amounts" of marijuana.219
In the area of electronic surveilance, Walker v. State220 affirmed the
view that a tape recording of a meeting between the defendant and a
police informant who wore a microphone and transmitter is admissible
even though some portions of the tape were inaudible and unintelligible.
The problem of determining who has standing to contest the validity
of a search continues to arise. In Dycus v. State,221 a defendant charged
with possession and sale or delivery of drugs to another on the day prior
to the seizure of the drugs in another's apartment was held to have no
standing to contest the validity of the search since he did not own or
possess the seized property at the time of the search, had no ownership or
possessory interest in the premises searched, and was not present on the
premises when they were searched. In Perkins v. State,222 the court im-
plied that a defendant would not have standing to contest a search of the
backyard of his father's premises.223 However, since the holding was
based on the fact that the defendant failed to show that the backyard of
his father's house was constitutionally protected against unreasonable
search and seizure, the court did not expressly rule on the issue of stand-
ing.
V. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
Florida Statutes section 317.981 (1969), which requires motor-
cyclists to wear crash helmets, has been upheld as constitutional on the
theory that the public has a valid interest in the protection of the individ-
218. Id. at 793.
219. Id. at 795. The court relied on FLA. STAT. § 901.19(1) (1969) and Benefield v. State,
160 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1964), neither of which, in the authors' opinion, permit the action
taken in the instant case. FLA. STAT. § 901.19(1) (1969) permits an officer to break in "if
he is refused admittance after he has announced his authority and purpose." Benefield v.
State lists four additional situations wherein the police may forcibly enter without an-
nouncement, but none of those purport to allow the police action taken in the instant case.
220. 222 So.2d 760 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 232 So.2d 181 (Fla. 1969). See
also Tollett v. State, 244 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971) (tape recording of telephone con-
versation between informer and accused admissible at defendant's trial if monitoring and
recording was with express or implied consent of informer).
221. 238 So.2d 493 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(1960). See also Brown v. State, 245 So.2d 68 (Fla. 1971), citing Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377 (1968). Brown held that a person legitimately on the premises the day before
the search does not have standing to contest the search.
222. 228 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1969).
223. This implication is surprising in light of fact that issues of consent to search by
a third party and whether the search itself was incidental to the arrest were lurking in the
case.
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ual.224 Florida Statutes section 317.221 (1969), which makes it unlawful
to operate a motor vehicle on the highway at a speed greater than is rea-
sonable and prudent under conditions-having regard to the actual and
potential hazards there existing, is not so vague as to be unconstitu-
tional. 26 Florida Statutes section 828.04 (1969), which prohibits child
abuse, has been held not constitutionally vague by use of words "unnec-
essarily and excessively" since men of common intelligence could com-
prehend the meaning of these words when taken in the context of the
statute."2 6 Also, the section of the Florida Vagrancy Statute (Florida
Statutes section 856.02 (1969)) which prohibits "wandering and strolling
around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object" was
held not so broad and vague in nature as to violate due process. 27 More-
over, a decision by the federal district court 228 invalidating the Jackson-
ville vagrancy ordinance on constitutional grounds was held not binding
on the Florida courts.2 '
In Van Cott v. Driver,23 Florida Statutes section 790.23 (1969),
224. State v. Eitel, 227 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1969). Accord, Bogue v. Faircloth, 316 F. Supp.
486 (S.D. Fla. 1970). But see Carter v. Town of Palm Beach, 237 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1970)
(ordinance prohibiting surfing on the 13 miles of town's beachfront held arbitrary, un-
reasonable and invalid). See also Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-351, requiring that headlights of
motorcycles be turned on at all times while being operated on public highways.
225. Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1970).
226. Campbell v. State, 240 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1970), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 936
(1971).
227. Smith v. State, 239 So.2d 250 (Fla. 1970), noted in 25 U. MIAMI L. REv. 345
(1971). But see Justice Boyd's dissent at 239 So.2d 251, which regards the vagrancy statute
as vague, outdated and abusive. [Subsequent to the period covered by this survey the
Supreme Court invalidated Florida's vagrancy laws. See Papachristou v. City of Jackson-
ville, 92 S. Ct. 839 (1972); Smith v. Florida, 92 S. Ct. 848 (1972)].
228. Lazarus v. Faircloth, 301 F. Supp. 266 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
229. Brown v. City of Jacksonville, 236 So.2d 141 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), cert. granted
sub nom. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 403 U.S. 917 (1971). In Brown the court
stated that
[a] decision of a Federal District Court, while persuasive if well reasoned, is not
by any means binding on the courts of a state. The Supreme Court of Florida is
the apex of the judicial system of the State of Florida, and its decisions are bind-
ing upon this court. Id. at 142.
The federal district court may, by affording habeas corpus relief to state defendants
who have been convicted under the vagrancy state, indirectly force the Florida courts to
submit to the federal ruling. Cf. State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So.2d 442 (Fla.
1970). See also notes 95-100 supra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the relation-
ship between Florida courts and lower federal courts in Florida see L. LEvnesON & C.
ALLOWAY, FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASEBOOK 103-105 (D & S Pub. 1972 ed.)
[Subsequent to the survey period the Supreme Court declared the Jacksonville vagrancy
ordinance unconstitutional and suggested that the Florida Statute is also unconstitutional.
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 92 S. Ct. 839 (1972); Smith v. Florida, 92 S. Ct.
848 (1972).]
230. 243 So.2d 457 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). The court also held that the extraordinary
writ of prohibition will lie where jurisdiction was never conferred because the statute under
which the action was brought was void for being unconstitutional. [Subsequent to the
period covered by this survey the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that although the phrase
"other similar offenses" was constitutionally vague, the unconstitutionality of that phrase
did not render the remainder of the statute unconstitutional. Driver v. Van Cott, 257 So.2d
541 (Fla. 1971).]
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which made it unlawful for felons to possess firearms, was held invalid on
the grounds that the phrase "or other similar offenses" did not inform
those persons subject to it exactly what conduct is prohibited and was
therefore unconstitutionally vague.
In Hearns v. State,"' the statute3 2 requiring the taking, in open
court, of the fingerprints of a person convicted of a felony was held not
to be an unconstitutional legislative imposition of non-judicial duties
on the judiciary in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
A city ordinance which prohibited "verbal abuse" of police officers
was held invalid as being overbroad and not sufficiently precise to de-
scribe an offense so as to give fair warning to the citizen that certain
speech is prohibited.2 33 In Carlson v. City of Tallahassee,234 the defendant
was arrested for disturbing the peace in violation of a city ordinance when
he attempted to forcibly enter, with a protest sign, a facility rented by a
political candidate. The arrest and conviction were held valid on the
theory that by his actions, the defendant was violating the first amend-
ment rights of those who reserved the facility for their meeting, and was
thus guilty of disturbing the peace.
In Wilson v. State,15 the court held that the power of the jury to
determine death or mercy in capital cases is neither a denial of due pro-
cess nor cruel and unusual punishment, and is not void due to lack of
standards or guidelines for application.
A statutory presumption23 that one who is in possession of guns and
lights during hours of darkness in a place where deer might be found and
who uses the light in a manner capable of disclosing the presence of deer
intends to violate the statute proscribing illegal taking and possession of
deer and wild turkey, has been held constitutional. The statutory pre-
sumption of Florida Statutes section 500.151 (2) (1969), which provides
that possession of certain drugs without a label indicating a valid pre-
scription is prima facie evidence that the possession is unlawful, was
upheld as constitutional in State v. Kahler3 8 The court stated that the
presumption is rebuttable, and constitutional guarantees are not violated
as long as: (1) "there is a rational connection between the fact proven
and the ultimate fact presumed;" and (2) there is reasonable opportunity
to rebut the presumption. 39
231. 223 So.2d 738 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970).
232. FLA. STAT. § 921.025 (1969), repealed by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-339, § 180. The
subject matter is covered in FLA. R. CRIn. P. 1.670.
233. Waller v. City of St. Petersburg, 245 So.2d 685 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). [Subsequent
to the period of this survey Waller was reversed by the supreme court. City of St. Petersburg
v. Waller, case no. 41,080 (Fla. Sup. Ct. filed April 12, 1972).]
234. 240 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 244 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1971), 403
U.S. 910 (1971).
235. 225 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 947 (1971).
236. See FLA. STAT. § 372.99 (1969).
237. Williams v. State, 239 So.2d 583 (Fla. 1970).
238. 232 So.2d 166 (Fla. 1970).
239. Id. at 168. For a discussion of the constitutionality of statutory presumptions, see
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Also in the area of narcotics law, the Supreme Court of Florida in
Raines v. State,24° held that marijuana is a harmful, mind-altering drug
which endangers the health of the user and is highly detrimental to the
public welfare, and is therefore a "dangerous drug" which may be prop-
erly regulated by the legislature." 1 Also, Florida Statutes section 398.20
(1969), which provides that the burden of proof of any exception to the
narcotics law shall be on the defendant, has been held constitutional. 42
Further, in Borras v. State,245 the Supreme Court of Florida held that
the United States Supreme Court decision in Stanley v. Georgia244 did not
apply so as to render the Florida statute prohibiting the private posses-
sion of marijuana unconstitutional since there are no first amendment
rights involved in the use of marijuana and "the possession of marijuana
poses a much greater threat to society" than does possession of obscene
material.245 The court stated:
The interest of the state in preventing harm to the individual
and to the public at large amply justifies the outlawing of mari-
juana, in private and elsewhere.246
In State ex rel Jones v. Wiseheart247 it was held that the statutes
which authorize the transfer of criminal cases from the criminal court of
record to the circuit court are constitutional. Also, it has been held that
the statute which provides for a $1.00 assessment against persons con-
victed of a crime (which is used to improve the Florida Bureau of Law
Enforcement) is not unconstitutional as a tax or as a violation of the
separation of power doctrine, but rather is valid as a court cost since
there is a direct relationship between persons convicted of a crime and
agencies designed to protect society against such acts.2 48
In Miller v. State,249 a special act allowing the public defender to
subpoena witnesses was held unconstitutional in that it violated article V,
Fuller and Urich, An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Statutory Presumptions that
Lessen the Burden of the Prosecution, 25 U. MIAmi L. REV. 420 (1971).
240. 225 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1969), citing Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 243
N.E.2d 898 (1969).
241. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 398 (1969) and § 398.18 (Supp. 1970).
242. Falcon v. State, 226 So.2d 399 (Fla. 1969)
243 229 So.2d 244 (Fla. 1969), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 808 (1971).
244. 394 U.S. 557 (1969), noted in 24 U. MIAmi L. REV. 179 (1969). (Georgia statute
which prohibited the possession of obscene material was an unconstitutional violation of
first and fourteenth amendments insofar as it punished mere private possession of obscene
matter.)
245. Borras v. State, 229 So.2d 244, 246 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 808 (1970).
246. Id. at 246, citing State v. Eitel, 227 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1969), discussed at note 224
supra and accompanying text. For a good discussion of the right to privacy and how it
pertains to the private use of drugs, etc., see Doss and Doss, On Morals, Privacy and the
Constitution, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395 (1971).
247. 245 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1971).
248. State v. Young, 238 So.2d 589 (Fla. 1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 962 (1970).
249. 225 So.2d 409 (Fla. 1969).
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section 3 of the constitution which provides that the practice and proce-
dure in all courts shall be governed by rules adopted by the supreme court.
In Municipal Court v. Patrick,2 50 the defendant was convicted in
municipal court for violation of a curfew ordered by the mayor. The
mayor's curfew order was issued pursuant to a charter provision which
authorized him to take command of police and government during emer-
gencies. The court held that the provision could not authorize the mayor
to establish a curfew with penalties for its violation since another provi-
sion of the city charter vested the legislative power in the city commission
and provided that all enactments of a penal nature should be made by
ordinance. Further, it was held that there was nothing in the city charter
which would authorize the municipal court to try a person for violation
of a proclamation issued by the mayor.
VI. RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION-RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION
2 51
In Talavera v. State,"2 it was held that a defendant in a joint trial
who wishes to call his codefendant as a witness is entitled to a severance
if he can satisfy the trial judge that the testimony he expects to elicit is
valuable. This "right to confrontation" is limited, however, and it will
not apply unless the trial judge is satisfied that the motion was made in
good faith and that valuable testimony will result therefrom.253
When a police officer testified as to incriminating evidence given to him
by the defendant's codefendant, the defendant's right to confrontation
was held to have been violated even though the jury was instructed to
apply the testimony to only the one codefendant.'"
The right to cross-examination was held to be violated in Allen v.
State,255 when a defense lawyer who was cross-examining a police officer
was not allowed to examine the notes from which the witness was refresh-
ing his memory. In Brown v. State,"'6 the right to cross-examination was
not violated when the defense counsel was given permission to leave the
courtroom to meet an appointment, and in his absence and while being
represented by a codefendant's counsel, a confession from the codefen-
dants, implicating the defendant, was introduced into evidence.
250. 241 So.2d 195 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) (at the conclusion of its opinion the District
Court of Appeal stated that it "intended to certify the matter to the Supreme Court" as
one of great public interest; the Supreme Court of Florida accepted certification and af-
firmed, 254 So.2d (Fla. 1971)).
251. See section III, D, and notes 147-155 supra and accompanying text for cases
dealing with the rights of a defendant at a joint trial when a non-testifying codefendant's
confession has been admitted into evidence.
252. 227 So.2d 493 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), aff'd in part, 243 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1971).
253. Id. See note 722 infra and accompanying text.
254. Seidel v. State, 240 So.2d 521 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). See also section III, D, and
notes 147-55 supra and accompanying text. Contra Schneble v. Florida, 40 U.S.L.W. 4299
(U.S. filed March 21, 1972).
255. 243 So.2d 448 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
256. 233 So.2d 337 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 229 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1969), 397
U.S. 969 (1970).
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When a defense attorney invokes "the rule" and a witness for the
defense (his mother) is present in violation of the rule, it is not a denial
of the sixth amendment to refuse to allow the witness to testify.
257
VII. APPEAL
Court-appointed counsel who regards his client's request for appeal
to be frivolous must accompany his request for permission to withdraw
with a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably sup-
port the appeal. 5 A copy of said brief and a copy of the motion to with-
draw must be served on the defendant by certified mail, return receipt
requested." 9 If there are no debatable points and counsel accordingly
presents no points for the court's consideration in the brief, the court
may, after reviewing the record, allow counsel to withdraw. 6° On the
other hand, where a public defender's Anders type brief suggests the
defendant's appeal is frivolous, but a cursory inspection of the record by
the appellate court indicates there are non-frivolous points, the defendant
is entitled to counsel on full appeal even though the points raised may
ultimately be decided against the defendant.
261
If the defendant's right to direct appeal has been frustrated, the
appellate court which would have been empowered to hear the direct
appeal may, in appropriate circumstances, grant a defendant a delayed
appeal through the remedy of habeas corpus.262 In this regard, "appro-
priate circumstances" include instances wherein the defendant was de-
prived of direct appeal by the actions of a state functionary.263 Thus, a
belated appeal by way of the remedy of habeas corpus is appropriate
where an indigent was not represented by court-appointed appellate coun-
sel because of the failure of the trial court clerk to enter an order adjudg-
ing the defendant insolvent,264 or where a frustrated appeal results from
the failure of a court-appointed counsel or public defender to file a
timely notice of appeal.265 On the other hand, the procedure suggested by
Hollingshead and Ervin"' was held not to apply in Mapp v. State.267 In
257. Pieze v. State, 243 So.2d 442 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 121
(1971). Contra, Braswell v. Wainwright, 330 F. Supp. 281 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
258. State v. Wooden, 246 So.2d 755 (Fla. 1971), citing Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967). Wooden overrules Frizzell v. State, 238 So.2d 67 (Fla. 1970).
259. Daniel v. State, 233 So.2d 405 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970). A copy of the Anders brief
must be served on the defendant whether counsel moves to withdraw or not.
260. See Wilson v. State, 245 So.2d 693 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
261. Smith v. State, 222 So.2d 45 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). For the subsequent history of
the case see Smith v. State, 228 So.2d 613 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969) (conviction reversed).
262. State v. Wooden, 246 So.2d 755 (Fla. 1971), citing Baggett v. Wainwright, 229
So.2d 239 (Fla. 1969).
263. See e.g., State ex rel. Ervin v. Smith, 160 So.2d 518 (Fla. 1964); Hollingshead v.
Wainwright, 194 So.2d 577 (Fla. 1967).
264. Betts v. State, 237 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), citing Hollingshead v. State,
194 So.2d 577 (Fla. 1967).
265. State ex rel. Arnold v. State, 233 So.2d 173 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
266. See note 263 supra.
267. 224 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
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Mapp, the defendant-prisoner delivered his notice of appeal to prison
officials four days before it was required to be filed in the clerk of the
trial court's office. The prison officials did not mail the notice of appeal
until four days later, the very day the notice had to be filed. The court
denied the petition for a habeas corpus belated appeal and held that the
late filing of the notice of appeal was due to the defendant's own lack of
diligence and was not the result of state action by prison officials. 68
In a case where appellate counsel, who was appointed nine days
before the running of the appeal period, did not file a timely notice of
appeal because he was under the impression that trial counsel had already
so filed, the court treated the pleadings as a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.269
In Cole v. State,270 the trial court considered a motion for new trial
although the motion had not been timely made. Nineteen days after the
denial of the motion for a new trial (which was 110 days entry of the
judgment appealed from) a notice of appeal was filed. The court held
that since the motion for a new trial was not timely it could not serve to
toll the running of the appeal period. The appeal was therefore dismissed
for want of jurisdiction.
A motion for a new trial is a prerequisite to an appeal based on in-
sufficiency of evidence.27' In Horsted v. Wainwright,272 it was held that
in the absence of an actual allegation of insufficiency of evidence in the
habeas corpus petition, a petitioner who sought appellate review of the
sufficiency of evidence underlying his conviction was not entitled to
habeas corpus relief. The court rejected the claim that failure of his
appointed counsel to file a motion for new trial deprived the defendant of
a right to appeal the sufficiency of the evidence and thereby constituted
a denial of due process.
In Jenkins v. Lyles2 75 the Supreme Court of Florida held that the
state's failure to serve a copy of notice of appeal on the defendant does
not divest the appellate court of jurisdiction. In such a case appropriate
sanctions may be imposed, but dismissal of the appeal is not proper
unless the defendant can show he has been substantially prejudiced by
the state's failure to serve notice. Further, it was held that since Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.030(a) provides that orders not entered in
open court shall be in writing, the state could not appeal from an oral
268. In the opinion of the authors, the result in Mapp is inconsistent with the dicta in
State ex rel. Ervin v. Smith, 160 So.2d 518 (Fla. 1964).
269. Henninger v. State, 230 So.2d 149 (Fla. 1970) (appellate counsel did timely file
motions for preparation of trial transcript, but the court held this did not constitute actual
notice of appeal).
270. 224 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
271. Rice v. State, 243 So.2d 226 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). See also notes 717-720 infra
and accompanying text.
272. 239 So.2d 153 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
273. 223 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1969).
1972]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVI
order granting a motion to quash an information.274 A similar problem
arose in State v. Kahler,275 wherein the trial judge orally quashed an in-
formation but refused to enter a written order to that effect. The Supreme
Court of Florida remanded the case to the trial court with the instruction
that a written order be entered stating the grounds for the decision to
quash.
The rule requiring the state to appeal pretrial orders suppressing
evidence "before trial" applies when the defendant pleads nolo contendere
as well as when he pleads guilty or not guilty.
2 70
In Lowman v. States77 it was held that the denial of a motion to
grant jail time credit is not appealable.
In Rushing v. State,2 78 the defendant argued that his right to appeal
had been thwarted because the court reporter had lost her notes and was
therefore unable to prepare a trial transcript. In response the court re-
stated the rule that:
It is not a necessary prerequisite to appellate review that the
record on appeal contain a verbatim transcript of the evidence
and events transpiring at the trial. On the contrary, a summar-
ized statement in narrative form [certified by the trial judge]
may furnish a substantially accurate account of the rulings of
the trial judge and the basis on which they were invoked. Such
statement may be prepared from notes kept by counsel; from
the judge's notes; from the recollection of counsel, the judge
and witnesses as to what occurred at the trial; and from any
and all sources which will contribute to an accurate reflection
of the trial proceedings . .. [T]he parties may agree upon a
condensed statement in narrative form of all or any part of the
testimony. 79
The question of whether a defective but timely notice of appeal
ousts the appellate court of jurisdiction was addressed, via conflict cer-
tiorari, in Gissendanner v. State.2 11 In Gissendanner the court held that
although the minute book references in the notice of appeal were to
entry and filing of verdicts rather than final judgment, such defects
were not jurisdictional since the notice of appeal, considered in context,
was sufficient to indicate an intent to appeal an appealable order and
was not misleading or prejudicial to the adverse party281 The court
relied on Florida Appellate Rule 3.2 (c) which provides:
274. Id., citing State v. Shedaker, 190 So.2d 429 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966). Contra, Gossett
v. State, 188 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
2,75. 224 So.2d 272 (Fla. 1969).
276. State v. Budnik, 237 So.2d 825 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
277. 242 So.2d 750 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
278. 233 So.2d 137 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
279. Id. at 138, quoting from Thomas v. State, 160 So.2d 119 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
280. 241 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1970).
281. Accord, Eggers v. Narron, 238 So.2d 72 (Fla. 1970) (civil case).
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Deficiencies in form or substance in the notice of appeal shall
not be jurisdictional and shall not be ground for dismissal of
the appeal unless it be clearly shown that the complaining
party was mislead or prejudiced by such deficiencies.
VIII. BAIL
In Ackies v. Purdy,8 2 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida held that the mandatory use of master bond
lists by the county sheriff's office was violative of the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The court stated:
"The right to pre-trial release under reasonable conditions is a funda-
mental right, both under the Florida and Federal Constitutions."288 The
court concluded that an accused may, after having been fully advised of
his right to have the conditions of his release set by a magistrate, waive
his right to such a hearing and post bond in compliance with the master
bond schedule.
In Williams v. State,"4 it was held that where the defendant had
previously committed a crime while free on supersedeas bond, it was not
an abuse of discretion to deny a subsequent supersedeas bond.
In State ex rel. Smith v. Untreiner,15 the defendant argued that bail
set at $100,000 pending his trial for allegedly committing three non-
capital felonies was excessive. The court stated that the purpose of bail
is not to punish the accused but rather to secure his attendance at trial.
However, the greater the number of charges the greater likelihood the
defendant will not appear for trial; therefore it was held that the court
did not abuse its discretion in setting a high bail, even though the defen-
dant established that he had a previous history of appearing when out on
bail in other cases.
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Greene v. State,286 held that
Florida Statute section 903.131 (1969), which denies bail upon appeal
to persons previously convicted of a felony, was not an unconstitutional
denial of equal protection. However, the statute is prospective only and
therefore may not be invoked to deny bail on appeal if the offenses for
which the defendant is charged were committed before the effective date
of the statute. This is so even though a conviction for one of the offenses
came after the effective date of the statute.
IX. CHARGE TO THE JURY
The Supreme Court of Florida has authorized the publication of
standard jury instructions by the Committee on Standard Jury Instruc-
282. 322 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
283. Id. at 41.
284. 229 So.2d 2 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
285. 246 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 250 So.2d 643 (Fla. 1971).
286. 238 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1970).
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tions in Criminal Cases.287 Further, the court amended the Florida Rules
of Criminal Procedure to include Form 1.985 authorizing the use of such
standard instructions when applicable and allowing for modification or
amendment by the trial judge.
288
Although Florida Statutes section 917.10(2) (1969) made it manda-
tory for jury instructions in a capital case to be written, it was not error
that the trial judge failed to make those written instructions available to
the jurors for the purposes of deliberation.28 9 Also, when the charges as
to degrees of homicide and the fact that the jury could recommend
mercy were in writing, the fact that the judge extemporaneously added
to the charge by orally instructing as to the possible verdicts returnable
on a recommendation of mercy was not error and the requirements of
Florida Statutes section 918.10(2) (1969) were satisfied." 0
Where a judge refers to four specific crimes and then charges the
jury to return one of "five forms of verdicts" (the fifth presumably
being not guilty), it is not error that the judge did not specifically in-
struct the jury that its verdict could be "not guilty," since the defense
counsel did not timely object to the incomplete charge, thereby waiving
the point.29' The question of misleading instructions was also raised in
Beckton v. State2 92 and was also summarily dismissed on the ground that
there was no timely objection to preserve the error. In Beckton, the
judge, pursuant to the jury's request for a repeat of the instructions, re-
peated the instructions on degrees of homicide but failed to repeat the
instructions on justifiable or excusable homicide. Judge Rawls, in his
dissenting opinion,"' argued that such error was so fundamental that a
new trial should have been granted even though the error was not ob-
jected to at trial. Support for such an argument may be found in Stinson
v. State2"4 which held that when the trial judge purports to give a charge
on justifiable homicide, every essential element of justifiable homicide,
justified by any of the evidence, should be given. Further, the omission
of an essential element of the charge is fundamental error, requiring a
reversal even though the charge was not objected to.
The question of how far a judge may go in an attempt to encourage
deliberating jurors to reach a verdict was addressed in Lee v. State.295
287. In re Standard jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 240 So.2d 472 (Fla. 1970).
288. Id.
289. Matire v. State, 232 So.2d 209 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
FLA. STAT. § 918.10(2) (Supp. 1970) provides that all charges, including those in
a capital case, shall be orally given and transcribed by the court reporter.
290. Baker v. State, 247 So.2d 495 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
291. Lindsey v. State, 230 So.2d 689 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
292. 227 So.2d 223 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
293. Id. (dissenting opinion), citing Hedges v. State, 172 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1965). The
authors agree with the dissent, and submit that the defendant was denied a fair trial.
FLA. STAT. § 918.10 (Supp. 1970) does not require that a party object at trial before
appealing an instruction, as was the case under FLA. STAT. § 918.10(4) (1969).
294. 245 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
295. 239 So.2d 136 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 240 So.2d 642 (Fla. 1970).
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In Lee a near midnight "Allen ' 296 or "blockbuster" type charge given
to a jury which had been deliberating for six hours accompanied with
information which implied that the jury of mixed sexes would be lodged
as a group overnight, was held to be reversible error. It was held that the
court, although anxious for a verdict, should not instruct the jury in a
manner which tends to embarrass a juror who is holding to his honest
convictions. The minority must not be led to believe it is their duty to
acquiese with the majority or with the wishes of the court.
Nothing should be said by the trial court . . . likely to influ-
ence the decision of a single juror to abandon his conscientious
belief as to the correctness of his position.297
During the period surveyed there has been much litigation con-
cerning charges on degrees of an offense298 and lesser included offenses.2 9
In Sloan v. State,3° the failure to instruct on lesser included offenses
was held not to be reversible error (1) where there was no request to so
instruct, and (2) where the appellant failed to show that the error was
prejudicial. In State v. Smith"0' the Supreme Court of Florida reaffirmed
the view of Brown v. StateS°2 and held that a lesser included offense may
or may not be necessarily included in the offense charged depending on
the accusatory pleading and the evidence3 0 Thus, if the record in a rape
case does not support the lesser included offense of assault, it is not
error for the judge to refuse to instruct on assault and battery.304 On the
other hand, upon request, the judge must charge the jury as to lesser
degrees of the charge whether the evidence will support the elements or
not.3 0
5
296. So named from the case of Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
297. Lee v. State, 239 So.2d 136, 139 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
298. FLA. STAT. § 919.14 (1969), which required that the judge should charge the jury
on all lesser degrees of a crime, was repealed by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-339, § 180, because the
same rule was covered by FLA. R. CRIm. P. 1.490.
299. FLA. STAT. § 919.16 (1969), which required the judge to charge the jury as to
all necessarily included lesser offenses, was repealed by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-339, § 180,
because the same rule was covered by FLA. R. CHI . P. 1.510.
300. 226 So.2d 863 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 234 So.2d 124 (Fla. 1969), 397
U.S. 1056 (1970). See also Grizzell v. State, 233 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), cert.
denied, 237 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1970), motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas
corpus denied, 400 U.S. 915 (1970).
301. 240 So.2d 807 (Fla. 1970), disapproving Goswick v. State, 143 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1962).
302. 206 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1968).
303. Thus, in Smith v. State, note 301 supra, it was established that if, in a prosecu-
tion for conspiracy to commit murder, the pleadings and the evidence will support a verdict
of conspiracy to commit assault and battery, the latter is a lesser included offense of the
former.
304. DeLaine v. State, 230 So.2d 168 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970). However, if it is proper to
charge on lesser included offenses, it is also proper to instruct the jury on the penalty for each
of the lesser included crimes. Pinkney v. State, 241 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1970), citing FLA. STAT.
§ 918.10(1) (1969).
305. Bailey v. State, 224 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1969).
Here is a difference between § 919.16,--the necessarily included offense statute-
and § 919.14-the divisibility into degrees statute. Under the former the lesser
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It has been held that where a defendant is charged with homicide
it is not necessary that the judge instruct the jury that it may find the
defendant guilty of aggravated assault, since assault is not a lesser neces-
sarily included offense of murder.3 6 Similarly, attempt to commit armed
robbery is not a lesser included offense of homicide.3 °7 On the other
hand, aggravated assault is a necessarily included lesser offense of the
charge of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit murder.3 8
Also, in a murder charge, the evidence may be such as to justify a charge
of shooting into a building in violation of Florida Statutes section
790.19 (1969). 809 Where a defendant is charged with second degree
murder, a conviction of the lesser included offense of manslaughter might
result; therefore, the judge should instruct the jury as to the elements of
justifiable homicide since justifiable homicide is specifically excludable
as an offense under the manslaughter statute.3 0
A person who is charged in an indictment or information with com-
mission of a crime may be convicted on proof that he aided or abetted in
the commission of such crime.3 ' Thus, the refusal to grant the state's
request for an aiding and abetting instruction is erroneous if the evidence
supported the charge.3 12
In Dames v. State3' the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
held that since the language of Florida Statutes section 919.14 (1969)
is mandatory, a charge on lesser degrees of homicide in a prosecution for
second degree murder is proper even though the defendant requested
that the court not so charge. However, in Washington v. State31 4 the
District Court of Appeal, First District, held an instruction on lesser in-
cluded offenses should not have been given where the defendant charged
with rape objected to such instruction. The court in Washington rea-
soned that since the instructions on lesser included offenses are waiv-
offense must necessarily be included in the offense charged. Hence it is necessary
to prove the lesser in order to prove the greater. Under § 919.14, the lesser degrees
of the major crime are not necessarily included in it, and, therefore, are not essential
elements of proof in establishing it. Nevertheless, the statute, § 919.14, permits a
jury to convict of the lesser degree regardless of the accusations and proofs.
Id. at 297, quoting Brown v. State, 206 So.2d 377, 381-82 (Fla. 1968), (emphasis supplied
by Bailey court).
306. Sadler v. State, 222 So.2d 797 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969); Anderson v. State, 235 So.2d
738 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). See also Brown v. State, 245 So.2d 68 (Fla. 1971).
307. Brown v. State, 245 So.2d 68 (Fla. 1971).
308. Moses v. State, 242 So.2d 145 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
309. Anderson v. State, 230 So.2d 39 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
310. Whitehead v. State, 245 So.2d 94 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971), citing FLA. STAT. § 782.07
(1969).
311. State v. Roby, 246 So.2d 566 (Fla. 1971), quashing Roby v. State, 229 So.2d 604
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1969); Anderson v. State, 241 So.2d 390, 395-96 (Fla. 1970).
312. State v. Roby, 246 So.2d 566 (Fla. 1971).
313. 222 So.2d 52 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
314. 247 So.2d 743 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). [Subsequent to the period covered by this
survey, the First District distinguished its holding in Washington. See Smith v. State, 259
So.2d 498 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).]
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able, 15 the defendant has the right to be tried upon the charges set out in
the charging instrument.
X. SENTENCE
In North Carolina v. Pearce31 6 the United States Supreme Court
established that (1) punishment already exacted must be fully credited
in imposing sentence upon a new conviction for the same offense, and
(2) due process requires that vindictiveness against the defendant must
play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. Thus, where
a defendant who originally received a ten year term was subsequently
sentenced to fifteen years at his new trial, the subsequent sentence was
invalid because (1) the defendant was not credited with time served
under the original sentence, and (2) there was no factual data in the
record which affirmatively supported the more severe sentence.
1 7
The rule that has developed is that regardless of how meritorious
a trial judge's reasons might be for imposing a more severe sentence
after a new trial, such reason must be made part of the record so that
the appellate court may review the question of vindictiveness, or the
sentence will be vacated.3 1
Although time served must be credited in imposing a sentence upon
a new conviction for the same offense,-1 ' awarding credit for time served
in jail while awaiting the original trial is within the discretion of the trial
judge.
3 20
315. See note 300 supra and accompanying text.
316. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against defendant for having
successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he re-
ceives after a new trial. And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitu-
tionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack
his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehen-
sion of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.
In order to assure the absence of such a motivation, we have concluded that
whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new
trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must
be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part
of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.
And the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based must be made part
of the record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be
fully reviewed on appeal.
Id. at 725-26.
317. Stonom v. Wainwright, 235 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), citing North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
318. Standifer v. State, 241 So.2d 205 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970) (trial court increased
sentence on basis of presentence investigation report which was not part of the record).
Accord, Cox v. State 243 So.2d 611 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971) (upon original conviction de-
fendant was sentenced to five years, at new trial he was sentenced to life; held, sentence
reversed).
319. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Stonom v. Wainwright, 235 So.2d
545 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
320. Richardson v. State, 243 So.2d 598 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971), citing FLA. STAT. § 921.161
(1969) which says that the judge may allow credit for time served awaiting trial; Albury
v. State, 246 So.2d 141 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). The federal rule is contra. Dunn v. United
States, 376 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1967) (mandatory requirement).
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In Durham v. State,32' the defendant argued that the refusal of the
trial judge to give him credit for jail time spent awaiting trial was a denial
of his constitutional right to equal protection as guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court dismissed
the constitutional issue by holding that since the most credit the defen-
dant could have received was 8-1/2 months of a 99 year sentence, the
doctrine of de minimis non curat lex applied.
During the period surveyed numerous cases have dealt with the
jurisdiction of the trial judge to modify a sentence. The trial judge has
no power to set aside a sentence already partially served and increase
the punishment. 22 Moreover, once sentence has been imposed and the
time provided for mitigation of sentence has run,823 the trial judge no
longer has jurisdiction to mitigate the sentence. 24 Thus, in Ware v.
State,32 5 a defendant who had been convicted and sentenced to two
years, and later placed on parole by the trial judge pursuant to an un-
timely motion for mitigation, could not upon revocation of parole, be
sentenced to a term longer than the original sentence.
If the maximum sentence a municipal court has jurisdiction to im-
pose is 90 days, a defendant who received a suspended sentence with an
order to leave town may not, after the expiration of 90 days, be in-
carcerated for being present in the town in violation of the order.32 6
Florida Statutes section 775.14 (1969) provides:
Any person receiving a withheld sentence upon conviction for
a criminal offense, and such withheld sentence has not been
altered for a period of five years, shall not thereafter be sen-
tenced for the conviction of the same crime for which sentence
was originally withheld.
This statute was applied in the interesting case of Gazda v. State. 27 In
Gazda the defendant plead guilty but sentence and adjudication were
withheld pending a medical examination of the defendant who had symp-
toms of tuberculosis. After having been sent to the hospital for treat-
ment, the defendant disappeared and was not returned to the trial court
until five years and three months after he had entered his guilty plea.
The court held that the five year period of limitation of Florida Statutes
section 775.14 (1969) must be measured from conviction,28 not from
321. 235 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
322. Beckom v. State, 227 So.2d 232 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), citing Smith v. Brown, 135
Fla. 830, 185 So. 732 (1938).
323. FLA. STAT. § 921.25 (1969) and FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.800(b) establish the time
within which a motion for mitigation of sentence can be made.
324. See State v. Evans, 235 So.2d 548 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 229 So.2d 261
(Fla. 1969).
325. 231 So.2d 872 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
326. State ex rel. Baldwin v. Alsbury, 223 So.2d 546 (Fla. 1969).
327. 244 So.2d 454 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). The decision was certified to the Supreme
Court of Florida as a question of great public interest.
328. "[T]he term 'conviction' means the finding of guilt either by the jury or by the
judge sitting as trier of fact or the establishment of guilt by a proper plea of guilty."
Gazda v. State, 244 So.2d 454, 456 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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time of adjudication.3 29 Thus, because the defendant was sentenced
after more than five years had elapsed from the date of conviction, the
district court held it had no jurisdiction to sentence the defendant."' °
It has been held that a sentence which is suspended "from day to
day and term to term until further order of the court" is illegal.3 1 How-
ever, in such a situation if the sentence is actually imposed within the
five year period fixed by Florida Statutes section 775.14 (1969), any
error is corrected.3 2
Where an information contains more than one count, but each is a
facet or phase of the same transaction, only one sentence may be im-
posed, and the sentence which should be imposed is for the highest of-
fense charged. 3 Thus, where the defendant, in the same information, is
charged with two counts of possession of marijuana and two counts of
sale of marijuana, and the possession and sale for each pair of counts
occurred on the same day, each pair of counts represented a facet or
phase of a single transaction, and therefore there should be one sen-
tence as to each pair of counts. 3 4
The rule of Williams v. Illinois,3 5 that an indigent defendant who
has been sentenced to the maximum period fixed by statute for the sub-
stantive offense may not be imprisoned beyond the maximum term speci-
fied by statute because of his inability to satisfy the monetary provisions
of the sentence, has been adopted in Florida 3 6 and has been held to apply
to court costs as well as to fines. 3 7
Miscellaneous cases on sentencing in the period surveyed include
329. Contra, McCloud v. State, 237 So.2d 818 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1970), citing Bateh v.
State, 101 So.2d 869 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1958), cert. discharged, 110 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1959); Rod-
riquez v. State, 119 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1960); Helton v. State, 106 So.2d 79 (Fla. 1958). The
Gazda court held these cases not applicable since they dealt with situations arising before
the effective date of FLA. STAT. § 775.14 (1969). Gazda v. State, 244 So.2d 454, 457 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1970).
330. In the dissenting opinion of Gazda v. State, 244 So.2d 454, 457, Justice Walden
offered a number of interpretations which would support a result contrary to that of the
majority, one of which being that the defendant should not, by his own flight, escape
sentencing. In the authors' opinion, it is likely that the suggestions found in Justice Walden's
dissent will be the basis for a reversal of the majority opinion by the Supreme Court of
Florida.
[Subsequent to the preparation of this survey Gazda was reversed by the Supreme
Court of Florida on the grounds that by leaving the state, the defendant tolled the running
of the five year limitation statute. State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242 (Fla. 1971).]
331. Stallworth v. State, 237 So.2d 328 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
332. Id. [Subsequent to the period of this survey, Stallworth was reversed by the
Supreme Court of Florida. State v. Stallworth, 251 So.2d 847 (Fla. 1971) citing Rodriquez
v. State, 119 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1960). See also Smith v. State, 259 So.2d 498 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1972).]
333. Yost v. State, 243 So.2d 469 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). See also Farrell v. State, 259
So.2d 540 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972) (decided subsequent to the survey period) which follows
Yost. But see Parker v. State, 237 So.2d 253 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970); note 431 infra and ac-
companying text.
334. Yost v. State, 243 So.2d 469 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
335. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
336. Dunn v. State, 247 So.2d 26 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971); Booth v. State, 246 So.2d 791
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1971) ; Schreck v. State, 240 So.2d 873 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
337. Gary v. State, 239 So.2d 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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decisions which held: the court may not sentence the defendant in his
absence;- 8 the crime of breaking and entering with intent to commit a
misdemeanor may be a felony or misdemeanor depending upon the
penalty actually imposed;"' a presentence investigation under Florida
Statutes section 948.01(2) (1969) is not mandatory, and the refusal of
the trial judge to order a presentence investigation before imposing sen-
tence is not error. 40 In those cases where the statute defining the crime
provides for increased punishment for the commission of successive
related offenses, one may not be given the enhanced sentence of a second
or third or subsequent offender without having been so charged and the
allegation proven in an adversary proceeding conducted with all due
process safeguards. 4'
XI. METROPOLITAN COURT
Pursuant to a petition by The Florida Bar, the Supreme Court of
Florida compiled a set of rules which govern all proceedings involving
traffic offenses for which a penalty may be imposed."4 2 The Florida Rules
of Practice and Procedure for Traffic Courts supersede all conflicting
rules and statutes and are applicable in municipal courts and in any
mayor's courts, magistrates courts, county courts, county judge's courts,
justice of the peace courts, and metropolitan courts having jurisdiction
of traffic cases.848 Local rules of any court which supplement these rules
must be published and approved by the Supreme Court of Florida.844 If,
in the trial of a traffic offense, a jury is requested, the Traffic Rules pro-
vide that the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure shall apply. 45 The
Traffic Court Rules are set out in Volume 247 of the Southern Reporter,
Second Series, page 281 and should be consulted prior to the litigation of
traffic offenses in the Metropolitan Court.
Goldstein v. State46 held that the metropolitan court has jurisdic-
338. Wellington v. State, 226 So.2d 432 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), citing FLA. STAT. § 921.07
(1969) [This statute was repealed by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-339, § 180, because the same
rule is contained in FLA. R. CRM. P. 1.720].
339. Brown v. State, 237 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1970), overruling Adams v. Elliot, 128 Fla.
79, 174 So. 731 (1937). See FLA. STAT. § 810.05 (1969) [amended by FLA. STAT. § 810.05
(Supp. 1970)].
340. Johnson v. State, 242 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), citing Morgan v. State, 142
So.2d 308 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
341. Johnson v. State, 229 So.2d 13 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
In Dallas v. State, 229 So.2d 891 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969) the defendant, while represented
by counsel, was convicted of a felony. There was, however, no attorney at sentencing.
Since the lack of an attorney at sentencing does not invalidate the conviction, it was held
that an increased punishment as a second offender may be given on the basis of the prior
conviction.
342. In re Florida Traffic Court Rules, 247 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1971). The Florida Traffic
Court Rules are abbreviated "Tr. CR."
343. FLA. Tr. CR. 6.01.
344. FLA. Tr. CR. 6.03.
345. FLA. Tr. CR. 6.13.
346. 223 So.2d 354 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), interpreting section 30-15(a) of the Code of
Metropolitan Dade County, Florida.
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tion to convict a defendant of violating a county ordinance which pro-
hibits driving while intoxicated "within this county," where the defen-
dant was found, while under the influence, driving her vehicle on the
private property of a third person which was situated within the county
of Dade.
XII. FORMER JEOPARDY
A plea of guilty entered to a valid criminal charge does, upon ac-
ceptance, raise the bar of former jeopardy against another prosecution
for an offense based on the same transaction.347 Thus, where the court
accepts defendant's plea of guilty to murder in the second degree,
jeopardy has attached, and the state may not nolle prosequi the charge
of murder in the second degree and charge the defendant with first
degree murder, since the same transaction was the basis for both
charges. 4 On the other hand, cases have distinguished between "same
offense" and "same transaction" and have held that the test for double
jeopardy is whether the defendant has been twice in jeopardy for the
same identical crime, not whether he has been tried before upon the
same acts, circumstances or situation, the facts of which may sustain
a conviction for a separate crime. 49 Thus, a conviction in municipal
court of unauthorized use of an automobile did not constitute former
jeopardy with regard to a subsequent prosecution in the county court
of record for breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny of such
automobile. 50 Also, conviction for operating a motor vehicle without a
valid driver's license did not bar a subsequent prosecution for driving
while the license is under suspension since the charges did not constitute
the "same offense," and the latter charge requires proof of additional
facts which the former does not."51
The defense of former jeopardy must be raised by a motion to dis-
miss. Failure to move to dismiss constitutes waiver of the defense.5 2
Double jeopardy does not bar all retrials. For example, the retrial
of an accused is not barred by double jeopardy if the original conviction
was set aside because of error in the proceedings leading to the convic-
tion. 53
In the case of a mistrial, it has been held that if the judge declared
a mistrial over the objection of the defendant, and there was no "urgent
347. Ray v. State, 231 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1969).
348. Reyes v. State, 224 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 958 (1970). See
also Ray v. State, 231 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1969).
349. State v. Conrad, 243 So.2d 174 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
350. Id.
The fact that the same set of facts will support a charge under a municipal ordinance
as well as a violation of a state statute does not constitute double jeopardy. State v. Malone,
227 So.2d 896 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). But see Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970) (cities
and states are not "separate sovereignties" for purpose of double jeopardy rule).
351. Lanier v. State, 226 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
352. Robinson v. Wainwright, 240 So.2d 65 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
353. Ray v. State, 231 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1969).
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necessity" for a mistrial, the doctrine of double jeopardy precluded a
retrial.,64 However, the requirement that the mistrial be "urgently neces-
sary" was relaxed in Goodman v. State ex rel. Furlong.55 In Goodman a
codefendant asked for a severance because he would be introducing
evidence which would prejudice his codefendant. The court granted a
mistrial as to both defendants. The non-moving codefendant argued his
subsequent prosecution was barred in that there was no necessity to
declare a mistrial as to him. The Supreme Court of Florida held that
the test for determining the effect of a mistrial is not whether a legally
sufficient reason existed for granting the mistrial, but whether the "trial
judge exercised his sound discretion in determining that the mistrial was
for good cause." '56 Since there was no showing that the trial judge abused
his discretion, the plea of double jeopardy was not substantiated.
In a somewhat unique case, the accuseds were found guilty of mur-
der in the first degree, but the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the
conviction because "the evidence was definitely lacking in establishing
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. '3 57 The court remanded the case for a
new trial. The defendants thereupon filed a suggestion for a writ of pro-
hibition, arguing that a reversal based on insufficiency of evidence is
tantamount to a finding of not guilty, and therefore the doctrine of
double jeojardy should bar a retrial. The District Court of Appeal,
Second District, disagreed. The district court interpreted the supreme
court's finding to be that the evidence, although weak, was legally suffi-
cient to withstand a motion for directed verdict of acquittal and there-
fore double jeopardy did not apply. 58
In Ashe v. Swenson, 59 the United States Supreme Court held that
the doctrine of "collateral estoppel" '36 is embodied in the fifth amend-
ment guarantee against double jeopardy. This rule applies to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. 6 1 Thus, when a jury determines by
354. State ex rel. Richmond v. Tyson, 226 So.2d 345 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969) (after hearing
state's witnesses the judge resigned and the new judge who was assigned the case declared
a mistrial; held, since the new judge could have recalled the witnesses, there was no need
for a mistrial).
355. 247 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1971), quashing State ex rel. Furlong v. Goodman, 238 So.2d
150 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
356. Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
357. Sosa v. State, 215 So.2d 736, 737 (Fla. 1968), quoted in Sosa v. Maxwell, 234
So.2d 690 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 240 So.2d 640 (Fla. 1970), 402 U.S. 951 (1971).
358. Sosa v. Maxwell, 234 So.2d 690, 691-92 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 240 So.2d
640 (Fla. 1970), 402 U.S. 951 (1971).
359. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
360. "Collateral estoppel" . . . means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has
once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be
litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
361. In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the United States Supreme Court
held the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy was enforceable against the
states through the fourteenth amendment. In Ashe the Court held the Benton rule to be
retroactive. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 437n.1 (1970). See also Sosa v. Maxwell, 234
So.2d 690 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 240 So.2d 640 (Fla. 1970), 402 U.S. 951 (1971).
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its verdict that a defendant was not one of a group of robbers, the state
may not bring him before a new jury to relitigate that issue. 62
Florida courts, however, have been reluctant in accepting the rule of
Ashe v. Swenson. In Simpson v. State,363 the defendant, after having his
first conviction for robbery reversed because of a defective instruction,
was acquitted of the charge of armed robbery of a store. The defendant
was subsequently prosecuted (for the third time) for robbing a different
individual at the same time and place. The court refused to apply the
collateral estoppel principle of Ashe to the third prosecution, arguing
that since the state had proved that the defendant was involved in the
robbery in the first prosecution, which had been reversed only because
of the defective instruction, the defendant should not be allowed to use
his subsequent acquittal as a bar to future prosecution for the same
offense. In Christopher v. State,364 the District Court of Appeals, First
District, after quoting a substantial portion of the Ashe decision, sug-
gested that the collateral estoppel doctrine did not apply when the testi-
mony identifying the defendant in the second case was stronger than at
the first trial.365
XIII. DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT
In Melendez v. State.66 the District Court of Appeals, Third Dis-
trict, held that because the defendant had not been notified that trial
proceedings were to begin when they did, and because the defendant was
not present when counsel selected the jury, defendant's subsequent in-
court waiver of any objection to selection of jurors in his absence was
not freely or competently given, and the statute prescribing the defen-
dant's right to presence during empaneling of jury was violated. How-
ever, in State v. Melendez 61 the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the
Third District and held: (1) that the defendant had ratified his coun-
sel's waiver of the defendant's right to be present by subsequently ap-
pearing without objection, and (2) the defendant had "constructive
knowledge" of the proceedings because he was represented by counsel
362. Asbe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 446 (1970).
363. 237 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). [Subsequent to the period covered by this
survey Simpson was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States. Simpson v.
Florida, 403 U.S. 384 (1971), citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).]
364. 240 So.2d 316 (Fla. 1st 1970). (Defendant was acquitted of robbing a bar and
was lated prosecuted for robbing a package store which, although in a different room, was
in the same building and was robbed at the same time as the bar.)
365. Id. at 317. The court also suggested that since the defendant did not move to
dismiss the second prosecution on the grounds of collateral estoppel he could not raise the
defense of collateral estoppel for the first time on appeal. The court failed to delineate which
theory served as the basis for its decision.
366. 231 So.2d 251 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), citing FLA. STAT. § 914.01(3) (1969). See also
notes 541-42 infra and accompanying text.
367. 244 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1971), citing FLA. R. CaIM. P. 1.180(a)(3) [FLA. STAT.
§ 914.01 (1969) was repealed by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-339, § 180, because the statute was
superseded by FLA. R. CRms. P. 1.180].
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(who was not objected to by the defendant) who had waived the defen-
dant's right to be present. Thus, in essence, the mandatory language of
criminal rule 1.180 is subject to waiver by a defendant who fails to object
to his counsel's unilateral waiver of the right of the defendant to be
present.
XIV. PRELIMINARY HEARING
During the period surveyed the Florida courts continued to cling to
the position that a preliminary hearing is not a necessary step in due
process of law. 8 The Supreme Court of Florida, however, indicated
that the continued practice of failing to bring a defendant before a magis-
trate in compliance with Florida Statutes section 901.23 (1969) would
result in strong action by the court."' As it predicted it would, the Su-
preme Court of Florida, in a recent case,370 held that the "rationale" of
the McNabb-Mallory rule was applicable in Florida and thus the failure
to bring a defendant before a magistrate without unreasonable delay
could result in the inadmissibility of any confession obtained in the
interim.
Notwithstanding the Florida courts' refusal to find that a pre-
liminary hearing is a necessary step in due process, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida has ruled that due
process demands that an incarcerated defendant be afforded a preliminary
hearing within a reasonable time after arrest.171 In Pugh v. Rainwater" I7
the federal district court judge directed the defendants to submit, within
60 days, a plan providing for preliminary hearings before a judicial officer
empowered to act as committing magistrate in all cases wherein prosecu-
tion is to be upon direct information. 7"
The defendant, upon request, is entitled to have a transcript of the
proceedings at a preliminary hearing; if the defendant fails to request
that the proceedings be transcribed, the failure to transcribe is not
error.
3 74
368. Sanagree v. Hamlin, 235 So.2d 729 (Fla. 1970); Anderson v. State, 241 So.2d
390 (Fla. 1970); State ex rel. Shailer v. Booher, 241 So.2d 720 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
369. See, e.g., State ex rel. Carty v. Purdy, 240 So.2d 480 (Fla. 1970); Sanagree v.
Hamlin, 235 So.2d 729 (Fla. 1970); Perkins v. State, 228 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1969).
370. Oliver v. State, 250 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1971). Although this case was not decided
within the time period covered by this survey, its importance requires its mention here.
See note 131 supra and accompanying text.
371. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
372. Id. Pugh does not affect the holding of Dibona v. State, 121 So.2d 192 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1960), that a denial of a preliminary hearing does not constitute grounds for reversal
of a conviction. In the authors' view, one solution to this problem is to prohibit the state
attorney from filing informations directly, and to require a showing of probable cause before
an indictment or information is issued.
373. At the time of this writing, the court is considering proposals submitted by the
named defendants in Pugh v. Rainwater.
374. Richardson v. State, 247 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1971).
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XV. FAIR TRIAL
In Baker v. State75 the defendant argued that he was denied his
constitutional right to a fair trial when the trial judge refused to grant
a mistrial after the prosecutor, at voir dire, asked prospective jurors
questions which implied that the defense attorneys were members of the
NAACP. The court held that since no blacks were involved, there was no
prejudice to the defendant, and therefore the refusal to grant a mistrial
was not error. Also, where the prosecutor, on voir dire, commented on
the fact that the accused's codefendant had been found guilty, there was
no denial of a fair trial . 76 However, where the state called a codefendant
to the stand with knowledge that he will claim the fifth and refuse to
testify, thereby implicating the defendant in the jury's eyes, the non-
testifying defendant was denied a fair trial since the jury was not in-
structed that the codefendant's silence should not implicate the defen-
dant.3 77 Similarly, where a codefendant plead guilty and made a state-
ment to the judge implicating the defendant, the subsequent trial of the
defendant before the same judge was not a fair trial.378
In Majors v. State 79 the defendants were jointly charged with the
crime of aggravated assault and the state forced them into the position
of each trying to prove that the other was the guilty party. The court
held that allowing the prosecutor to sit back and watch the defendants
"fight it out" was a denial of a fair trial and a violation of due process of
law. More significantly, the court in Majors also held that where some of
the state's witnesses testified that the defendant did not commit the crime
for which he was being tried, the state's case itself "created a reasonable
doubt as a matter of law" and since the state is bound by its own evi-
dence, due process requires a reversal of the conviction."8
As previously indicated,38' comments by the prosecutor have often
raised the issue of whether there has been a denial of a fair trial. State-
ments made by the prosecutor in summation to the jury which charged
that the defendant had not produced certain witnesses in his behalf were
prejudicial and required a reversal since the defendant has no burden of
proving a case or producing witnesses.3 2 Similarly, where a prosecutor,
375. 241 So.2d 683 (Fla. 1970).
376. Sanders v. State, 241 So.2d 430 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
377. Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1971).
378. Mackey v. State, 234 So.2d 418 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970). The defendant was granted
a new trial even though he did not move to disqualify the trial judge after his codefendant
made the implicating statement.
379. 247 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 250 So.2d 898 (Fla. 1971) (there
were two defendants, one gun, one bullet fired, and one victim; each was charged with the
crime).
380. Majors v. State, 247 So.2d 446, 446-48 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), citing Jackson v.
State, 12 OkI. Cr. 446, 158 P. 292 (1916); State v. Haynes, 64 Idaho 627, 135 P.2d 300
(1943); Leavine v. State, 109 Fla. 447, 147 So. 897 (1933); Gustine v. State, 86 Fla. 24,
97 So. 207 (1923).
381. See notes 375 and 376 supra and accompanying text.
382. Kirk v. State, 227 So.2d 40 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
1972]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVI
in his closing argument, said that the defendant "by his own testimony
has spent the better part of his life in jail," reversible error has occurred
and a new trial was ordered because such a comment was not a reasonable
inference from the facts established."' In Thompson v. State,884 the
prosecutor, in closing argument, made a statement to the effect that the
defendant, because there was no evidence to support the defense, would
not look him in the eye when he said "you were justified in shooting that
man down." The court held that the statement constituted prejudicial
interjection of personalities which, when taken together with other re-
marks, impaired the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial. On the
other hand, where the prosecuting attorney, in summation, stated his
personal belief as to the defendant's guilt, there was no denial of a fair
trial since the other evidence of defendant's guilt was strong.8 5 Also,
a comment as to the defendant's failure to testify made by the attorney
for a codefendant was not a comment by the prosecutor and thus not re-
versible error. 86
Since reference to "mug shots" implies that the defendant was a
criminal, such a reference by the prosecutor in his opening statement was
prejudicial and required a reversal.8 7 However, when a witness for the
state makes the reference to "mug shots" of the defendant on cross-
examination and there was no motion to strike, reversible error has not
occurred.888
Where a trial judge, after ruling correctly on a particular objec-
tion by the prosecution, went into a tirade to rebuke the defense counsel
in the presence of the jury, prejudice to the defendant's right to receive a
fair trial was held to have occurred, and a new trial was ordered. 89
In Esposito v. State,9' a defense attorney, on cross-examination, at-
tempted to discredit a state's witness by suggesting that the witness'
agreement to testify in exchange for receiving a sentence to run concur-
rently with a longer sentence was equivalent to "[getting] nothing" as a
sentence. The court's instruction to the jury that defense counsel's
It is the duty of the trial judge to carefully control the trial and zealously protect
the rights of the accused so that he shall receive a fair and impartial trial. The
trial judge must protect the accused from improper or harmful statements, or con-
duct by a witness or by a prosecuting attorney during the course of a trial. It is
also the duty of a prosecuting attorney in a trial to refrain from making improper
remarks or committing acts which would or might tend to affect the fairness and
impartiality to which the accused in entitled.
Id. at 43.
383. Fitzgerald v. State, 227 So.2d 45 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
384. 235 So.2d 354 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 239 So.2d 828 (Fla. 1971).
385. Roundtree v. State, 229 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969), appeal dismissed, 242 So.2d
136 (Fla. 1970).
386. Smith v. State, 238 So.2d 120 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 242 So.2d 136
(Fla. 1970).
387. Jones v. State, 194 So.2d 24 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
388. Anderson v. State, 230 So.2d 704 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), citing Gagnon v. State, 212
So.2d 337 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
389. Tyndall v. State, 234 So.2d 154 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
390. 243 So.2d 451 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
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statement was "incorrect" and thus should not be considered by the jury
was held to be a violation of the defendant's right to a fair trial and an
infringement of the jury's duty to determine the credibility of a witness.
Although the court may have been correct in its ruling that a concurrent
sentence was not a "nullity," it was the duty of the prosecutor rather
than the court to rehabilitate a state witness.
In State v. Bryan, 9' the court held that the mere fact that the
prosecutor had previously served as the defendant's public defender in
an unrelated case would not disqualify him from prosecuting the defen-
dant for a subsequent crime. 92 However, in Jackson v. State, 9' the
court held that an allegation that one of the defendant's prosecuting at-
torneys was previously employed by defendant's counsel entitled the
defendant to an evidentiary hearing under rule 1.850. The court added
that if the allegation were well founded, a new trial would be required.
In applying the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Witherspoon v. Illinois,94 Florida courts have had to determine when
the exclusion of a juror because of his beliefs concerning the death pen-
alty has resulted in denial of a fair trial. The Supreme Court of Florida
has emphasized that the state as well as the defendant is entitled to a jury
that is impartial as to penalty. 95 Thus, if a prospective juror's scruples
against capital punishment were such as to preclude him from returning
a verdict of guilty if it might mean the imposition of the death penalty,
then the court may properly exclude the venireman. 96 If the juror says
that, because of his views on capital punishment, he can render a verdict
of guilty only if accompanied by a recommendation of mercy, the Florida
courts deem him to be not qualified 97 In Hallihan v. State,898 the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, First District, held that even though the trial
court systematically excluded all prospective jurors with scruples
391. 227 So.2d 221 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
392. [T~he State Attorney can only be disqualified if it were shown that as Public
Defender he had actually gained confidential information from a prior attorney-
client relationship with the defendant, which information would be useable in the
new matter to defendant's prejudice. Such confidential information, however, must
go beyond general information about defendant's personal characteristics tactically
useable in any subsequent trial against him.
Id. at 223.
393. 234 So.2d 708 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
394. 391 U.S. 510 (1968), noted in 23 U. MiAmi L. REv. 631 (1969). In Witherspoon
the Court held that a prospective juror who professes scruples against capital punishment
may not be automatically disqualified from serving in a capital case unless his beliefs are
such as to bias his determination of the primary issue of guilt or innocence or prevent him
from considering the death penalty as a possible punishment upon a finding of guilt. See
also Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 (1969), cited in Watson v. State, 234 So.2d 143,
144 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) (dissenting opinion) discussed in section XXVI, B, infra.
395. Williams v. State, 228 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1969).
396. Perkins v. State, 228 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1969). Cf. Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S.
478 (1969).
397. Campbell v. State, 227 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1969), citing Piccot v. State, 116 So.2d 626
(Fla. 1959). See also Paramore v. State, 229 So.2d 855 (Fla. 1969).
398. 226 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
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against capital punishment, there was no need for a reversal or new trial
since the jury convicted but recommended mercy 99
The question of whether a defendant has received a fair trial may
hinge on whether he has been frustrated in his attempt to secure informa-
tion which may be important to his defense. In State ex rel Duncan v.
Crews,4 °° it was not error for the trial court to allow the defendant, who
was charged with manslaughter, to inspect and copy the traffic homi-
cide report prepared by the Florida Highway Patrol after the accident.
The state argued that the report was "confidential" and the privileged
"work product" of the prosecution. In affirming the trial court, the
appellate court noted that although the information sought to be ob-
tained might be elicited by deposition of the reporting officer, it was not
error to allow the defendant to copy the original report.'O°
In State v. Pitts402 the court responded to the defendants' allegation
that they had been denied a fair trial because the state had withheld
information favorable to the defense, by holding that since the defen-
dants plead guilty and did not contest the state's case at trial, the ques-
tion of state suppressed evidence was "immaterial." Also, in Lawrence v.
State, °8 at the preliminary hearing a witness testified that the defendant
was not the perpetrator of the crime. This testimony was unknown to the
defense but known to the police and magistrate. After conviction the de-
fendant moved to vacate his sentence on the ground that the failure to
disclose this beneficial information to the defense was error according to
Brady v. Maryland.4 0 4 The court held there was no error since the de-
fense knew or should have known that the witness had testified at the
preliminary hearing, and therefore could have taken the witness' depo-
sition for use at trial had it so desired.
Although the number of defense witnesses testifying to the defen-
dant's good reputation may be limited in the discretion of the trial judge,
it was an abuse of discretion to limit such evidence when the character
of the defendant was a vital issue in his trial for rape.4"'
399. It has been argued that a new trial should be ordered in such a case since a jury
selected on the basis of their acceptance of the death penalty has a greater propensity to
convict than a jury with scruples against the death penalty. See Oberer, Does Disqualifica-
tion of Jurors for Scruples Against Capital Punishment Constitute a Denial of Fair Trial
on Issue of Guilt?, 39 TExAs L. Rlv. 545 (1961). See also Note, 23 U. MiAMI L. REv. 631,
640-41n.52 (1969).
400. 241 So.2d 754 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
401. Id. at 755.
402. 241 So.2d 399, 413 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). [Subsequent to the period covered by
this survey the District Court of Appeal, First District, modified its position and held that
the rule of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1969) (suppression of evidence favorable to
defense by prosecution violated due process) applies even though the defendant plead
guilty. State v. Pitts, 249 So.2d 47 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1971).]
403. 244 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
404. 373 U.S. 82, 87 (1963) which held that
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of good faith or bad faith of prosecution.
405. Washington v. State, 247 So.2d 743 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
CRIMINAL LAW
In Rivers v. State40 6 a witness who was unable to identify the defen-
dant by photographs shown to her at the police station or by lineups or by
newspaper pictures, was able to identify the defendant as her assailant
only after watching him during the duration of the trial. The defendant
argued that the delayed, in-court identification was inadmissible. The
Supreme Court of Florida held that the fact of last minute identification
went to the weight and credibility and not to the admissibility of the iden-
tification.
In Caldwell v. State40 7 it was not a denial of a fair trial nor an un-
constitutional infringement of freedom of religion to refuse to allow the
defendant to hold and openly display a Bible during his trial.
XVI. GRAND JURY
The statute40 8 authorizing inspection by a court of testimony given
before a grand jury did not provide for an in camera inspection by a crimi-
nal court judge where no criminal case was pending before the judge and
where it was not shown that the inspection was in the furtherance of
justice. 0 9 However, in State v. Drayton4 10 the court allowed "in the
furtherance of justice" a pretrial in camera inspection of a prosecutrix'
testimony where it was alleged that her statements to police conflicted
with statements she made on deposition.
In State v. Papy41' it was held that the presence of an unauthorized
person in a grand jury hearing at the time of deliberations resulting in
indictment was grounds for a dismissal of the charge.
XVII. HABEAS CORPUS
41 2
In Frizzell v. State413 the Supreme Court of Florida expressly re-
ceded from its former position and held that a writ of habeas corpus will
be considered on its merits even though the petitioner would not be en-
titled to immediate release if successful in his attack on the conviction
and regardless of whether the sentences are concurrent or consecutive.
Habeas Corpus, like rule 1.850, will not be allowed to substitute for
an appeal. Thus, a petitioner who plead not guilty to charges contained
in a procedurally defective information and who did not move for a new
406. 226 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1969).
407. 243 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), appeal dismissed, 247 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1971).
408. FLA. STAT. § 905.27 (1969) [amended by FLA. STAT. § 905.27 (Supp. 1970)] (the
statute allows a judge to inspect the testimony before a grand jury so that he may ascertain
whether it is consistent with that given by the witness before the court or if such inspection
is in the furtherance of justice).
409. State ex rel. Oldham v. Baker, 226 So.2d 21 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
410. 226 So.2d 469 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). The court also held that there was no con-
stitutional right to a pretrial examination of a witness's testimony notwithstanding the rule
of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) that the prosecution must not suppress evidence
favorable to the defense. See section XXXIV, A, 2 infra.
411. 239 So.2d 604 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
412. See also notes 262-69 supra and accompanying text.
413. 238 So.2d 67 (Fla. 1970), noted in 25 U. MAm-i L. REv. 354 (1971).
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trial or an appeal could not attack the validity of the information by way
of habeas corpus. 14
In Jackson v. Wainwright415 the petitioner, on his sworn petition for
habeas corpus, made statements which were contrary to the record. The
court deemed the petitioner a perjuror and directed the clerk of the
court to forward a copy of the opinion to the Probation and Parole Com-
mission. Such a practice was to be continued in the future whenever any
collateral attack device reflects perjured statements.
XVIII. IMMUNITY
Immunity under Florida Statutes section 932.29 (1969) accrues if
there is compulsory testimony; compulsory appearance by subpeona is
not sufficient. 1 Moreover, immunity under the statute can only be con-
ferred by the prosecution; counsel for a codefendant cannot confer im-
munity upon another codefendant at a deposition where the deponent in-
vokes the fifth amendment and refuses to testify unless given immunity.
417
Where the defendant, who was subpoenaed before a grand jury and
refused to waive immunity, gave testimony relating to transactions iden-
tified in the indictment and information under which he was subse-
quently charged, the court held that the defendant had been granted im-
munity from prosecution for such crimes. 8
Where a defendant appears by subpoena before a grand jury and
voluntarily signs a written waiver of the immunities of section 932.29
(1969), the fact that the defendant was not then advised of his Miranda
rights does not make the defendant immune from prosecution on the
charges arising out of the testimony before the grand jury.
4 19
In Englander v. State420 the Supreme Court of Florida held that a
county official who waives immunity under the threat of loss of office
(city charter provided for loss of job if immunity not waived by com-
missioner) is considered to have waived immunity involuntarily and,
therefore, his testimony may not be used against him. In Headley v.
414. Stack v. State ex rel. LaFratta, 230 So.2d 15 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969), cert. discharged,
235 So.2d 491 (Fla. 1970). (The court distinguished between a procedurally defective in-
formation and an information filed without authority of law. The latter could be attacked
by habeas corpus.)
415. 238 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). See also note 630 infra and accompanying
text.
416. State ex rel. Foster v. Hall, 230 So.2d 722 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
417. State v. Schell, 222 So.2d 757 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), citing United States v. Ernest,
280 F. 515 (D. Mont. 1922). The court in Schell pointed out that each codefendant was
attempting to confer immunity upon each other and that this absurd result, which would
completely frustrate the prosecution, was not contemplated by the statute.
418. State v. Papy, 239 So.2d 604 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), citing FLA. STAT. § 932.29 (1969).
419. State v. Chadroff, 234 So.2d 412 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970). Accord, Englander v. State,
246 So.2d 746 (Fla. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 108 (1971).
420. 246 So.2d 746 (Fla. 1971), [cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 108 (1971)] citing Garrity v.
New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) ; Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968). But see
Headley v. Baron, 228 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1969).
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Baron,421 the Supreme Court of Florida previously held that the im-
munity under section 932.29 (1969) protects against criminal prosecu-
tion only; it does not protect a police chief from loss of position resulting
from testimony given under the immunity statute.
Immunity was not afforded in Davis v. State422 where the defendant
was told by the judge that if he did not answer the prosecutor's questions
concerning embezzled funds, defendant's motion for an order declaring
him insolvent would be denied.
In State ex rel. Lurie v. Rosier,2 3 the court held that although re-
ceiving stolen property was not one of the crimes listed in section 932.29
(1967), larceny was, and since the subject matter of the investigation
bore upon larceny, immunity attached to the transactions even though
the subject matter of the investigation also dealt with receiving stolen
property.
Stancel v. Schultz4 24 held that contractual immunity given by a state
attorney and ratified by the circuit judge is not binding beyond that
jurisdiction and, therefore, will not bar a prosecution in a different county.
During the survey period, Florida Statutes section 932.29 (1969)
was renumbered as Florida Statutes section 914.04 (Supp. 1970) and was
substantially reworded in 197 1.425
XIX. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION
Florida Statutes section 906.04(2) (1969),426 which provided that
no objection to any information on the ground that it was not subscribed
or verified shall be made after pleading thereto or after moving to dis-
miss, was held to apply even though the alleged defects were allegedly
not apparent from the face of the information."
In State v. Rand 28 an information, stated in the disjunctive, charged
violations of statutes proscribing the obtaining of property by the unlaw-
ful drawing, making, uttering, issuing or delivering of worthless checks,
drafts, or other written orders. The information was held not to be
421. 228 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1969).
422. 233 So.2d 641 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970) (the court suggested that since the defendant
was a lawyer and justice of the peace, he would not be allowed to take advantage of the
court's remarks so as to force an immunity from the court).
423. 226 So.2d 825 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969) (the court barred a prosecution for receiving
stolen property even though it was not one of the five crimes enumerated in FLA. STAT.
§ 932.27 (1967); the current codification of the immunity statute does not enumerate
specific crimes. See FLA. STAT. § 914.04 (Supp. 1970), amended by Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-99,
§ 1).
424. 226 So.2d 456 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
425. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-99, § 1, amending FLA. STAT. § 914.04 (Supp. 1970).
426. Repealed by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-339, § 180, because the same rule is contained
in FLA. R. CRIn. P. 1.140(g).
427. State v. Polo, 242 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1970), citing Champlin v. Cochran, 125 So.2d
565 (Fla. 1961).
428. 231 So.2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), citing FLA. R. CRIb. P. 1.140(k)(5) and FLA.
STAT. § 906.13 (1969) [FLA. STAT. § 906.13 (1969) was repealed by Fla. Laws 1970, ch.
70-339, § 180, because the same rule is contained in FLA. R. CRiM. P. 1.140(k)(5).]
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fatally vague on the ground that it did not inform the defendant of the
specific offense with which he was charged.
Where an information contains more than one count, but each is a
facet or phase of the same transaction, only one sentence may be imposed;
and the sentence which should be imposed is for the highest offense
charged.429 Thus, in Yost v. State,"' the defendant, who was charged
with both possession and sale of marijuana, could be sentenced only for
the higher offense since both charges were facets of the same transac-
tion. However, in Parker v. State43 the District Court of Appeal, First
District, ruled that it was proper to sentence the defendant on each of
three counts; namely, possession and sale of marijuana and possession of
seconal, even though the charges all stemmed from one transaction. The
court in Parker ruled that since there were three separate violations of
the law, separate sentences were proper notwithstanding the fact that
only one transaction was involved.
It is well settled that a defendant cannot be indicted or informed
against for one offense and convicted and sentenced for another, even
though the offenses are closely related and of the same general nature or
character and punishable by the same grade of punishment. Thus, where
the information charges the unlawful sale of heroin and the proof is of
an unlawful sale of morphine there is a fatal variance between informa-
tion and proof, and the conviction must be reversed." 2 Also, when the
state proved that the alleged crime was committed on a specific date
which differed from the date alleged in the information and bill of par-
ticulars, it was error to allow the state, over the defendant's objection, to
amend the bill of particulars to conform to the state's proof."'
Problems arise when a defendant is convicted of an offense which is
not a lesser included offense434 of the charge in the indictment or infor-
mation. A conviction for receiving stolen property under an information
charging larceny of automobile was fundamental error, cognizable on ap-
peal notwithstanding absence of an objection to an erroneous instruction
on lesser included offense.4"' Also, where the defendant was charged with
conspiracy to commit first degree murder but was convicted of con-
spiracy to commit assault and battery, the conviction was invalid be-
cause: conspiracy to commit assault and battery was not a lesser degree
429. Yost v. State, 243 So.2d 469 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). [See also Farrell v. State, 259
So.2d 540 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972), which was decided subsequent to the survey period.]
430. 243 So.2d 469 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
431. 237 So.2d 253 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), citing Simmons v. State, 151 Fla. 778, 10 So.2d
436 (1942). See note 333 supra and accompanying text.
432. Jiminez v. State, 231 So.2d 26 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) (the court went on to hold
that the state was not precluded from a subsequent prosecution for the unlawful sale of
morphine).
433. Crowell v. State, 238 So.2d 690 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
434. See FLA. R. CR13. P. 1.510. See also section IX supra and notes 299-305 supra and
accompanying text.
435. Johnson v. State, 226 So.2d 884 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969) (such a result operates as an
acquittal of the charge of larceny of an automobile).
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nor a necessarily included lesser offense of conspiracy to commit murder;
the information did not allege the means or the manner the murder was to
be perpetrated, therefore the lesser offense was not established by the
pleadings and evidence.43
In State v. Fattorusso437 the state, after having its original informa-
tion dismissed, was ordered by the trial court to refile within twenty
days. The state inadvertently failed to refile and the trial court dis-
missed the information with prejudice. The District Court of Appeal,
Third District, held that since the failure to refile was a nondeliberate
violation of an oral order involving a procedural matter and since the de-
fendant's constitutional rights had not been violated, the trial court's
order of dismissal with prejudice was an abuse of discretion.
XX. ArmEsT
The fact that the defendant was not informed of the charge against
him when arrested does not necessarily render the arrest invalid; being
informed of the charge shortly after arrest is sufficient if no prejudice re-
sulted from the initial failure to inform.
4 38
In Skadwick v. City of Tampa4 9 the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, held constitutional a municipal ordinance which per-
mitted the city clerk to issue arrest warrants. The ordinance was at-
tacked on the basis of the separation of powers doctrine,440 i.e., judicial
functions being performed by a non-judicial officer. The court held that
the decision whether to issue a warrant is, at most, a quasi judicial func-
tion, which is not within "judicial power" reserved by the constitution to
the judicial branch. The court further found that there was no indication
in the record to support the notion that the clerk was, in essence, nothing
more than a "rubber stamp" for the police. Thus, as long as the clerks
make objective determinations that probable cause exists before issuing
a warrant, such warrants are deemed valid.
XXI. EVIDENCE
441
The rule that is developing in Florida is that evidence of previous
crimes is admissible if found to be relevent for any purpose save that of
showing bad character or propensity to commit crime." 2 Moreover, evi-
436. Smith v. State, 233 So.2d 870 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 240
So.2d 807 (Fla. 1970). As to the requisites for a conviction for a lesser included offense, see
notes 299-305 supra and accompanying text.
437. 228 So.2d 630 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
438. Thomas v. State, 223 So.2d 318 (Fla. 1969).
439. 237 So.2d 231 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), aff'd, 250 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1971). Contra, State v.
Paulick, 277 Minn. 140, 151 N.W.2d 591 (1967).
440. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3, and art. V, § 1.
441. See also section XV supra.
442. Baker v. State, 241 So.2d 683 (Fla. 1970) (the evidence concerning other crimes
should be carefully scrutinized by the court before it is determined to be admissible). See
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dence of crimes other than the crime for which the defendant is charged
may be admissible even though the extraneous crime occurred shortly
after the crime for which the defendant is charged.448 The fact that the
defendant was acquitted444 of the charge or not arrested 4 5 for the charge
does not necessarily render evidence of the crime inadmissible. However,
if the evidence of a prior crime is stressed, making the prior offense "a
feature instead of an incident," reversible error has occurred and a new
trial is necessary.44 6
Thus, during the biennium, it has been held that evidence of similar
crimes is admissible to show a common scheme or system; 4  to show a
mode of operation;44 8 or to establish the defendant's presence at the
scene of the crime.449 However, evidence of prior crimes may not be ad-
mitted if its sole relevancy is to prove that the defendant had propensity
to commit a crime.45 °
In Coppolino v. State,45'1 the state attempted to strengthen the cred-
ibility of its witness by introducing evidence of an illicit intimate rela-
tionship between herself and the defendant. The trial court let the evi-
dence in, but the appellate court ruled that evidence of such unrelated
crimes is not admissible to strengthen or impeach the credibility of the
witness. The court went on, however, to rule that the error in admitting
such evidence was harmless when considered in light of the total record.
The right of cross-examination was deemed frustrated in Allen 'v.
State,452 when the court refused to allow the defense attorney the right
to inspect notes that the witness (police officer) used to refresh his mem-
ory.
also Saxon v. State, 225 So.2d 925 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969) and Coppolino v. State, 223 So.2d
68 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968) appeal dismissed, 234 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
927 (1970), which lists a number of specific circumstances under which evidence of previous
crimes is admissible.
443. Christie v. State, 246 So.2d 605 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). See note 447 infra.
444. Wingate v. State, 232 So.2d 44 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 237 So.2d 764
(Fla. 1970), 400 U.S. 994 (1971). See note 448 infra and accompanying text; Dempsey
v. State, 238 So.2d 446 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 240 So.2d 646 (Fla. 1970);
Bryant v. State, 235 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1970).
445. See Mins v. State, 241 So.2d 715 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
446. Green v. State, 228 So.2d 397, 399 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 237 So.2d
540 (Fla. 1970) (the failure to give a limiting instruction, coupled with the emphasis given
the prior crime in relation to the crime charged, resulted in a reversal).
447. Christie v. State, 246 So.2d 605 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971) (this is true even though the
extraneous crime occurred the day after the crime for which the defendant was charged).
Bogan v. State, 226 So.2d 110 (Fla. 2d.Dist. 1969).
448. Wingate v. State, 232 So.2d 44 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 237 So.2d 764
(Fla. 1970), 400 U.S. 994 (1971); Crosby v. State, 237 So.2d 286 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970)
(crime committed four years before was held to be relevant in that it showed similar mode
of operation). See also Bryant v. State, 235 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1970).
449. Williams v. State, 247 So.2d 425 (Fla. 1971).
450. Franklin v. State, 229 So.2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 237 So.2d 754
(Fla. 1970).
451. 223 So.2d 68 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1969),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970). See also Rhodes v. State, 104 Fla. 520, 140 So. 309 (1932).
452. 243 So.2d 448 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
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During the biennium there were numerous evidentiary cases dealing
with identification, mug shots, photographs and the like. Florida courts
have adopted the position that convictions based on eyewitness identifica-
tion at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will not be
set aside unless the photograph identification procedure was so imper-
missibly suggestive as to give rise to a substantial likelihood of irrepar-
able misidentification.5 Thus, the fact that the witness was presented
a single photograph at the pretrial identification does not result in revers-
ible error if there is some other basis for the identification.4"
When shown to be relevant, photographs of a murder victim are
admissible into evidence, provided what they depict is not so shocking
or inflammatory that it overcomes the value of its relevancy. 55 The
photographs may be admitted in spite of the defendant's offer to stipulate
as to the facts the picture may depict.4" 6 However, notwithstanding the
fact that the photographs may be relevant to the crime charged, the
introduction of an unnecessarily large number of photographs constitutes
prejudicial error to the defendant when fewer and less gruesome photo-
graphs would be sufficient to prove the point.4 57
Although reference to mug shots by the prosecutor may be preju-
dicial in that it tends to suggest to the jury that the defendant has com-
mitted other crimes, 58 such a reference by the police officer-witness in
Williams v. State459 was deemed to be harmless error since the guilt of
the defendant was conclusively established by identification by the vic-
tim and arresting officer.
In Anderson v. State460 the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that
fingerprints and palm prints are not evidence of a testimonial or commu-
nicative nature and therefore are not protected by the fifth amendment
strictures against self-incrimination. Moreover, the taking of a palm
print is not a critical stage of the criminal proceeding requiring that the
defendant be afforded the right to have counsel present.
Florida courts continue to follow the rule that the use of perjured
453. Bunk v. State, 231 So.2d 39 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
454. Id; Fuller v. Wainwright, 238 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1970) (where the in-court identifica-
tion was based on the witness' observations at the scene of the crime as well as on the
pretrial photographic identification, the fact that the witness was shown a single photograph
was not reversible error).
455. Williams v. State, 228 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1969).
456. Id. See also Arrington v. State, 233 So.2d 634 (Fla. 1970). In Arrington it was
held that it was not error to allow the state to introduce evidence on a point which was the
subject of a stipulation between the lawyers. The parties stipulated to the identification of
the body and the cause of death. The court ruled that the breath of the stipulation did
not preclude the state from introducing evidence relating to the cause of death.
457. Young v. State, 234 So.2d 341, 347-48 (Fla. 1970), citing Leach v. State, 132
So.2d 329 (Fla. 1961). In Young the state introduced 45 photographs, 22 of which were
the victim's partially decomposed torso.
458. Jones v. State, 194 So.2d 24 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
459. 233 So.2d 428 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
460. 241 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1970).
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or false testimony by a witness for the prosecution is not reversible error
unless it is done with the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney.46'
Miscellaneous decisions pertaining to criminal evidence decided
during the period of this survey include the following cases. An arresting
officer's opinion as to the state of intoxication of the driver is admissible
when preceded by a description of the defendant's acts and appear-
ance.41 In homicide cases if an identity witness, other than a member of
the victim's family, is available, it is error to have the family member
testify.46 3 Corroboration of a prosecutrix' testimony is not necessary to
authorize a conviction for rape.464 The court may, in its discretion, order
a pretrial psychiatric examination of a prosecutrix in a rape case, but
such practice is discouraged and should be resorted to only in extreme
instances where it is necessary to insure a just disposition of the cause.465
It has been held not an abuse of discretion to allow a police officer to tes-
tify after "the rule" had been invoked and the officer had been present in
court contrary to "the rule."46 In establishing the chain of possession of
contraband seized from the defendant, the test is whether there is any
indication of probable tampering with the evidence; the state need not
establish by live witnesses that these witnesses actually had possession
or control from the time of arrest to the time of trial.467 Reports of psy-
chological testing made by a psychologist for the use and benefit of psy-
chiatrists in diagnosis are hearsay and are properly excluded in a trial for
first degree murder.468 Although hearsay evidence is admissible at a revo-
cation of probation hearing, revocation should not be based on hearsay
alone."6 9 Secondary evidence of an incriminating document in the posses-
sion of the defendant is admissible only when a proper foundation has
been laid by giving the defendant reasonable notice to produce the
original.47 ° Where a defendant's testimony pertained to matters unre-
461. Fuller v. Wainwright, 238 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1970), citing Wade v. State, 193 So.2d
459 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
462. City of Orlando v. Newell, 232 So.2d 413 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
463. Abram v. State, 242 So.2d 215 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 245 So.2d 870
(Fla. 1971), citing Ashmore v. State, 214 So.2d 67 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968) and Gibson v. State,
191 So.2d 58 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966). However, if the guilt of the defendant is otherwise dearly
established, the harmless error rule applies to prevent a reversal. But see Furr v. State, 229
So.2d 269 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 237 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1970) (manslaughter case).
464. Smith v. State, 239 So.2d 284 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970) [Subsequent to the period of
this survey, Smith was reversed by the Supreme Court of Florida. State v. Smith, 249 So.2d
16 (Fla. 1971)].
465. Dinkins v. State, 244 So.2d 148 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). The court did not expressly
delineate what circumstances must exist before pretrial psychiatric examination would be
proper, but it was suggested that a showing that the prosecutrix was suffering from a mental
disorder might be sufficient.
466. Smith v. State, 243 So.2d 602 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
467. Stunson v. State, 228 So.2d 294 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 237 So.2d 179
(Fla. 1970).
468. Hallihan v. State, 226 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
469. Franklin v. State, 226 So.2d 461 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). See Section XXX and note
580 infra and accompanying text.
470. Kirk v. State, 227 So.2d 40 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969) wherein it was held that admis-
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lated to the crime charged, it was not error to strike the defendant's
entire testimony, considering the fact that the evidence of guilt was
great. 7' Similarly, the admission of evidence concerning a conversation
between a police officer and the defendant may have been error, but
because of the harmless error statute,4 72 there need not be a reversal.
4 73
In Diamond v. State4 74 a codefendant made a pretrial statement to
the prosecution which exculpated the defendant. The defendant, who
was not informed of the exculpatory statement, was convicted for posses-
sion of marijuana. Subsequent to the conviction the defendant learned of
the exculpatory statement and thereupon moved to vacate the conviction
pursuant to rule 1.850 on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. The
petition was denied on the somewhat shallow grounds that: (1) the writ-
ten document was hearsay and inadmissible; (2) the codefendant was
available as a witness had the defense wished to call him to testify; and
(3) the exculpatory statement was similar to what the defendant testified
to in his own defense and, therefore, the codefendant's statement was
"cumulative." The majority in Diamond apparently overlooked the rule
of the United States Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland,4 7 5 which
holds that it is a denial of due process for the state to suppress evidence
which is favorable to the defense.
In Sutton v. State4 71 it was held not an abuse of judicial discretion to
allow the state to impeach a defense witness by showing that the same
witness, at a prior trial of the same cause (which ended in a mistrial),
had testified against the defendant.
In Smith v. State477 the District Court of Appeal, Second District,
dealt with the issue of sufficiency of the evidence in a rape case. The
rule that was applied was that if the record as a whole discloses a possi-
bility of error, the interest of justice demanded that a new trial be given,
notwithstanding the fact that the evidence was technically sufficient to
support a conviction.478
sion of testimony relating to contents of alleged confession was error where there was no
attempt to secure paper from defendant or to inform him in any way that such paper
should be produced at trial.
471. Harris v. State, 236 So.2d 135 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
472. FLA. STAT. § 924.33 (1969), reworded by FLA. STAT. § 924.33 (Supp. 1970).
473. Parnell v. State, 233 So.2d 437 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), on remand from the Florida
Supreme Court, see State v. Parnell, 221 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1969).
474. 233 So.2d 418 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
475. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
476. 239 So.2d 644 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1970).
477. 239 So.2d 284 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970). The majority of the court, led by Judge Mann,
could not, in good conscience, affirm a "technically sufficent" convction for rape where the
record as a whole suggested error.
We conclude that judges have historically granted new trials in the interest of justice
where the record, though technically sufficient, raises so much doubt that the con-
viction cannot in conscience be upheld.
Id. at 290.
478. The prevailing view, as stated by Judge Pierce in his dissent, is that if the
evidence for the state is a matter of law, sufficient to convict if believed by the jury and
concurred in by the trial judge, the conviction must be sustained even though the appellate
1972]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXV1
XXII. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS
In Monserrate v. State4 79 the defendant was found guilty of posses-
sion of marijuana on the strength of a policeman's testimony that the
defendant sold marijuana to a confidential informant. The informant did
not testify and his identity was kept secret. The District Court of Appeal,
Third District, held that under these circumstances it was prejudicial
error to refuse to require the state to divulge the name of the police in-
formant, since the right to confront adverse witnesses, which is funda-
mental to a fair trial, was involved. However, Monserrate is an exception
to the general rule that the identity of police informants is privileged;
thus, the defense is normally not entitled to know the identity of non-
testifying confidential informants under criminal rule 1.220(e).48 °
XXIII. PLEA OF GUILTY
In Boykin v. Alabama"' the Supreme Court of the United States
held that since a plea of guilty entails a waiver of federal constitutional
rights (e.g., privilege against self-incrimination, right to trial by jury,
right to confront accusers), the guilty plea must be made knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily; thus, the trial judge must advise the defen-
dant of his constitutional rights and of the consequences of his guilty
plea prior to acceptance thereof, and on appeal, the record must affirma-
tively show that the defendant was so advised.
The main thrust of Boykin, that a presumption of waiver from a
silent record is impermissible, has been reluctantly accepted by the
Florida courts. In Johnson v. Wainwright"2 the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida established that the "record" rule of Boykin did not apply retroac-
tively. In McPherson v. State4 5 the record did not affirmatively establish
that the trial court advised the defendant pursuant to Boykin, but the
District Court of Appeal, First District, held that problem, in and of
itself, was not sufficient to reverse; the defendant must do more than
allege a "silent record," he must make an affirmative showing of a denial
of constitutional rights before a reversal will be ordered.4 84 The District
judge, if on the jury, would have voted for acquittal. Smith v. State, 239 So.2d 284, 290
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1970) (dissenting opinion). [Subsequent to the period of this survey, Smith
was reversed by the Supreme Court of Florida. State v. Smith, 249 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1971)].
479. 232 So.2d 444 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
480. Maycox v. State, 239 So.2d 851 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), citing Treverrow v. State,
194 So.2d 250 (Fla. 1967). For other cases dealing with confidential informants see notes
187-90 supra and accompanying text.
For a discussion of FLA. R. CauM. P. 1.220(e), see section XXXIV, A, 4, infra.
481. 395 U.S. 238 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Boykin].
482 238 So.2d 590 (Fla. 1970). Accord, Odle v. State, 241 So.2d 184 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
483. 237 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). Accord, Hodge v. State, 241 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 246 So.2d 113 (Fla. 1971) ; Moore v. State, 241 So.2d 868 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1970); Anderson v. State, 245 So.2d 90 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971); Williams v. State, 245
So.2d 267 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
484. This may be done at an evidentiary hearing under rule 1.850. McPherson v. State,
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Court of Appeal, Second District, in Young v. State,485 after pointing out
that "[w]e have no quarrel with the holding in Boykin, ' 480 held that
where the court reporter's notes of the proceedings wherein the defendant
pleaded guilty were unintentionally destroyed, the "silent record" was
overcome by having the principals (trial judge, counsel, petitioner, pro-
bation supervisor) testify at a rule 1.850 hearing. In Bilger v. State,
487
however, the Second District unqualifiedly applied Boykin and reversed
on the grounds that "[t]he trial judge did not follow Boykin v. Alabama
... and the guilty plea received cannot stand without a record supporting
its voluntariness. 488
Criminal rule 1.170(a) requires that the judge not accept a plea of
guilty without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily with
understanding of the nature of the charge. This requirement is not met
when the trial judge asks the defendant's lawyer if he explained the
effects of the plea to his client; the trial judge himself must make in-
quiry of the defendant.
4 9
A voluntary plea of guilty which has been entered on the advice of
counsel constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects in any stage
of the proceedings against the defendant occurring prior to the entry of
a guilty plea.49° Thus, if there is some doubt as to the voluntary nature
of a guilty plea, it is an abuse of discretion to refuse to allow a change of
plea.491 However, such a motion must be timely made, and a motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty made after sentence has been imposed may, in
the absence of compelling circumstances, be properly denied.492
The question of whether a plea of guilty was, in fact, voluntary was
discussed in a number of cases. It has been held that a plea of guilty was
not rendered involuntary by the fact that it was based on the state's
agreement, subsequently fulfilled, to nolle prosequi other charges pending
against the defendant.49 A plea of guilty was not rendered invalid be-
cause the defendant's attorney conferred with the defendant for only a
short time.494 On the other hand, where the defendant alleged he entered
a plea of guilty without the aid of counsel and without intelligent ex-
237 So.2d 18, 20 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). Accord, Williams v. State, 245 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1971).
485. 245 So.2d 104 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
486. Id. at 106.
487. 247 So.2d 721 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
488. Id. See also Young v. State, 233 So.2d 178 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970) ; Rudolph v. State,
230 So.2d 14 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970). The Florida courts have failed to instruct the defendant as
to exactly what he is giving up via the waiver as required by Boykin.
489. Laws v. State, 235 So.2d 754 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
490. Ward v. State, 236 So.2d 187 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
491. Lopez v. State, 227 So.2d 694 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
492. Stapleton v. State, 239 So.2d 140 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). But see Brown v. State, 245
So.2d 41 (Fla. 1971) discussed at note 505 infra.
493. King v. State, 233 So.2d 406 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). See also Jones v. State, 237
So.2d 249 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
494. Byrd v. State, 243 So.2d 1 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
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planation of the consequences, he was entitled to a rule 1.850 hearing. 95
Also, where the defendant alleged that he was hard of hearing and that
he thought he plead guilty to assault with intent to rape, but in fact he
plead guilty to rape, the defendant was entitled to a rule 1.850 hearing
to determine whether the plea was voluntarily made.498 In Steinhauser v.
State,497 the defendant, who alleged his guilty plea was entered only
because he was told it was the only way to save his girl friend, was
denied a 1.850 hearing on the grounds that at trial the judge, prior to
accepting the guilty plea, asked the defendant whether he had been prom-
ised anything or had been coerced, and the defendant, admitting his plea
to be voluntary, replied in the negative. In Brumley v. State,40" however,
the fact that the defendant did not allege coercion when the trial judge
inquired into the voluntariness of the guilty plea did not preclude a rule
1.850 hearing on voluntariness. If coercion was responsible for the plea,
that same coercion may also have motivated the answers to the trial
judge's questions with respect to the voluntariness of the pleas.
There has been some conflict in the reported Florida cases as to
whether a guilty plea which is given in return for a tacit promise of re-
duced sentence, subsequently unfulfilled, is deemed voluntary. In Garcia
v. State 9' a guilty plea entered pursuant to an understanding between
the prosecutor and defense lawyer, subsequently unfulfilled, was deemed
voluntary by the District Court of Appeal, Third District. The same re-
sult was arrived at in Flimming v. State50° and Carter v. State.5"1 On the
other hand, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Cooley v.
State 02 held that where a defendant alleged that his guilty plea was
rendered in response to a tacit promise from his lawyer of a five year
sentence as opposed to a life sentence if no plea, the defendant is entitled
to a 1.850 hearing notwithstanding the fact that the record on its face
suggested the plea was voluntary. Also, in Johnson v. State,5 3 allegations
that a plea of guilty was entered pursuant to the prosecutor's promise to
ask the court for a 20 to 30 year sentence, subsequently unfulfilled (the
prosecutor did not even appear at sentencing and defendant was sen-
495. Moret v. State, 242 So.2d 500 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
496. Williams v. State, 245 So.2d 680 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
497. 228 So.2d 446 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). See also Willis v. State, 236 So.2d 143 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1970) ; Hooper v. State, 232 So.2d 257 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
498. 224 So.2d 447 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969) (defendant alleged plea of guilty was result of
threats of charges of kidnapping and threats that if he failed to plead guilty his gun shot
wounds would be made fatal).
499. 228 So.2d 300 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). It is interesting to note that in Garcia the
prosecutor questioned the defendant as to voluntariness and not the judge. This may not
satisfy FLA. R. CRM. P. 1.170. See Laws v. State, note 489 supra and accompanying text.
500. 242 So.2d 797 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
501. 247 So.2d 332 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), citing Plymale v. State, 201 So.2d 85 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1967).
502. 245 So.2d 679 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), citing Brumley v. State, 224 So.2d 447 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1969).
503. 233 So.2d 668 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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tenced to 60 years), was deemed sufficient to require a rule 1.850 eviden-
tiary hearing on the issue of voluntariness. The general problem of unful-
filled promises of reduced sentences was addressed by the Supreme Court
of Florida in Brown v. State.50 4 In Brown it was stressed that the court
is never bound by negotiations or understandings between the defendant
and the state; however, where the defendant, as a result of misinforma-
tion, has honestly misunderstood the plea bargaining process and the
sentence he received surprised him, the court should allow the defendant
to change his plea from guilty to not guilty.
[A] judge is not bound to grant probation and ... an accused
cannot withdraw his guilty plea merely because the sentence
did not conform to what he hoped it might be. However, the
facts before us are ... consistent with actual misunderstanding
and mutual mistake resulting to a large extent from statements
made at the conference between trial counsel, the prosecutor
and the judge. . . . We repeat that a judge is never bound in
sentencing by these negotiations ... however, a judge should be
liberal in the exercise of his discretion and allow withdrawal
of guilty plea where . . . the plea was based on a failure of
communication or misunderstanding of the facts. 505
The Florida court may recede somewhat from its position that negotia-
tions as to pleas are not binding in light of the recent decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Santabello v. New York.5 06 In
Santabello the Supreme Court held that when a guilty plea rests in any
significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it
can be said to be a part of the inducement or consideration, such promise
must be fulfilled. If such a promise is breached, the case should be re-
manded and, according to the circumstances of the case, the defendant
may obtain specific performance or withdraw his plea of guilty.
In another vein, Chatman v. State50° held that a defendant may en-
ter a plea of guilty to a capital offense.
XXIV. NOLO CONTENDERE
In State v. Ashby5°8 the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that a de-
fendant could enter a plea of nolo contendere, conditional on reservation
for appellate review of the question of legality of the evidence seized and
used against him. The court stressed, however, that this procedure was
acceptable as to questions of law but not as to questions of fact.
504. 243 So.2d 441 (Fla. 1971), quashing 234 So.2d 161 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
505. Brown v. State, 245 So.2d 41, 43-44 (Fla. 1971).
506. 92 S. Ct. 495 (1971). See, e.g., Barker v. State, No. 71-108, 71-109 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Filed March 17, 1972) decided subsequent to the period of this survey.
507. 225 So.2d 576 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 232 So.2d 176 (Fla. 1969).
508. 245 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1971), affirming in part and quashing in part 228 So.2d 400
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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A plea of nolo contendere, like a plea of guilty, should not be ac-
cepted by a trial judge unless he has determined that it was knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily made. 09
XXV. SELF-INCRIMINATION
In Lacy v. State5 10 the District Court of Appeal, Second District,
held that requiring a defendant accused of lettering a forged check to
give a handwriting exemplar did not violate his fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination. In so holding, the court relied on the reason-
ing in Schmerber v. California,51' which distinguished between testimo-
nial or communicative evidence-which may not be compelled-and non-
testimonial evidence such as photographs, fingerprints, or blood tests-
which may be compelled.
The question of whether a defendant need be advised that he had a
right to refuse to take a sobriety test was answered in the negative in
State v. Liefert.512 In a somewhat questionable decision, the District
Court of Appeal, Second District, relying on State v. Mitchell,513 held
that since such a chemical test may be administered without the defen-
dant's consent, a police officer who has probable cause to arrest a defen-
dant for drunk driving need not inform the defendant that the law allows
him to refuse to take such a test.
51 4
In Kozerowitz v. Stack,51 the Supreme Court of Florida held that
the statutory provision.6 requiring the filing of a sworn answer to com-
509. Russell v. State, 233 So.2d 148 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), citing FLA. R. CRIM. P.
1.170(a).
510. 239 So.2d 628 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 958 (1971). In Lacy the
court also intimated that voice print identification would not violate the fifth amendment.
511. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
512. 247 So.2d 18 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
513. 245 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1971). See note 203 supra and accompanying text.
514. It is submitted that the reliance on Mitchell is misplaced. Mitchell upheld an un-
consented test of an unconscious driver. Moreover both FLA. STAT. § 322.261 (Supp. 1970)
and FLA. STAT. § 322.261 (1969) provide that: "Such a person shall be told that his failure
to submit to such a chemical test will result in the suspension of his privilege to operate a
motor vehicle .... " (emphasis added) At firsh blush it may appear that the consequences
attendant to the right of refusal render the right somewhat meaningless, but it is submitted
that a choice between a possible three month revocation for refusing to submit to a
chemical test, as opposed to a conviction for driving while under the influence, may render
the option somewhat less insubstantial. Moreover, in some jurisdictions, the refusal to
submit to a chemical test is inadmissible since the refusal is a "testimonial by-product" and
is privileged under the fifth amendment prohibition against self-incrimination. See Com-
ment, Admissibility of Testimonial By-Products of a Physical Test, 24 U. MIAMI L. REv.
50 (1969) ; Annot. 87 A.L.R.2d 370 (1963). Florida courts have taken a somewhat divergent
view on this point. See Gay v. City of Orlando, 202 So.2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968) (refusal to take non-compulsory chemical test held inadmissible)
and State v. Esperti, 220 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), cert. dismissed, 225 So.2d 910 (Fla.
1969) (if chemical test is compulsory and admissible, evidence of refusal to take test is
admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt).
515. 226 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 147 (1970).
516. FLA. STAT. § 475.30(1) (1969).
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mission's charges in proceedings brought by Florida Real Estate Com-
mission for license revocation or suspension did not violate the constitu-
tional guarantee against self-incrimination.517
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 1.200, which requires the defendant to give notice
of an alibi defense and disclose his alibi witnesses, does not violate the
privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. 1
In State v. Carpenter51 9 the Supreme Court of Florida reaffirmed its
decision in State v. Young5" by holding that it did not violate the defen-
dant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination to instruct the
jury that exclusive possession of recently stolen property raises an infer-
ence that the person in possession stole such property unless that person
gives a reasonable and credible account of how he came into possession
so as to raise a reasonable doubt.
XXVI. JURY TRIAL
A. The Right to Trial by Jury
In Williams v. Florida52" ' the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the sixth and fourteenth amendment right to trial by jury was
not violated by Florida's decision to provide a six-person rather than
twelve-person jury in noncapital cases. 2z
In Duncan v. Louisiana5 23 the Supreme Court held that the four-
teenth amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases
which-were they to be tried in a federal court-would come within the
sixth amendment guarantee. The Court did not, however, attempt to
specifically define the difference between a petty offense and a serious
crime. Later, in Baldwin v. New York,524 the Court held that no offense
can be deemed "petty" for the purposes of the right to trial by jury
where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized. In City of
517. Chief Justice Ervin dissented in Kozerwitz on the basis of Spevack v. Klein, 385
U.S. 511 (1967) which prohibits self-incrimination in noncriminal as well as criminal
proceedings. Kozerwitz v. Stack, 226 So.2d 682, 684 (Fla. 1969) (dissenting opinion).
518. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
519. 222 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1969).
520. 217 So.2d 567 (Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 853 (1969).
521. 399 U.S. 78 (1970), noted in 24 U. MiAm- L. Rav. 832 (1970). Accord, Heains
v. State, 223 So.2d 738 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970), upholding FLA.
STAT. § 913.10 (1969) and FLA. R. Cmr. P. 1.270; Morgan v. State, 223 So.2d 801 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1969) cert. denied, 399 U.S. 933 (1970); Williams v. State, 224 So.2d 406 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1969).
522. FLA. STAT. § 913.10 (Supp. 1970) provides that "[t]welve persons shall constitute
a jury to try all capital cases, and six persons shall constitute a jury to try all other criminal
cases."
523. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
524. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
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Ft. Lauderdale v. Byrd525 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
held that the rights extended by Baldwin did not apply where three sepa-
rate offenses, each carrying a less than six month possible sentence, are
joined in one trial and the aggregate could exceed six months.
In Smith v. Davis526 the Supreme Court of Florida held that the
right to trial by jury in drunk driving cases, extended by Florida Statutes
section 322.262(4) (1969), did not apply to persons charged with such
an offense under a municipal ordinance. In subsequent application of this
rule, the Supreme Court of Florida pointed out that defendants charged
with such an offense could, under Florida Statutes sections 932.61-.66
(Supp. 1970), transfer such a case to a state court where a jury trial
would be obtainable.527 After a suggestion by the Supreme Court of
Florida, 2 the legislature amended section 322.262(4) to provide for
jury trial for all persons charged with driving while under the influence
whether the prosecution is in municipal court or state court.
529
It has been held that when charges are properly consolidated into a
single trial, the defendant is not entitled to double the number of peremp-
tory challenges, but the judge may, in his discretion, grant additional
challenges when it appears that the defendant may be prejudiced."0
The question of whether waiver of jury trial is procedural or sub-
stantive was addressed in State v. Garcia."' In Garcia the Supreme Court
of Florida held that waiver of a jury trial is procedural; therefore, such
a waiver may properly be regulated by court rule, 82 and a defendant who
was under indictment for a capital offense to which he had not plead
guilty was entitled to waive a jury trial pursuant to such rule.
Notwithstanding Chief Justice Ervin's concurring opinion in Perkins
v. State,"' wherein the virtues of bifurcated trials were extolled, Florida
courts have thus far refused to provide for bifurcated trials whereby one
jury determines questions of guilt or innocence, and upon a finding of
guilt, a second jury determines the punishment.3
4
525. 242 So.2d 494 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
526. 231 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1970), quashing Davis v. Smith, 227 So.2d 342 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1969). See also Purdy v. Evans, 231 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1970).
527. Dohm v. O'Connor, 240 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1970).
528. Robertson v. Bradford, 233 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1970) and Robertson v. State ex rel.
Harty, 233 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1970).
529. FLA. STAT. § 322.262(4) (Supp. 1970); DeJonge v. Pallotto, 239 So.2d 252, 253
(Fla. 1970) (special concurring opinion of Justice Adkins).
530. Johnson v. State, 222 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1969), citing FLA. STAT. § 913.08 (1969) and
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.350.
531. 229 So.2d 236 (Fla. 1969), aff'g State v. Garcia, 224 So.2d 395 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
532. FLA. R. Cium. P. 1.260 provides that "a defendant may, in writing, waive a jury
trial with the approval of the court and the consent of the state." This rule supersedes any
legislative enactment governing practice and procedure [see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 912.01 (1967))
to the extent that statute and rule are inconsistent. State v. Garcia, 229 So.2d 236, 238
(Fla. 1969).
533. 228 So.2d 382, 393-95 (Fla. 1969).
534. Sanders v. State, 241 So.2d 430 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970). See note 641 infra.
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B. Jurors
Application of the rule of Witherspoon v. Illinois535 (pertaining to
the exclusion of jurors with opinions against capital punishment) by the
Florida courts has been discussed previously in this survey."a
Jurors whose scruples against capital punishment are such that it
would preclude them from returning a verdict of guilty if it might mean
imposition of the death penalty are properly excluded. 37 However, as
was pointed out by the Supreme Court of the United States in Boulden
v. Holman:
5 8
[I]t is entirely possible that a person with "a fixed opinion
against" or who does not "believe in" capital punishment might
nevertheless be perfectly able as a juror to abide by existing
law-to follow conscientiously the instructions of a trial judge
and to consider fairly the imposition of the death sentence in
a particular case.
Thus, where the record does not reflect that the juror's beliefs would
have precluded an objective evaluation, the exclusion of the juror is
error. 53
9
Under Florida Statutes section 919.05 (1969)540 and Florida Crim-
inal Rule 1.410, jurors are entitled, upon request, to have testimony
read back to them during deliberation. Thus, Slinsky v. State54 held
that the judge's summary denial of the deliberating jury's request to have
certain testimony read to them was reversible error since the attorneys
were not notified of the request, the defendant was not present,54 2 and it
could not be determined from the record the effect, if any, that denial
may have had in the guilt determination.
XXVII. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE54
In State ex rel Gerstein v. Stedman' the state, in its suggestion for
a writ of prohibition, urged that Judge Carling Stedman should be dis-
qualified from trying the Milander-Wolfe case because the case involved
immunized witnesses and the judge had stated, in a previous case, that
535. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
536. See notes 394-399 supra and accompanying text.
537. Perkins v. State, 228 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1969).
538. 394 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1969).
539. See Watson v. State, 234 So.2d 143, 144 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) (dissenting opinion).
540. Repealed by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-339, § 180, because the same rule is contained
in FiA. R. CRuM. P. 1.410.
541. 232 So.2d 451 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
542. FLA. STAT. § 914.01(4) (1969) provides that the defendant is entitled to be present
at all proceedings before the court when the jury is present. This statute was repealed by
Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-399, § 180, because the same rule is contained in FLA. R. CRIM. P.
1.180(4). See also section XIII and notes 366 and 367 supra and accompanying text.
543. See generally FLA. R. Cam. P. 1.230(e).
544. 233 So.2d 142 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. discharged, 238 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1970).
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he would not rely on the testimony of immunized witnesses.5 45 The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Third District, pointed out that the fact that a
certain statute or principle of law may run counter to the personal views
of the judge does not necessarily render that judge disqualified to try a
case involving such law or principle.546 The court found that the judge
had not indicated prejudice against the specific defendants involved, and
that the state's allegations concerning the judge's views did not state
that the judge would refuse to follow the law.
In State ex rel. Schmidt v. Justice,547 the fact that the trial judge
had, in a previous trial of the same case, expressed a personal feeling as
to the guilt or innocence of a defendant was held not legally sufficient
to disqualify the judge.
After disqualifying himself a judge should proceed no further in a
case; therefore, after disqualifying himself a judge had no legal right or
authority to proceed on a motion to revoke probation and to sentence.
48
XXVIII. SPEEDY TRIAL
During the period surveyed and thereafter there have been signifi-
cant developments in the law concerning speedy trial. On the federal
level, the Supreme Court of the United States in Smith v. Hooey5 9 ex-
tended the right to a speedy trial by providing that a state has, upon
demand, an affirmative duty to secure the presence of an accused for trial
when the accused is incarcerated by another sovereign. In Dickey v.
Florida5" the United States Supreme Court reversed a Florida conviction
on the grounds that the eight year delay between commission of the
alleged offense and trial was a violation of fourteenth amendment due
process55' in light of the repeated efforts by the defendant, who was in-
carcerated in another sovereign, to secure a trial and because prejudice
545. The affidavit accompanying the suggestion also urged that the Judge's former
statement that "[t]here is no such thing as a good grand jury indictment . . . [they] are
all bad" indicated prejudice by the judge making disqualification proper. State ex rel. Gerstein
v. Stedman, 233 So.2d 142, 143 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
546. Id. at 144, citing State ex rel. Sagonias v. Baird, 67 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1953). Accord,
State ex rel. Schmidt v. Justice, 237 So.2d 827 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
547. 237 So.2d 827 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), citing Nickels v. State, 86 Fla. 208, 98 So.
497 (1923).
548. Vaughn v. State, 226 So.2d 443 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), citing FLA. R. CRim. P.
1.230(d) and FLA. STAT. § 911.01 (1969) [FLA. STAT. § 911.01 (1969) was repealed by Fla.
Laws 1970, ch. 70-339, § 180, because the same rule is contained in FLA. R. CRim. P.
1.230(d) ].
549. 393 U.S. 374 (1969). Accord, Dickey v. Circuit Court, 200 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1967).
550. 398 U.S. 30 (1970), noted in 25 U. MmAm L. REv. 330 (1971).
551. In Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) the sixth amendment right to
a speedy trial was held binding on the states through the fourteenth amendment. However,
both Klopfer and Smith v. Hooey, note 549 supra, were not operative law when Dickey
petitioned Florida to try him. Thus, rather than holding that Klopfer and Smith v. Hooey
were retroactive, the Court based its decision on the fourteenth amendment due process
clause (rather than the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial) which was the test employed
by the federal courts prior to Klopfer. See Note, 25 U. MIAmI L. REv. 330 (1971).
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resulted from the delay (death of witnesses, loss of police records). The
Court in Dickey correctly prophesied that "the speedy trial guarantee
should receive a more hospitable interpretation than it has yet been
accorded.
552
The "three term of court" speedy trial rule of Florida Statutes sec-
tions 915.01 (Supp. 1970) and 915.02 (Supp. 1970) have been re-
pealed"'5 and in lieu thereof, the rights guaranteed by section 918.015'"
of the Florida Statutes have been realized by the promulgation by the
Supreme Court of rule 1.191 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure555 Rule 1.191 provides inter alia that a person charged with a mis-
demeanor be tried within 90 days from the time such person is taken into
custody; that a person charged with a felony be tried within 180 days
from the time such person is taken into custody; and that any person
charged with any crime, upon demand, be brought to trial within 60 days
of the filing of the demand. At the time of this writing, rule 1.191 is
being interpreted by the Florida courts.55
Rule 1.191(i)(3) provides that "[a]ny rights which shall have ac-
crued to any defendant under former Fla. Stat. § 915.01 and 915.02 shall
not be disturbed by this rule." Applying this rule, the Supreme Court of
Florida in State ex rel. Atwood v. Baker557 held that:
(1) if the demand periods and full terms [under § 915.01 and
915.02 (1969)] were satisfied prior to repeal, then a defendant
is entitled to release under operation of the statute; (2) if a
defendant's third full-term was completed after repeal, but
prior to the effective date of the Rule [1.191], his constitu-
tional right to a speedy trial requires his release; (3) if the
third full-term has not been reached, or the term has not ex-
pired prior to the effective date of the Rule, then his trial must
commence within 180 days of the adoption of the Rule; if a
demand was made after the date of the Rule's adoption, then a
trial must commence within 60 days.5"
552. Dickey v. Florida, 298 U.S. 30, 57 (1970) (concurring opinion).
553. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-1(B), § 7.
554. (1) In all criminal prosecutions the state and the defendant shall each have
the right to a speedy trial.
(2) The supreme court shall, by rule of said court, provide procedures through
which the right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by subsection (1) and by Section
16 of Article I of the state constitution shall be realized.
Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-1(B), §,6. See In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 245 So.2d
33 (Fla. 1971).
555. FiA. R. Cmm. P. 1.191 (1971), reported in 245 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1971) and amended
in 251 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1971).
556. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hanks v. Goodman, 253 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1971) holding
inter alia that the 60 day period mentioned in rule 1.191(a) (2) begins to run from the time
the defendant has been charged with a crime by indictment, information or trial affidavit
and not from date of arrest. But see State ex rel. Buono v. Goodman, 233 So.2d 185 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1970), cert. discharged, 243 So.2d 594 (Fla. 1971) wherein it was stated that the
purpose of a speedy trial provision is to prevent the state from arresting and then delaying
prosecution.
557. 250 So.2d 869 (Fla. 1971).
558. Id. at 871-72.
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During the biennium there were a number of decisions interpreting
the "three term of court" rule of Florida Statutes chapter 915 (1969).
Under section 915.01(1) (1969), if the defendant's demands for speedy
trial had not been filed on the first day of each term of court, the demand
was considered a nullity. 59 Similarly, failure to comply with the require-
ments of section 915.02 (1969), that the demand be in writing, rendered
the demand ineffective."e
The state may not avoid the effect of the three term statute by nolle
prossing in the third term and filing another information. 6' Also, the
fact that a crowded docket is the reason for delaying the trial beyond the
statutory limit is not sufficient to prevent dismissal of the case. 62
The defendant may, by his action or inaction, waive his right to a
speedy trial."5 The failure to object to a continuance has been held to
constitute a waiver.'" Similarly, the failure of the defendant to request
a trial has precluded a finding that there has been a denial of the speedy
trial right.5 6 5 On the other hand, it has been held that moving for a
change of venue after filing demands does not constitute a waiver of the
right to a speedy trial.566 The rule is that if the delay is caused by the
defendant, that delay cannot be relied upon to support a dismissal under
the speedy trial law." 7 Thus, where the defendant withdrew his waiver
of a jury trial shortly before trial time568 or moved for a mistrial in a case
originally brought in the third term,569 the fact that trial commenced
subsequent to the statutory period did not entitle the defendant to a dis-
missal under the three term rule. Also, where the defendant's motion to
dismiss the information had been granted within the three term period,
the fact that his trial (which came after the reversal of the order dis-
missing the information) came after the expiration of three terms did
not entitle the defendant to a dismissal.570
559. Moore v. Edwards, 241 So.2d 736 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
560. State v. Williams, 230 So.2d 185 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) (oral demand held invalid).
561. State ex rel. Bird v. Stedman, 223 So.2d 85 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). See also FLA.
R. CRm . P. 1.191(h)(2).
562. State ex rel. Leon v. Baker, 238 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1970); Leonard v. McIntosh,
237 So.2d 809 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
563. See State ex rel. Leon v. Baker, 238 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1970).
564. State ex rel. Leon v. Baker, 229 So.2d 595 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969); Cacciatore v.
State, 226 So.2d 137 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). But see State ex rel. Leon v. Baker, 238 So.2d
281 (Fla. 1970) wherein this rule was modified. See also FLA. R. CRam. P. 1.191(d)(3).
565. Cacciatore v. State, 226 So.2d 137 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
566. State ex rel. Johnson v. Edwards, 233 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1970).
567. Id.
568. Buttler v. State, 238 So.2d 313 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
569. Payton v. Edwards, 226 So.2d 822 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969), appeal dismissed, 237
So.2d 536 (Fla. 1970). (The fact that trial was instituted within the statutory period was
sufficient to toll the statute.) The effect of a mistrial on the speedy trial rule is now covered
by FLA. R. Cant. P. 1.191(g).
570. State v. Carrol, 240 So.2d 205 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) [Subsequent to the period of
this survey, this case was reversed by the Supreme Court of Florida. Carrol v. State, 251
So.2d 866 (Fla. 1971).].
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In Woodward v. Edwards5 ' the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, held that Florida Statutes chapter 915 (1969) did not require
that an accused necessarily be prepared for trial at the time he filed an
initial demand for a speedy trial. This result has been changed by rule
1.191(c) (1971) which provides that:
A demand for speedy trial binds the accused and the State. No
demand for speedy trial shall be filed or served unless the ac-
cused has a bona fide desire to obtain trial sooner than other-
wise might be provided. A demand for speedy trial shall be
deemed a pleading by the accused that he is available for trial,
has diligently investigated his case, and that he is prepared or
will be prepared for trial.5
XXX. STIPULATIONS AS TO LIE DETECTOR TESTS
5 73
In Butler v. State574 the defendant and the state, with the tacit ap-
proval of the court, entered into an agreement whereby the defendant
was to take a lie detector test, with the results therefrom binding both
sides. The defendant took the test and the results indicated that the de-
fendant was telling the truth. The state initially dismissed the charge
but subsequently recharged and tried the defendant. On appeal the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed the conviction and held
that the court's participation in the agreement was tantamount to ap-
proval thereof, and that the state's "promise constituted a pledge of
public faith which should not have been repudiated." 57
XXX. PROBATION
Grant of probation rests within the board discretion of the trial
judge and is a matter of grace, not of right.17 Also, the power to revoke
probation is an inherent power of the trial court which may be exercised
at any time upon the court determining that the probationer has violated
the law. 7 Thus, if a defendant is sentenced to a jail term with proba-
tion to commerce upon release from jail, misdeeds committed while
serving the term may be the basis of revocation of the probation. The
fact that the misdeed was committed before the term of probation com-
571. 244 So.2d 438 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), cert. discharged, 249 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1971).
572. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 245 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla. 1971).
573. On stipulations generally see note 456 supra and accompanying text. See also Section
XXIV, A, 3, infra.
574. 228 So.2d 421 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969), citing State v. Davis, 188 So.2d 24 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1966) noted in 21 U. MIAxI L. REv. 896 (1967).
575. Butler v. State, 228 So.2d 421, 424 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
576. See, e.g., Martin v. State, 243 So.2d 189 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 247
So.2d 63 (Fla. 1971), citing FLA. STAT. § 948.01(1)(3) and § 948.03 (1969).
577. Martin v. State, 243 So.2d 189 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 247 So.2d 63
(Fla. 1971), citing Bronson v. State, 148 Fla. 188, 3 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1941).
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menced is irrelevant, inasmuch as the misdeed was committed subsequent
to the entry of the order of probation.
578
To hold otherwise would make a mockery of the very philosophy
underlying the concept of probation, namely, that given a sec-
ond chance to live within the rules of society and the law of the
land, one will prove that he will thereafter do so and become
a useful member of society.1
9
Revocation of probation hearings are informal in nature, and hear-
say evidence is admissible if there is also other evidence upon which the
decision can be based.58 °
In Murphy v. State5"' a defendant was found guilty by the jury, and
the court withheld adjudication and sentencing and entered an order of
probation. The defendant appealed and asked for an order staying the
terms of probation pending disposition of the appeal. The District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that an application for a stay of
a probation order is entitled to the same consideration that would accrue
to an application for a stay of any other sentence pending an appeal.
After a plea of nolo contendere the judge in State v. Williams582
placed the defendant on twenty years probation, the terms of which
required that the defendant pay $3,000 in fines and spend 60 days in
jail each year. The state appealed, assigning the conditional probation
as error. Although the court admitted that the conditions were "unor-
thodox, ' 58 3 the appeal was dismissed on the ground that while the state
could appeal a sentence, 8 4 it could not appeal from the conditions of
probation imposed by the trial court.
XXXI. EXPUNGING OF ARREST RECORDS
In the absence of statutory authority or overriding equitable con-
siderations, records made under legislative authority concerning criminal
acts may not, by court order, be expunged or destroyed even when the
accused has been acquitted or the charge dismissed.58
578. Martin v. State, 243 So.2d 189 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
579. Id. at 191.
580. Crossin v. State, 244 So.2d 142 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), citing Brill v. State, 159
Fla. 682, 32 So.2d 607 (Fla. 1947); McNeely v. State, 186 So.2d 520 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
Cf. Franklin v. State, 226 So.2d 461 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969) (hearsay evidence alone not
sufficient). See generally FLA. R. CRim. P. 1.790.
581. 231 So.2d 263 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
582. 237 So.2d 69 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
583. Id. at 70.
584. See FLA. STAT. § 924.07(5) (1969).
585. Mulkey v. Purdy, 234 So.2d 108 (Fla. 1970), aff'g Purdy v. Mulkey, 228 So.2d
132 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969) (fingerprints and photographs taken by the sheriff pursuant to
FLA. STAT. § 30.31 (1969) not expunged even though eight years had elapsed from the
time the defendant, who was 17 years old, plead guilty to the misdemeanor of petty larceny).
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XXXII. CUSTODIAL TREATMENT
Myron v. Wainwright586 the habeas corpus petitioner claimed that
the punitive confinement 5 7 imposed upon him because of his breach of
prison rules constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court denied
the petition and held that such treatment is not violative of the consti-
tution when it is imposed because of a prisoner's violation of prison
rules.
XXXIII. SPECIFIC CRIMES AND DEFENSES
A. Crimes
1. ACCESSORY
A defendant charged with robbery but convicted of being an ac-
cessory after the fact is entitled to have that conviction reversed, but
such reversal is not with prejudice to the state's filing a new information
charging the defendant with being an accessory.58
2. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
Aggravated assault differs from simple assault through the addition
of one element-the use of a deadly weapon.589
In a case of first impression in Florida, the District Court of Ap-
peal, First District, in Bass v. State 90 held that a gun, whether loaded
or unloaded, was a "deadly weapon" when pointed at someone; there-
fore, a conviction for aggravated assault under Florida Statutes sec-
tion 784.04 (1969)6' was proper when it was established that the de-
fendant pointed an unloaded gun at another.
3. BURGLARY AND POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS
The crime of breaking and entering with intent to commit a mis-
demeanor 92 has been held to be a felony.593 However, in Brown v.
State.. the Supreme Court of Florida indicated that the crime of break-
586. 225 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
587. Petitioner was segregated, limited to three minute showers on alternate days, not
allowed sunlight, denied reading material and medical and dental care. Id.
588. Mackey v. State, 223 So.2d 380 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), citing Newkirk v. State, 222
So.2d 435 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
589. McCullers v. State, 206 So.2d 30 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
590. 232 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
591. FLA. STAT. § 784.04 (1969) provides that: "Whoever assaults another with a deadly
weapon, without intent to kill, shall be guilty of an aggravated assault . .. ."
592. FLA. STAT. § 810.05 (1969) and FLA. STAT. § 810.05 (Supp. 1970).
593. Grainger v. State, 239 So.2d 277 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970); Brown v. State, 232 So.2d
55 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
594. 237 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1970).
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ing and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor may be a felony de-
pending on the penalty actually imposed. Under Florida Statutes sec-
tion 810.06 (1969) knowing possession of burglary tools with intent
to employ same in a burglary is a felony. In Mesenbrink v. State595 the
District Court of Appeal Third District, reversed a conviction based on
section 810.06 because the state failed to demonstrate the felonious in-
tent which the statute requires. The "tools" in Mesenbrink were seized
as a result of a consented search of the defendant's apartment after the
defendant had been arrested for vagrancy in a residential neighbor-
hood. In reversing, the court pointed out that in all prior cases wherein
an 810.06 conviction was affirmed on appeal, the defendant was in im-
mediate possession of the "tools."59
In Greene v. State597 it was held that an automobile trunk was a
"depository" within the meaning of section 810.06; 5"' therefore pos-
session of tools with an intent to break into an auto trunk will sustain
a conviction under section 810.06.
4. CONTEMPT
Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.840(a) (6) and (7)
the judge, prior to pronouncing sentence for contempt of court, must:
inform the contemnor of the accusation and judgment against him; in-
quire as to whether the contemnor has any cause to show why sentence
should not be pronounced; and afford the contemnor the opportunity to
present evidence of mitigating circumstances. Moreover, 1.840(a) (6)
requires that the judgment "should" contain a recital of the facts consti-
tuting the contempt of which the defendant has been found guilty. In
Moore v. State599 the court reversed a contempt judgment even though
the evidence was sufficient to support it, on the grounds that the judge
failed to comply with rule 1.840(a) (6) and (7) and because the sen-
tence imposed was to be "at hard labor" which is an unlawful sentence
for contempt.600
In Goodwin v. Statel"' the defendant was held in contempt and sen-
tenced to six months for giving false testimony before a trial judge. On
appeal the defendant argued that it was error to sentence him to six
595. 231 So.2d 852 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
596. Id., citing Brown v. State, 98 Fla. 871, 124 So. 467 (1929); Fitzgerald v. State,
203 So.2d 511 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967); Estevez v. State, 189 So.2d 830 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
597. 237 So.2d 46 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970) (the "tool" in question was a fingernail file).
598. FLA. STAT. § 810.06 (1969) provides in pertinent part that
whoever . . . knowingly has in his possession any . . . tool . . . designed for cutting
through, forcing or breaking open any building, vault, safe, or other depository, in
order to steal therefrom . . . knowing the same to be adapted and designed for the
purpose aforesaid, with intent to use ... same . . . for such purpose, shall be pun-
ished . . . . (emphasis supplied).
599. 245 So.2d 880 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
600. See, e.g., State ex rel. Saunders v. Boyer, 166 So.2d 694 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
601. 236 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
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months for the contempt charge without first being offered a jury trial
on the issue of whether he was in contempt. The District Court of Ap-
peal, First District, affirmed, pointing out that a six month sentence for
contempt is "minor" and may be imposed by the trial judge without a
trial by jury on the issue of contempt.
5. CONSPIRACY
Conspiracy to commit robbery is not an offense included under
the charge of robbery.0°2 Thus, where the information charged robbery,
it was error to convict for conspiracy to commit robbery."0 3
In Bentancourt v. State °4 the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, upheld a conviction for conspiracy to sell marijuana. The defen-
dant argued that because an undercover police officer was the one
intended to purchase the goods (the purchase was not consumated), a
conviction was improper under the rule of King v. State.05 The court
in Bentancourt held, however, that an offer to sell was equivalent to a
sale under the then existing drug law, 06 and therefore, since actual pur-
chase was not an essential element of the offense, the holding of King v.
State"07 was inapplicable.
6. DRUNK DRIVING0 ° 8
Florida Statutes section 322.261(1)(g) (1969) °10 provides that
any person arrested for driving while under the influence may request
to have a chemical test made of his "breath, blood, saliva, or urine" for
the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of the arrested person's
blood. In State v. Smith 10 the defendant was arrested for driving while
under the influence. He was requested to take a breathalyzer test 11 but
602. Kinchen v. State, 235 So.2d 749 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), citing Newkirk v. State, 222
So.2d 435 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
603. Id. A reversal on such grounds does not preclude the state from refiling an in-
formation charging conspiracy to commit robbery. See also note 436 supra and accompanying
text.
604. 228 So.2d 124 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
605. 104 So.2d 730, 733 (Fla. 1958).
[W]here two or more persons conspire with another who is, unknown to them, a
government agent acting in the line of duty, to commit an offense under an agree-
ment and an intention that an essential ingredient of the offense is to be performed
by, and only by, such government agent, such persons may not legally be convicted
of a conspiracy.
Id.
606. FLA. STAT. § 398.02(9) (1967).
607. See note 605 supra.
608. See also note 346 supra, note 203 supra, and notes 526-29 supra and accompany-
ing text.
609. FLA. STAT. § 322.261(1)(g) (Supp. 1970) amended the 1969 statute by deleting
reference to a blood, saliva, or urine test and providing only for a breath test: "If the
arresting officer does not request a chemical test of the person arrested . .. such person
may request ... a chemical test ... of the arrested person's breath . . ." (emphasis added)
610. 241 So.2d 728 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
611. FLA. STAT. § 322.261(1) (a) (1969) provides that any person who accepts the
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refused, claiming that section 322.261(1)(g) (1969) allowed him the
right to select a blood test instead. The District Court of Appeal, Second
District, held that section 322.261(1) (g) (1969) was not intended to
allow the accused to select which of the four specific tests, but only to
select a test. This result was codified in the 1970 revision of section
322.261 (1) (g). 61 2
In Perryman v. State 13 the defendant was requested to submit to a
breathalyzer test pursuant to Florida Statutes section 322.261(1)(a)
(1969) 1 He failed to complete the test and thereafter his license was
suspended for refusing to submit to a chemical test pursuant to section
322.261(1)(c) (1969). On appeal, the defendant argued that he was
too intoxicated to perform the breath test and therefore, he should have
been given a blood test. The court rejected the argument and observed
that while a blood test may be given to an unconscious driver pursuant
to section 322.261(1)(b), there is nothing that requires such a test
under the circumstances of Perryman. Moreover, the court stressed that
the defendant would not be allowed to circumvent the "implied con-
sent" law by "professing to be too drunk to perform the simple task . . .
of blowing breath into a tube or similar device for chemical testing. M
15
Evidently, the court believed that the defendant was not, in reality, too
drunk to perform the test, and that his argument to that effect was de-
vised to escape the consequences of his refusal to take the test. In other
jurisdictions, if it is found that the defendant was, in fact, unable to
complete a breath test, the defendant's license may not then be revoked
or suspended for "refusal" to take the test 10
7. ESCAPE
Under Florida Statutes section 843.12 (1969), escape from an
officer or person who has or is entitled to lawful custory is a felony.
In Maggard v. State" the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
held that for a conviction to be valid under section 843.12 it is not neces-
sary to show that the escaped person was being held under a convic-
tion at the time of escape; however, it is necessary to prove that the
escaped person was in lawful custody at the time of escape.
i s
privilege of operating a motor vehicle in Florida "impliedly consents" to a chemical test for
intoxication. The refusal to submit to such a test is grounds for suspension of license. See
generally Comment, Florida's "Implied Consent" Statute: Chemical Tests for Intoxicated
Drivers, 22 U. MiAm L. REv. 698 (1969).
612. See note 609 supra.
613. 242 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
614. See note 611 supra.
615. Perryman v. State, 242 So.2d 762, 763 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
616. See, e.g., In re Scott, 5 App. Div. 2d 859, 171 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1958).
617. 226 So.2d 32 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
618. In Maggard the State did not offer evidence proving that the defendant was in
lawful custody at the time of escape; therefore, the court reversed the conviction. (Sub-
sequent to the period covered by the survey, the District Court of Appeal, First District, in
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8. EXPLOSIVES
In State v. Babun619 the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
held that a prosecution for possession of explosives without a license
under Florida Statutes chapter 552 (1969) need not, in all circumstances,
be preceded by an exhaustion of the administrative remedies set out in
the chapter, since the administrative procedures are intended basically
for license revocation proceedings and not for criminal prosecutions.
9. FORGERY-BAD CHECKS
Passing a forged check with intent to defraud is a felony.0"
The crime of forgery requires making of a writing which falsely
purports to be the writing of another with intent to defraud. The essence
of the offense is the intent to defraud; thus, when a man uses an assumed
name and persons in the community know him by that assumed name,
the writing of a check under that assumed name on an account with
insufficient funds does not constitute forgery.02'
In Edwards v. State622 the defendant was charged with forgery of a
check and uttering a forged instrument. Defendant was subsequently
found guilty of "attempting to utter a forged instrument." On appeal
the District Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed and held that there
was no distinction between uttering a forged instrument and attempting
to utter a forged instrument; uttering is proved as fully by an attempt
to negotiate a forged instrument as it is proved by complete negotiation.
Under Florida Statutes section 832.05(3) (a) (1969) it is a crime
to "obtain" goods by means of a check the drawer knows to be drawn
on an account with insufficient funds. In Gill v. Statea the defendant
had issued such a check for four automobiles, but he did not take actual
possession of the cars until after he had reimbursed the auto auctioneer
for the bad check. The defendant argued that since he did not take pos-
session of the cars until after the check was made good, the most he could
be charged for was uttering a worthless check."24 The District Court of
Appeal, Second District, disagreed and affirmed the conviction under
section 832.05(3) (a) on the grounds that since the defendant received
bills of sale and titles to the cars, as well as a gate release, he was in
"constructive possession" of the cars, and therefore he "obtained" them
within the meaning of the statute.
Brochu v. State, 258 So.2d 286 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972) held that in order to be convicted of
escape under FLA. STAT. § 944.40 (1969), the state must show the prisoner was "convicted
and sentenced" in accordance with the law].
619. 233 So.2d 171 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
620. Woods v. State, 239 So.2d 853 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), citing Brown v. State, 237
So.2d 129 (Fla. 1970).
621. Walters v. State, 245 So.2d 907 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
622. 223 So.2d 746 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
623. 235 So.2d 751 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
624. FTA. STAT. § 832.05(2) (1969).
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10. LARCENY
In Adams v. State 25 the defendant was charged with breaking and
entering with intent to commit a felony. The television that the defen-
dant allegedly stole was worth $115.55 when it was originally pur-
chased two years previous to the alleged offense. There was no proof
of the television's value at the time of the theft. Nor was there any proof
that the premises contained extensive valuable property and that the
defendant intended to take as much as he could. Thus, the District Court
of Appeal, First District, held that the evidence was insufficient to
establish that the defendant had intent to commit grand larceny (taking
of property of value of $100 or more). The conviction was, therefore,
reversed, and the case remanded with instruction to the trial court to
enter judgment and sentence on the lesser included offense of breaking
and entering with intent to commit petit larceny.
It has been held that in a larceny prosecution under Florida
Statutes section 811.021, the state must prove that the accused appro-
priated the money to his own use or that of another person other than
the true owner. 26 Thus, mere proof that the complaining witness gave
the defendant monies to open a bank account, but that no account was
ever opened, was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of grand
larceny."2"
Subsequent to the period covered by this survey there has been
some question as to exactly when the statute of limitations begins to run
in a larceny case. 28 This question is briefly treated in another section
of this survey.'2"
11. PERJURY
In Goodwin v. State 30 the defendant, in proceedings to vacate a
judgment, presented perjured testimony regarding torture, coercion and
forced drug use. The trial court held the defendant in contempt for
knowingly and willfully presenting false testimony in the presence of a
trial judge and sentenced the defendant to six months for contempt.
Florida Statutes section 90.07 (1969), which prohibits convicted
perjurers from testifying in court proceedings, was repealed in 19710"
625. 242 So.2d 723 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), citing Lambert v. State, III So.2d 68 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1959).
626. Edwards v. State, 226 So.2d 140 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
627. Id., citing Eizenman v. State, 132 So.2d 763 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961) and Ricard v.
State, 181 So.2d 677 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
628. State v. King, Case No. 71-10512 (Dade Co. Crim. Ct. filed Dec. 12, 1971), appeal
filed, March 27, 1972, Fla. 3d Dist.
629. See section XXXIII, B, 4 and notes 687-90 infra and accompanying text.
630. 236 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). See also Jackson v. Wainwright, 238 So.2d 657
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), discussed at note 415 supra.
631. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-72.
CRIMINAL LAW
Also, by statute, the fact of prior conviction for perjury is admissible for




12. H OMICIDE-FELONY-MURDER RULE
The requirements for establishing the corpus delecti in homicide
cases are: (1) the fact of death, (2) the existence of the criminal agency
of another person as the cause of death, and (3) the identity of the de-
ceased."' Identity testimony regarding the deceased must be preceded
by predicate testimony which establishes the basis for the identification,
i.e., that the witness had seen, recognized or by some other means identi-
fied the body." 4
In Green v. State3' the court reaffirmed the view that in a prosecu-
tion for manslaughter, it is mandatory on the court to instruct on justi-
fiable and excusable homicide.
During the biennium the felony-murder ruleO6 was the subject of
interpretation by the Florida courts. In Campbell v. State637 a defen-
dant had participated in a robbery and was apprehended. In an escape
attempt he shot and killed a police officer. The Supreme Court of
Florida held that the escape after arrest was in furtherance of the
felony and, therefore, confederates of the defendant who participated in
the robbery were subject to the felony-murder rule and an instruction
thereon was proper. The court restated the rule that:
"Whether the felony was technically completed, is not of itself
sufficient to take the case out of the category of felony murders.
It is a homicide committed during the perpetration of a felony,
if the homicide is part of the res gestae of the felony." . . . A
person may be said to be engaged in the commission or perpetra-
tion of a robbery while he is endeavoring to escape and make
away with the property taken in such robbery."
The Campbell court rejected the defendant's argument that the felony-
murder instruction was improper because he was not pursued by one
specific law officer continuously and uninterruptedly from the time of
robbery until apprehension. Also, the court refused to find that the
crime of robbery came to an end when defendant was arrested.
632. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-72, amending FLA. STAT. § 90.08 (1969).
633. Murphy v. State, 240 So.2d 854 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), citing Johnson v. State, 201
So.2d 492 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
634. Murphy v. State, 240 So.2d 854 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), citing Terzado v. State, 232
So.2d 232 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). Terzado also held that in a murder case, circumstantial
evidence which did not eliminate all reasonable hypotheses of defendant's innocence was
insuffident to sustain conviction.
635. 244 So.2d 167 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971), citing Hedges v. State, 172 So.2d 824 (Fla.
1965).
636. FLA. STAT. § 782.04(3) (1969).
637. 227 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1969), cert. dismissed, 400 U.S. 801 (1970).
638. Id. at 878, citing Jefferson v. State, 128 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1961).
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In State v. Andreu..9 the District Court of Appeal, First District,
in a per curiam decision held that the felony-murder rule did not apply
when one police officer was accidentally killed by a second police officer
in the course of the latter's attempt to apprehend the defendant. The
accidental shooting occurred when the defendant, who was unarmed and
who did not know of the officer's presence, was attempting to burglarize
a residence.
Chief Justice Ervin in his concurring opinion in Perkins v. State
6 40
suggested that Florida adopt the bifurcated trial approach in capital
cases-one jury for issue of guilt, another to determine punishment.
Although there is much to recommend such an approach,"4' at the time
of this writing no such system has been adopted.
Subsequent to the period covered by this survey, the Supreme
Court of California held the death penalty was cruel and unusual pun-
ishment and therefore unconstitutional.1 The same issue is currently
pending before the Supreme Court of the United States. 43
13. NARCOTICS AND MARIJUANAU
4
Marijuana has been held to be a "dangerous drug." 4 Therefore, the
state may, in order to protect the health of its citizens, make its posses-
sion unlawful, even when that possession is within the privacy of one's
home. 46
Possession, sale, and delivery of LSD have been held to constitute
offenses in violation of statute relating to "barbituates, central nervous
639. 222 So.2d 449 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969). See also the recent case of State v. Williams,
254 So.2d 548 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971) wherein a co-conspirator was held not responsible for
the death of an arsonist co-conspirator who set the fire.
640. 228 So.2d 382, 393 (Fla. 1969) (concurring opinion).
641. For a good example of why a bifurcated trial is recommended, see Campbell v.
State, 227 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1969), cert. dismissed, 400 U.S. 801 (1970). In Campbell the
defendant argued that the exclusion of expert testimony relating to defendant's lack of
control over his impulsive behavior was error since it may have been relevant to the issue
of mercy. However, because the testimony was not properly relative to an insanity defense
under the McNaughten test, the court held it properly excluded on the theory that it might
have confused the jury. [Subsequent to the survey period the Florida Legislature promulgated
Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-72 creating FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2), which provides for bifurcated
trials in capital cases.]
642. People v. Anderson, 40 U.S.L.W. 2552 (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed February 18, 1972)
(unconstitutional under the California constitution).
643. See 40 U.S.L.W. 3341 (January 25, 1972), citing Aikens v. California, No. 68-5027,
Furman v. Georgia, No. 69-5003, Jackson v. Georgia, No. 69-5030, Branch v. Texas, No.
69-5031.
644. See also notes 238-46 supra and accompanying text. Recent legislative changes in
this area are discussed in section XXXV infra.
645. Raines v. State, 225 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1969).
646. Borras v. State, 229 So.2d 244 (Fla. 1969), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 808 (1970),
distinguishing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See also Buttler v. State, 238 So.2d
313 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) (not a denial of due process that FLA. STAT. ch. 398 (1969) lists
marijuana as a narcotic and state did not prove that marijuana is a narcotic).
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system stimulants, and other drugs.' 647 In this regard, the legislature
has enacted Florida Statutes section 404.015 (Supp. 1970) which pro-
vides that:
It is the intent of the legislature that all drugs controlled by the
drug abuse laws of the United States, now or in the future,
shall, in addition to the drugs specified by the laws of Florida,
be controlled by the terms of this chapter [chapter 404 Florida
Statutes (1969)].
The question arises as to whether section 404.015 (Supp. 1970) is in-
valid as being an unlawful delegation of legislative authority.
Whenever drugs are found on premises which are under the con-
trol of two or more persons, the question arises as to whether each per-
son enjoying control may be prosecuted for possession. In Langdon v.
State"8 the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that where a
defendant has joint control of the premises where contraband is dis-
covered, the evidence must show that the defendant had some knowledge
that the contraband was on the premises. In Langdon the defendant was
one of eight occupants of a bus (he was not the owner) in which a small
quantity of marijuana was found. The court ruled that since there was
no evidence that the defendant knew of the marijuana, he was entitled
to a directed verdict. Langdon should be compared with Zicca v. State,64
wherein the defendant, owner and operator of a bus containing four
persons, was convicted of possession of marijuana which was found, in
plain view, on a shelf in the bus. The Zicca court ruled that since the
defendant was the owner and operator of the bus, and since the mari-
juana was in plain view, the defendant must have had knowledge of the
presence of marijuana. In Kirtley v. State65 the defendant rented motel
facilities wherein marijuana, LSD and narcotic paraphenalia were found.
The evidence established that a number of people other than the defen-
dant were in and out of the premises during the day the drugs were
seized. Since the state failed to show that the defendant knew of the
existence of the contraband, the conviction for possession was set aside
by the District Court of Appeal, Third District.
In Eckroth v. State"51 the District Court of Appeal, Second District,
held that a person who receives from another a pipe of marijuana for
purposes of taking a puff was not in possession within the meaning of
chapter 398 of the Florida Statutes. The Supreme Court thought other-
647. State v. Hoffman, 242 So.2d 147 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), citing FLA. STAT. § 404.02
(1969); State v. Hayles, 240 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1970).
648. 235 So.2d 321 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), citing Frank v. State, 199 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1967) and Markman v. State, 210 So.2d 486 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
649. 232 So.2d 414 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 238 So.2d 430 (Fla. 1970), citing
Markman v. State, 210 So.2d 486 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
650. 245 So.2d 282 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
651. 227 So.2d 313 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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wise, however, and in State v. Eckroth, 652 it reversed the Second Dis-
trict and held that a person who takes a drag from a "pot" pipe pos-
sessed and controlled the narcotic sufficient to sustain a conviction for
unlawful possession under chapter 398.
14. OBSCENITY
Possession of obscene materials is a violation of chapter 847 of the
Florida Statutes. In State v. Reeseas the Supreme Court of Florida held
that the term "immoral" in the statute was unconstitutionally vague,
but since the term was severable, the remainder of the statute was con-
stitutional. Moreover, the Reese court suggested that notwithstanding
the outdated standard for determining obscenity provided for in chapter
847654 the state may prosecute for obscenity and the courts are to apply the
latest pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court as the stan-
dard for determining obscenity. Thus, the Florida courts are to apply
the following standard when determining obscenity under chapter 847:
it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the mate-
rial taken as a whole appeals to a purient interest in sex; (b)
the material is patently offensive because it affronts contem-
porary community standards relating to the description or repre-
sentation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly
without redeeming social value."55
In Mitchem v. State ex rel. Schaub656 the Supreme Court of Florida
again upheld the constitutionality of chapter 847, but ruled that a court
could not issue a general permanent injunction against a bookstore owner
who had sold materials considered to be pornographic.
In Collins v. State Beverage Department,57 the District Court of Ap-
peal, First District, upheld the action of the State Beverage Depart-
ment which suspended the petitioner's liquor license for sale and pos-
session of obscene material, even though no testimonial evidence was
adduced at the administrative level that the literature in question met
the standards of obscenity as determined by the United States Supreme
Court. The court in Collins took the "we know hard core pornography
when we see it" approach and claimed that the pictures of completely
nude women, focused directly upon genitalia, were obviously obscene
and were without any social or artistic merit.
652. 238 So.2d 75 (Fla. 1970).
653. 222 So.2d 732 (Fla. 1969). See also Mitchum v. State, 244 So.2d 159 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1971).
654. FLA. STAT. ch. 847 (1969) was based on the standard established by Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The defendant argued the statute was unconstitutional
because it did not specifically adopt the standard for obscenity as modified by the United
States Supreme Court in cases subsequent to Roth. See, e.g., A Book Named "John Cleland's
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
655. Mitchem v. State ex rel. Schaub, 250 So.2d 883, 885 (Fla. 1971).
656. 250 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1971), citing Martin v. State, 248 So.2d 643 (Fla. 1971).
657. 239 So.2d 613 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
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15. RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY
It is essential to a conviction for receiving stolen property that the
evidence shall show to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt that the ac-
cused had knowledge that the property in question was stolen at the time
he received it, or that circumstances of the transaction were sufficiently
suspicious to put a person of ordinary intelligence and caution on in-
quiry."5 8 Proof of mere naked possession of property recently stolen,
not aided by other proof that the accused received it knowing it to be
stolen, is not sufficient to show guilty knowledge. 59
In Flowers v. State"' the District Court of Appeal, Second District,
found that receiving stolen property was a felony irrespective of the
value of the thing stolen. Thus, it was not necessary for the jury to fix




It has been suggested that in order for proof of alibi to be sufficient,
it must include and cover the entire time when the presence of the ac-
cused was required to commit the offense charged. 62 However, in Dixon
v. State" the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that evi-
dence of an alibi is admissible for the jury's consideration and evaluation
even when the alibi evidence falls short of complete proof of absolute im-
possibility of the accused's presence at the alleged time and place of the
act. The court in Dixon suggested the following as an appropriate alibi
charge:
A defendant may submit evidence that he could not have com-
mitted the crime, because he was not present at the place and
time where and when it would have been necessary for him to
be present in order to be guilty of the crime charged. Such
proof constitutes an alibi. If, from all of the evidence, you have
a reasonable doubt he was present, you must acquit."
In Bogan v. State6 5 the court, in a footnote to its opinion, stated
658. State v. Graham, 238 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1970); Schuster v. State, 235 So.2d 30
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1970); Lawrence v. State, 230 So.2d 160 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
659. State v. Graham, 238 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1970).
Proof of possession should be coupled with evidence of unusual manner of acquisi-
tion, attempts at concealment, contradictory statements, the fact that the goods
were being sold at less than their value, possession of other stolen property ....
Id. at 621.
See also Taylor v. State, 241 So.2d 426 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
660. 222 So.2d 786 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
661. See generally FLA. R. CRim. P. 1.200.
662. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 128 So.2d 754 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
663. 227 So.2d 740 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 237 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1970).
664. Dixon v. State, 227 So.2d 740, 742 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 237 So.2d 179
(Fla. 1970).
665. 226 So.2d 110, 113 n.3 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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that even though the state did not file a written demand for a notice of
alibi pursuant to rule 1.200 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the state nonetheless had the right to anticipate a particular alibi defense
and attempt to rebut it.
2. INSANITY' 66
The McNaughten Rule667 is in effect in Florida.66 Accordingly, it is
not error to exclude expert testimony as to the defendant's psychological
state when that testimony does not show the defendant to be insane
under the McNaughten test. 6 '
In Collins v. State""° the defendant, in response to a Miranda warn-
ing, said "I guess I will have to get a lawyer." The statement was ad-
mitted into evidence and the defendant objected on the grounds that the
statement was privileged because it dealt with his election to avail him-
self of the constitutional right to counsel. The District Court of Appeal,
Third District, admitted the statement, reasoning that it was evidence of
the defendant's state of mind and was therefore relevant to the issue of
insanity.
In Parkin v. State 7' the Supreme Court of Florida addressed itself
to the question of whether a defendant who pleads insanity may, con-
sistent with the prohibition against self-incrimination, be ordered to re-
spond to the questions of a court-appointed psychiatrist. At trial, the
defendant, who refused to talk to the court-appointed psychiatrist, was
ordered to respond to the psychiatrist's questions under pain of for-
feiting the testimony of her own privately engaged psychiatrist. On
appeal the supreme court held that where insanity is interposed as a de-
fense, compulsory examination of an accused by experts, including
eliciting testimony from the defendant, does not violate the prohibition
against self-incrimination and does not violate due process. The court
went on, however, to limit the use of the results of such an inquiry:
The court should prohibit the psychiatrist from testifying di-
rectly as to the facts surrounding the crime, where such facts
666. See generally FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.210.
667. To be declared insane under the MeNaughten test it must be proven that
the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason from a disease, of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he had
known it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.
Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
668. Campbell v. State, 227 So.2d 873, 877 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 801
(1970) ; Grissom v. State, 237 So.2d 57 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
669. Campbell v. State, 227 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 801 (1970)
(evidence that defendant lacked control over his compulsive behavior held properly ex-
cluded); Grissom v. State, 237 So.2d 57 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) (evidence of exculpatory
mental attitude held properly excluded).
670. 227 So.2d 538, 539 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
671. 238 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 1189 (1971), aff'g 222 So.2d 457
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
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have been elicited from the defendant during the course of a
compulsory mental examination.
In other words, the Court and the State should not in their
inquiry go beyond eliciting the opinion of the expert as to sanity
or insanity . . . however, if the defendant's counsel opens the
inquiry to collateral issues, admissions or guilt, the State's re-
direct examination properly could inquire within the scope
opened by the defense.67s
Another interesting decision by the Supreme Court of Florida in-
volving the defense of insanity is Daniels v. O'Conner.673 In Daniels
the defendant was indicted for rape but was found incompetent to
stand trial under Florida Statutes section 917.01 (1969),111 and was,
therefore, committed to the Florida State Hospital. The defendant at-
tacked the legality of his commitment by a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, alleging that (1) there was no competent evidence upon which
to base the indictment for rape returned against him; and (2) section
917.01 was unconstitutional on due process and equal protection grounds.
The Supreme Court of Florida upheld the statute as constitutional, point-
ing out that section 917.01 was designed to "protect the accused" by
making "sure that he will be able to assist his counsel" in preparing a
defense . 75 The court, refusing to review the facts upon which the grand
jury relied, concluded that whether the defendant was guilty or inno-
cent of the charge was irrelevant; restraint upon the liberty of one ac-
cused of a crime, because he was found to be incompetent, was held not
to be denial of due process.
A judge who adjudicates a defendant incompetent may not commit
the accused to an institution that is not a party to the case. A "proper
institution," as mentioned in criminal rule 1.210(a), is a state hospital
created under chapter 394 of the Florida Statutes. 76
3. ENTRAPMENT
Entrapment may not be asserted as a defense where the defendant
denies that he committed the crime charged.6 77
Entrapment is a question for the jury unless the evidence is so clear
and convincing that it can be passed on by the trial judge as a matter of
law.
678
The defense of entrapment was held to apply in City of Ft. Lauder-
672. Parkin v. State, 238 So.2d 817, 820 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 1189 (1971).
673. 243 So.2d 144 (Fla. 1971).
674. Repealed, Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-339, § 180, because superseded by FLA. R. Came.
P. 1.210.
675. Daniels v. O'Conner, 243 So.2d 144, 147 (Fla. 1971).
676. Dade County v. Baker, 237 So.2d 545 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
677. Pearson v. State, 221 So.2d 760 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
678. State v. Rouse, 239 So.2d 79 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). See also Frady v. State, 235
So.2d 56 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
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dale v. Couts, 79 wherein a police officer telephoned the defendant, sug-
gested that they could have companionship, and thereafter rented a motel
room where the defendant was arrested for offering to commit prostitu-
tion.
In Rouse v. State s0 ° a plainclothes agent who posed as a photog-
rapher was invited into the defendant's truck whereupon he indirectly
asked the defendants to smoke marijuana for purposes of taking a pic-
ture of "somebody sitting on the canal bank smoking marijuana." Pur-
suant to the suggestion, the defendants displayed marijuana cigarettes
and were photographed smoking same. Thereafter they were arrested
for possession. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed
the trial judge's order suppressing the evidence and held that the defense
of entrapment is not available to a defendant who has an intention to
commit a crime, and an officer, acting in good faith for the purpose of
detecting a crime, merely furnishes the opportunity for the commission
of such crime.""
4. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Florida Statutes section 932.05 (1969)82 provides that if an infor-
mation is brought within the two year statute of limitations and it is
dismissed after the two years have elapsed because of a defect, omission
or insufficiency in the contents of form thereof, the state may file an-
other information within three months after the entry of the order
quashing or setting aside the information. In State v. Garcias the
court strictly applied section 932.05 and held that where the initial in-
formation was voluntarily dismissed after the defendants' conviction
had been set aside, which was more than two years after the date the
alleged crime was committed, the state could not file a new information.
In Harris v. State,"s4 the state was allowed to amend its information
after the two year period of limitation by changing the single count of
unlawful sale and possession to two counts, namely (1) unlawful posses-
sion, and (2) unlawful sale. The court allowed the amendment under the
"linkage theory," ' since the amendment did not change the date,
quantum or manner of offenses and did not mislead the defendants.
Where an information is filed within the statutory period but is
nolle prossed solely because the state was not ready to go to trial, a
trial under a second information filed subsequent to the two year period
is barred.686
679. 239 So.2d 874 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), citing Thomas v. State, 185 So.2d 745 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1966).
680. 239 So.2d 79, 80 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
681. See also Frady v. State, 235 So.2d 56 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
682. Transferred and amended, see FLA. STAT. § 915.03 (Supp. 1970).
683. 245 So.2d 293 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
684. 229 So.2d 670 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 237 So.2d 752 (Fla. 1970).
685. See State v. Adjmi, 170 So.2d 340 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
686. State v. Guerra, 245 So.2d 889 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
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There is some question as to when the statute of limitations begins
to run in a larceny case. In State v. Pierce6 87 the Supreme Court of
Florida held that the two year statute begins to run not when the mis-
appropriation occurred, but rather when demand was made upon the
fiduciary to return the funds. The court in Pierce ruled that the statutory
offense of embezzlement was committed when the fiduciary-executor
failed to respond to the probate court's demand for the return of the
funds. The supreme court's decision in Pierce was interpreted by the
District Court of Appeal, First District, in Downing v. Vaine.688 In
Downing the court interpreted the supreme court's holding in Pierce to
mean that the statute of limitations in a larceny case begins to run from
the date that the person having an interest in the fund knows, or by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, should know that there has been a
defalcation. The problem with Downing's interpretation is that, in close
cases, the court is faced with having to determine exactly when a victim
"should have known" that another-in most instances a fiduciary-
has defalcated by converting the victim's funds. Such a determination is
properly a factual question which probably should be determined by the
trier of fact and not the judge hearing a motion to dismiss."' Thus, a
literal interpretation of Pierce, i.e., that the statute of limitations in a
larceny or embezzlement case begins to run when demand is made upon
the fiduciary, may be the better rule. At the time of this writing this
question of law is pending before the appellate courts of Florida in the
case of State v. Larry King.69
XXXIV. RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE" 9'
Throughout this survey reference has been made to specific rules
of procedure whenever the rule was germane to the topic discussed. 92
The rules not already so discussed will be covered here.
In many cases where a statute and a rule of criminal procedure were
identical, the statute has been repealed, and the rule of procedure, which
has superseded the statute, remains as the exclusive statement of law. 93
A. Discovery
The discovery rule, rule 1.220, has been the subject of much litiga-
tion.
687. 201 So.2d 886 (Fla. 1967).
688. 228 So.2d 622 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969), appeal dismissed, 237 So.2d 767 (Fla. 1970).
689. See generally Rouse v. State, 239 So.2d 79 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970); Frady v. State,
235 So.2d 56 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970). (Defense of entrapment is a question for the jury unless
the evidence is so clear and convincing that it can be passed on by the trial judge as a
matter of law.)
690. Case. 71-10512 (Dade Co., Crim. Ct. filed December 20, 1971), appeal filed,
March 27, 1972, Fla. 3d Dist.
691. See note 3 supra.
692. See, e.g., sections I and XXVIII supra.
693. See Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-399, § 180. See note 726 infra.
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1. PRETRIAL DISCOVERY OF STATEMENTS
MADE BY THE DEFENDANT
Rule 1.220(a) (1) provides that the defendant may, prior to trial,
"inspect and copy or photograph the defendant's written or recorded
statements or confessions, if any, whether signed or unsigned." In Dar-
rigo v. State"94 the court held this rule inapplicable to a statement made
by the defendant to agents of the police which was not reduced to a
verbatim statement by the police, but rather was reduced only to in-
formal notes outlining what the defendant had stated. The court char-
acterized such non-verbatim notes as "work product" of the prosecution
and were, therefore, not discoverable as "statements or confessions."
2. PRETRIAL DISCOVERY OF STATEMENTS OF STATE WITNESSES
Although not specifically provided for in rule 1.220, under certain
circumstances the defense may be entitled to pretrial discovery of the
statements of prosecution witnesses. Normally, statements of prosecu-
tion witnesses are not discoverable prior to trial,695 although such state-
ments are available to the defense at trial for purposes of impeachment
under the rule of Jencks v. United States.9 6 However, statements of
prosecution witnesses may be discoverable prior to trial if the following
exceptional circumstances occur: (1) if the accused shows cause to
believe that the state possesses evidence materially favorable to the issue
of guilt or punishment that it refused to reveal to an accused upon re-
quest; and (2) if the accused shows that this evidence cannot be obtained
through the utilization of appropriate portions of the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure or applicable statutes.6 97 The purpose of allowing
such pretrial inspection is to prevent violation of the rule of Brady v.
Maryland,698 which prohibits the state from suppressing evidence which
is favorable to the defense. Thus, both State v. Williams9 9 and State v.
Gillespie7"" require that the evidence sought is material to the ques-
tion of guilt or innocence and is otherwise not discoverable. If the
defense establishes the necessary predicate, the court may, in its discre-
tion, order an in camera inspection of the state's evidence so that it may
review the evidence and decide whether it is properly discoverable prior
to trial.70'
694. 243 So.2d 171 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
695. See State v. Gillespie, 227 So.2d 550 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969); State v. Shouse, 177
So.2d 724 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) ; State v. Drayton, 226 So.2d 469 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
In Gillespie the court stated, "[w]e reaffirm first then, that an accused has no con-
stitutional right to pre-trial discovery." State v. Gillespie, 227 So.2d 550, 554 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1969).
696. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
697. State v. Williams, 227 So.2d 253 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 237 So.2d 180
(Fla. 1970); State v. Gillespie, 227 So.2d 550 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
698. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
699. 227 So.2d 253 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 237 So.2d 180 (Fla. 1970).
700. 227 So.2d 550 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
701. State v. Gillespie, 227 So.2d 550, 557-59 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). See also State v.
Drayton, 226 So.2d 469 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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3. DISCOVERY OF POLYGRAPH TEST RESULTS
In Anderson v. State7 2 the defendant moved for discovery of results
or reports of scientific tests made in connection with the case.70 3 The de-
fense, relying on Brady v. Maryland,70 specifically asked for the results
of a polygraph test performed on a codefendant who had testified against
the defendant. The Supreme Court of Florida upheld the denial of the
request, reasoning that since the polygraph tests are themselves inad-
missible, the results thereof were not subject to pretrial discovery.
4. EXCHANGE OF WITNESS LISTS
Rule 1.220(e) establishes the procedure for an exchange of witness
lists. The rule provides that after the defendant files an offer to ex-
change witness lists, the prosecutor "shall file . . . and furnish to the
person charged, a list of all [prosecution] witnesses . . ." whereupon
the defendant shall reciprocate with a list of defense witnesses. The rule
that has developed is that noncompliance with rule 1.220(e) by the
state does not entitle the defendant to have nonlisted witnesses excluded
from testifying unless it is shown that prejudice resulted from the non-
compliance.7"5 The trial court has discretion to determine whether non-
compliance with rule 1.220(e) will prejudice the defendant, but the
court's discretion can be properly exercised only after the court has
made an adequate inquiry into all the surrounding circumstances.706
Thus, the court must inquire: whether the state's violation of the rule
was inadvertent or willful, whether the violation was trivial or substan-
tial, and what effect, if any, noncompliance had upon the defendant's
ability to prepare for trial.7 7 The circumstances establishing nonprejudice
to the defendant must affirmatively appear in the record, or the trial
court's discretion in allowing in the testimony of nonlisted witnesses
will be considered an abuse of discretion.708
When the defendant invokes rule 1.220(e) and later fails to comply
with it, it has been held that the exclusion of his nonlisted witnesses was
not an abuse of judicial discretion and did not constitute a denial of the
sixth amendment right to call witnesses.70 9 Also, the court's refusal to
702. 241 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1970).
703. See FLA. R. Cam. P. 1.220(b).
704. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See notes 404 and 698 supra and accompanying text.
705. Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1971), modifying 233 So.2d 868 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1970); Salamone v. State, 247 So.2d 780 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971); White v. State, 243
So.2d 627 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971); Ramirez v. State, 241 So.2d 744 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970);
Howard v. State, 239 So.2d 83 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970); Buttler v. State, 238 So.2d 313 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1970) ; Rhome v. State, 222 So.2d 431 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). Contra, Rouse v. State,
243 So.2d 225 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). For an example of a case wherein the noncompliance
was not prejudicial see Miranda v. State, 237 So.2d 228 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
706. Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1971); Salamone v. State, 247 So.2d 780
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1971); Ramirez v. State, 241 So.2d 744 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
707. Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1971); Salamone v. State, 247 So.2d 780
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1971); Ramirez v. State, 241 So.2d 744 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
708. Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1971).
709. Cacciatore v. State, 226 So.2d 137 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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permit the defendant to call as witnesses police officers who had been
listed by the state but not called by the state, has been upheld as not an
abuse of discretion.71° Obviously, the "harmless error" rule of Richard-
son v. State711 should apply to the defendant's noncompliance with
1.220(e) as well as to the state's.
In State v. Jones712 the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of an information on the grounds that
the state's failure to keep records or memoranda reflecting the location or
whereabouts of witnesses who were used by the state as informants was
in derogation of the defendant's right to a fair trial.
B. Motion to Dismiss
Rule 1.190 pertains to a motion to dismiss. Under rule 1.190(c) (4),
the defendant may move to dismiss the indictment or information on the
grounds that there are no material disputed facts and the undisputed
facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt. When ruling on such a
motion, it is proper for the judge to consider the bill of particulars as
well as the indictment or information itself.713
Rule 1.190(b)(1) provides that all defenses available to a defen-
dant, other than not guilty shall be made by motion to dismiss. Rule
1.190(c) establishes the time within which a motion to dismiss must be
made. 1.190(c) (4) provides that the court may "at any time" entertain
a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy. The failure to raise the
defense of double jeopardy in the form of a motion to dismiss during
the proceedings has been held to be a waiver of that defense.'
C. New Trial
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.640(a) provides that when a
new trial has been granted, it shall proceed as if there were no former
trial except that
when an offense is divided into degrees or the charge includes a
lesser offense, and the defendant has been found guilty of a
lesser degree or lesser included offense, he cannot thereafter
be prosecuted for a higher degree of the same offense or for a
higher offense than that of which he was convicted.
In State v. Miller71 5 the above rule was held not to preclude the imposi-
tion of a more severe sentence (death) after retrial of a first degree
murder conviction which had resulted in a life sentence.1 6
710. Powers v. State, 224 So.2d 411 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969) (a poor result in the authors'
opinion).
711. 246 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1971).
712. 247 So.2d 342 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
713. State v. Davis, 243 So.2d 587 (Fla. 1971), aff'g 234 So.2d 713 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
714. Robinson v. State, 239 So.2d 282 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
715. 231 So.2d 260 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 238 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1970).
716. It would seem that the Supreme Court's decision in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
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Generally, a motion for a new trial is a prerequisite to an appeal
based on the insufficiency of the evidence.717 It has been held, however,
that the mere filing of such a motion is not sufficient; the court must
rule thereon (i.e., deny the motion) before an appeal based on insqffi-
ciency of evidence will lie. 18 In Owens v. State,"' the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, held that a motion for a directed verdict at the
close of all the evidence would give the defendant standing to appeal the
sufficiency of evidence notwithstanding the defendant's failure to move
for a new trial. This case was reviewed by the Supreme Court of Florida
in State v. Owens,7 20 wherein the court reiterated that a motion for a new
trial is a prerequisite to an appeal based on insufficiency of evidence in
all criminal cases except those where the defendant is sentenced to death.
D. Severance721
Although it is generally held that it is within the discretion of the
trial judge to grant a severance, the supreme court in State v. Talavera
722
held that a severance shall be granted pursuant to rule 1.190(j) when
one of several codefendants files a bona fide motion based on necessity
rather than mere convenience. The motion should: (1) show the exculpa-
tory nature of the testimony to be elicited from a codefendant; (2) be
accompanied by some assurance that the codefendant is willing to testify;
(3) set out the facts indicating that the codefendant would not be willing
to testify at a joint trial; and (4) clearly indicate that the testimony
sought from the codefendant is relevant, material, competent and non-
cumulative.
E. Continuance
Rule 1.190(g) (2) provides that the court "may in its discretion for
good cause shown grant a continuance."
It has been held that a continuance is not mandatory simply because
the trial was conducted the same day the information was filed.as It has,
however, been held that it is error to deny a continuance when the defen-
dant alleges that a witness who could establish the defense of entrapment
was removed from the jurisdiction by the state.?U Thus, if it is shown
U.S. 711 (1969) would prohibit such a result. See notes 316-20 supra and accompanying
text.
717. See generally State v. Wright, 224 So.2d 300 (Fla. 1969).
718. Melkun v. State, 244 So.2d 145 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971) (defendant filed a motion for
new trial but the judge failed to rule thereon; held, appeal precluded). In essence, this case
penalizes the defendant for the court's failure to act on a filed motion. It is, therefore, in
the authors' judgment, a manifestly unjust result.
719. 227 So.2d 241 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
720. 233 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1970), citing State v. Wright, 224 So.2d 300 (Fla. 1969).
721. See notes 147-155 supra and accompanying text. See also FLA. R. Cmis. P. 1.190(j).
722. 243 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1971).
723. Jernigan v. State, 228 So.2d 273 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1029 (1970).
724. Thomas v. State, 243 So.2d 200 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
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that prejudice will result from the denial of a continuance, the continu-
ance should be granted
25
XXXV. LEGISLATION
During the biennium there was much legislative activity in the area
of criminal law and procedure, much of it dealing with somewhat minor
changes in the wording of a statute. Therefore, this analysis will, of
necessity, be selective.
As was mentioned periodically throughout this survey, in many cases
where there was duplication between a statute and a rule of criminal
procedure, the statute was repealed and superseded by the rule.7 26 Florida
Laws 1970, chapter 70-339, renumbered and amended certain sections of
chapters 901 through 932 of the 1969 Florida Statutes. It is therefore
advisable to check the 1970 Supplement to the Florida Statutes for the
revised "Criminal Procedure Law.
'727
The statutes dealing with the regulation of bail bondsmen have been
transferred to chapter 648 of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1970).728
Florida Statutes section 27.015 (Supp. 1970) has been added,729
providing that all state attorneys are prohibited from the private practice
of law. Also, Florida Statutes section 27.255 (Supp. 1970)780 provides
that investigators employed by the state attorney may serve arrest war-
rants and search warrants and may carry a weapon.
Florida Statutes section 27.52 (Supp. 1970) establishes the method
of determining insolvency. Subsection (2) (a)7"' provides that there is a
725. Cf. Jernigan v. State, 228 So.2d 273 (Fla. 1969) (concurring opinion).
726. See Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-339, § 180, repealing the following sections of the 1969
Florida Statutes: 901.03, 901.05, 901.13, 902.01, 902.02, 902.03, 902.04, 902.05, 902.06,
902.07, 902.08, 902.09, 902.10, 902.11, 902.12, 902.13, 902.14, 902.18, 903.01, 903.04,
903.07, 903.12, 903.13, 903.19, 903.23, 903.24, 903.25, 904.01, 904.02, 906.01, 906.02,
906.03, 906.04, 906.05, 906.06, 906.07, 906.08, 906.09, 906.10, 906.11, 906.12, 906.13,
906.14, 906.15, 906.16, 906.17, 906.18, 906.20, 906.21, 906.23, 906.24, 906.25, 906.26,
906.27, 906.28, 906.29, 907.01, 907.02, 907.03, 908.01, 908.02, 908.03, 909.01, 909.02,
909.03, 909.05, 909.06, 909.07, 909.08, 909.09, 909.10, 909.11, 909.12, 909.13, 909.14,
909.15, 909.16, 909.17, 909.19, 909.20, 909.22, 911.01, 911.02, 911.03, 911.04, 911.05,
911.06, 911.07, 911.08, 911.09, 911.10, 912.01, 913.01, 913.02, 913.04, 913.05, 913.06,
913.07, 913.09, 913.11, 914.01, 916.02, 916.03, 916.04, 916.05, 916.06, 916.07, 916.08,
917.01, 917.02, 918.01, 918.02, 918.08, 918.09, 919.01, 919.02, 919.03, 919.04, 919.05,
919.06, 919.07, 919.08, 919.09, 919.10, 919.11, 919.12, 919.13, 919.14, 919.15, 919.16,
919.17, 919.18, 919.19, 919.20, 919.21, 919.22, 920.01, 920.03, 920.04, 920.05, 920.06,
920.07, 920.08, 920.09, 921.01, 921.02, 921.025, 921.03, 921.04, 921.05, 921.06, 921.07,
921.08, 921.10, 921.11, 921.13, 921.14, 921.17, 921.19, 921.24, 921.25, 922.01, 922.03,
922.05, 922.13, 924.01, 924.10, 924.11, 924.12, 924.13, 924.21, 924.23, 924.24, 924.25,
924.26, 924.27, 924.29, 924.30, 924.32, 924.36, 924.39, 924.40, 925.04, 932.08, 932.09,
932.10, and 932.11 (1969).
727. Chapters 900 through 925 are to be cited as the "Criminal Procedure Law." See
FLA. STAT. § 900.01 (Supp. 1970).
728. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-339, § 177.
729. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-79, § 1.
730. Created by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-275, § 1.
731. Created by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-57, § 1.
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presumption of solvency, and that the defendant has the burden of rebut-
ting the presumption by competent proof. Section 27.52(b) and (c)
(Supp. 1970) set out a list of factors which establish a prima facie case
of solvency. Among the items on the list are: if the defendant has $300
cash, if the defendant has been released on bail in the amount of $1,500
or more, and if the defendant makes more than $75 per week gross (if
no dependants).
Florida Statutes chapter 372 (Supp. 1970), the "Game and Fresh
Water Fish Law," has new sections conferring powers of arrest upon
game wardens; 73 2 providing for seizure of property and up to five years
imprisonment for poaching alligators; 733  and prohibiting the sale of
alligator products and making possession of same in a place of business a
misdemeanor. 3
Florida Statutes chapter 784 (1969), dealing with assault and bat-
tery, has been reworded, 735 and a section has been added making aggra-
vated battery an offense punishable by up to two years imprisonment.736
Florida Statutes section 811.30 (Supp. 1970) 717 has been added,
making larceny of any firearm a felony.
Florida Statutes chapter 814 (Supp. 1970) '73 is the new "Auto
Theft Statute," and it provides that: possession of a motor vehicle known
to be stolen is a felony; 7 9 second and subsequent offenses carry enhanced
penalties; unauthorized temporary use of an auto is a misdemeanor;
741
theft of parts from an auto may be a felony or misdemeanor depending
on value of parts taken; 742 and the driver's license of any person con-
victed of an offense under chapter 814 shall be automatically revoked.
The statute also specifies acts which constitute prima facie evidence of
an intent to deprive the owner of his property. 7 3 One of the acts so speci-
732. FLA. STAT. § 372.071 (Supp. 1970), created by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-396, § 1.
733. FLA. STAT. § 372.663 (Supp. 1970), created by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-1, § 1.
734. FLA. STAT. § 372.6645 (Supp. 1970), created by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-3, § 1.
A similar act was upheld as constitutional in A.E. Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d
182, 264 N.E.2d 118, 315 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1970), appeal dismissed sub nom. Reptile Products
Ass'n v. Diamond, 401 U.S. 969 (1971).
For a case dealing with the scope of the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission's
power, see Whitehead v. State, 223 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1969) (rule of Game and Fresh Water
Fish Commission providing open season on hunting between fixed dates controls over
Florida statutes proscribing use of firearms on Sunday).
735. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-88, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 784.02 and 784.03 (1969).
736. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-63, § 1, creating FLA. STAT. § 784.045 (Supp. 1970).
737. Created by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-350, § 1.
738. Created by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-19 and ch. 70-289, amended by Fla. Laws 1971,
ch. 71-342, which provides that the provisions of chapter 814 also apply to the theft of air-
craft, boats and boat motors.
739. FLA. STAT. § 814.03(2) (Supp. 1970), created by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-19, § 1.
740. FLA. STAT. § 814.03(4) (Supp. 1970), created by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-19, § 1.
741. FLA. STAT. § 814.04 (Supp. 1970), created by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-19, § 1.
742. FLA. STAT. § 814.03 (Supp. 1970), created by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-19, § 1.
743. Fr. STAT. § 814.06 (Supp. 1970), created by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-19, § 1.
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fled is the failure to return to a rental or leased motor vehicle within 72
hours after due date.744
Chapter 870 of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1970)"11 gives municipal
and county authorities the power to declare emergencies whenever there
exists a clear and present danger of a riot or other general public disorder.
Whenever a state of emergency is declared to exist, it is unlawful to sell,
display, or publicly possess a firearm.746 The statute also authorizes the
establishment of curfews, the prohibition of the sale of alcohol, and the
prohibition of the sale of gasoline.747
There has been significant legislation in the area of drug abuse.
Chapter 397 of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1970)748 provides for the
rehabilitation of drug dependents. Under the statute, a person may apply
to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Service for drug depen-
dence treatment. However, such person may not be confined in any
facility, including penal facilities, against his will.749 The fee for treat-
ment varies according to the person's ability to pay.75° Florida Laws
1971, chapter 71-222, further develops chapter 397 and provides inter
alia for the licensing and regulation of drug abuse treatment and educa-
tion centers.
Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-107, 71 transfers the regulation of
cannabis from chapter 398 to chapter 404 and provides that possession or
delivery (without consideration) of less than five grams of cannabis is a
misdemeanor.
Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-262,752 defines "narcotic drug" as
Cocoa leaves, opium, isonipecaine, cannabis and every sub-
stance neither chemically nor physically distinguishable from
them, and any and all derivatives of same, and any other drug
to which the narcotics laws of the United States apply. [em-
phasis added]
A major revision and reclassification of criminal penalties was effec-
tuated by Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-136."' 8 The statute provides
that every offense which is punishable by death or imprisonment in the
state penitentiary is a felony, and that all offenses not a felony are mis-
demeanors.754 The statute (a) classifies felonies as either a (1) capital
744. FLA. STAT. § 814.06(5) (Supp. 1970), created by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-19, § 1.
745. Created by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-990, §§ 1-9.
746. FLA. STAT. § 870.044 (Supp. 1970), created by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-990, §§ 4-5.
747. FLA. STAT. § 870.045 (Supp. 1970), created by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-990, §§ 4-6.
748. Created by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-183.
749. FLA. STAT. § 397.041(5) (Supp. 1970), created by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-183, § 3.
750. FLA. STAT. § 397.051(3) (Supp. 1970), created by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-183, § 4.
751. Adding FLA. STAT. §§ 404.01(12), 404.15.
752. Amending FLA. STAT. § 398.02.
753. Amending FLA. STAT. § 775.08 (1969) ; adding §§ 775.081, 775.082, 775.083, 775.084;
repealing §§ 775.05-.10 and § 104.40 (1969).
754. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-136, § 1, amending Fla. Stat. § 775.08 (1969).
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felony, (2) first degree felony, (3) second degree felony, and (4) third
degree felony; and (b) classifies misdemeanors as either (1) first degree
misdemeanors, or (2) second degree misdemeanors. 755 Each classification
carries a corresponding maximum penalty.7r6 The statute goes on to
amend the hundreds of criminal penalty sections of the Florida Statutes
so that they will conform to the classifications and penalties adopted by
chapter 71-136.
Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-30,757 provides that shoplifting is
one of the enumerated larcenies of chapter 811.
Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-66,/ makes it unlawful for any per-
son to disclose testimony given before a grand jury and provides for cer-
tain exceptions.
Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-115 7r9 designed to "encourage and
contribute to the rehabilitation of felons," provides that a person shall
not be disqualified from employment by the state or its agencies or
political subdivisions (except law enforcement agencies) solely because
of a prior conviction of a felony. It provides further that a person whose
civil rights have been restored may not be disqualified from any practice,
trade or profession requiring a permit solely because of a prior conviction
of a felony, unless that felony directly relates to the position, trade or
practice.
Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-1 10,760 deals with eligibility for pa-
role and provides that: inmates who have been sentenced to five years or
less shall be interviewed by a number of the parole commission within
six months of the initial date of confinement; those sentenced to more
than five years shall be interviewed by a member of the commission
within one year after the initial date of confinement; and that those in-
mates convicted of a capital crime shall be interviewed at the discretion
of the parole commission. The act further provides that the inmate shall
be advised within 30 days of an interview of the decision of the commis-
sion and that subsequent to the initial interview, the inmate shall be
interviewed for parole at periodic intervals, not less often than annually.
Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-239, 711 makes it a misdemeanor of
the second degree for a person to deposit litter in a public place.
Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-318,'62 restricts the class of con-
victed felons who will be allowed to possess firearms to those whose civil
rights have been restored.
Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-310,71 provides that willfully and
755. FIa. Laws 1971, ch. 71-136, § 2, adding FLA. STAT. § 775.081.
756. Fa. Laws 1971, ch. 71-136, § 3, adding FLA. STAT. § 775.082.
757. Amending FLA. STAT. § 811.021(1) (1969).
758. Creating FLA. STAT. §§ 905.27(2),(3),(4).
759. Creating FLA. STAT. § 112.011.
760. Amending FLA. STAT. § 947.16(1) (1969).
761. Creating FLA. STAT. § 403.63(1).
762. Amending FLA. STAT. § 790.23(2) (1969).
763. Amending FLA. STAT. § 822.18 (1969).
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maliciously damaging property of another shall constitute a misdemeanor
of the first degree or, if the damage exceeds $200, a felony of the third
degree.
Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-33 7,?64 amends the obscenity law
(chapter 847) by providing more severe penalties for second and subse-
quent offenders and by adding a new subsection providing criminal
penalties for a person who knowingly promotes, conducts, performs or
participates in an obscene, lewd, lascivious or indecent show, exhibition
or performance done before a live audience.
Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-72,765 repealed the statute prohibiting
convicted perjurers from testifying in court proceedings and allows the
fact of prior conviction for perjury to be submitted in evidence for pur-
poses of impeaching a witness.
Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-99,66 rephrased the statute granting
immunity from criminal prosecution to persons required to testify or
produce documents in certain specified proceedings.
764. Amending FLA. STAT. §§ 847.011(1) (a) (2)(3) (1969) and creating FLA. STAT.
§ 847.011(4).
765. Repealing FiA. STAT. § 90.07 (1969) and amending FLA. STAT. § 90.08 (1969).
766. Amending Fa. STAT. § 914.04 (1969).
